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Over the past few decades, precarity and insecurity have increased for many 
workers. However, a constellation of recent events—most centrally the 2016 election of 
Donald Trump as President of the United States—has brought attention to a particular 
group of workers: white, working-class men in rural America. This dissertation joins a 
large body of sociological literature in exploring the lives of working-class men, although 
with a focus on rural place. Based upon life history interviews with 61 working-class men 
from northwestern Pennsylvania, I investigate the state of working-class men in rural 
America today. 
First, I explore the declining labor force participation rate among prime-age, 
working-class men, which is near its lowest point on record. While virtually all the men 
in this study were in the labor force at the time of the interview, a closer examination of 
their lifetime labor force histories show a pattern of what I term chronic churning, in 
which men leave the labor force for extended periods but almost always return and often 
persist in formal employment. 
Second, I explore how men do—and do not—seek to improve their labor market 
prospects in three domains: upskilling, geographic mobility, and occupational flexibility. 
I find that men are often doing more to improve their labor market position than existing 
accounts allow.  
Third, I examine these men’s jobs, both the “good jobs” that pay at least $15 an 
hour and the jobs that pay less. The good jobs are mostly in traditional, blue-collar 
occupations and industries; often unionized; and sometimes professional or managerial. 
Dynamics of the lower-wage labor market include lateral moves among comparable jobs, 
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few clear-line paths of wage improvement, and wages that stagnate between $10 and $15 
an hour. 
Fourth, I explore how working-class men craft their identities in a labor market 
where jobs are often unfulfilling, poorly-paid, and precarious. I find that men ask both 
more and less of work, which both reflect less attachment to one’s job. They ask more in 
the sense that men care about the nature of their work and are less willing to countenance 
work that is not personally fulfilling or at least tolerable, especially if poorly paid. Men 
ask less of work in the sense that many men have deemphasized the role of work in their 
identities. Men have what I call vocational selves, in which they find meaning and 
fulfillment in non-work pursuits. I also find a unique contentment among these men that I 
attribute to a set of subcultural beliefs and practices grounded in rural masculinity. These 
beliefs provide a sense of stability but also constrain how men approach work.  
Finally, I explore the political implications of the current state of working-class 
men. Regarding the 2016 election, most men were reluctant about Trump but saw Clinton 
as even less acceptable. Men have grievances that are more in line with political but not 
economic populism, yet I suggest that the deep stories of the political right and left can be 
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All projects are personal, but some are more personal than others. The formal 
beginning of this project can be traced back to my applications to doctoral programs, 
when I used my personal statement to ask, “How are workers today, especially those with 
limited educations, faring in their quest for dignified work with decent pay?” In 
particular, I wrote that I was interested in exploring this question among low-income men 
living in small towns and rural communities. As it happened, that is largely what this 
dissertation is about. 
But the true origins of this project go all the way back to my upbringing in rural 
Pennsylvania, which is perhaps why this topic was not easily abandoned. As the product 
of a low-income, working-class family in rural America, I have always been aware of 
social class, even when I did not have the language for it. I saw how my Dad worked hard 
but failed to get ahead, and visits back home over the years have always left me curious 
about how those who live there make a living. This dissertation, at least in part, is my 
attempt to find out. 
My decision to apply to Johns Hopkins was born at the ASA Annual Meeting in 
New York City in 2013. Having long equivocated about going back to school, I finally 
committed to the process and used the ASA meeting to reacquaint myself with Sociology 
and steal time with scholars I hoped to work with. I approached Kathy Edin (then at 
Harvard) after a session and delivered—probably in a fog—my elevator pitch. Given my 
interests, she said, I should look at the work of Andy Cherlin at Johns Hopkins. And by 
the way, she added, she and her husband Tim would soon be leaving Harvard for 
Hopkins as well. I still applied widely to programs, but Hopkins always had the pole 
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position. In fact, during a campus visit at another program, I shared in a one-on-one 
faculty meeting that one of my options was working with Kathy at Hopkins, to which that 
scholar replied, “Definitely go to Hopkins.” I have never for a moment regretted the 
decision to attend Hopkins, thanks in large part to the mentorship of Kathy and Andy, 
who have been every bit as supportive as I could have hoped when I first approached 
Kathy at ASA.  
Kathy, it has always seemed to me supremely lucky—perhaps providential—that 
I decided to go back to school just as you and Tim were making the move to Hopkins. 
The fact I got to work with you—first on $2.00 A Day and then of a variety of projects, 
some of which are bearing fruit this very Spring—has been the highlight of my Hopkins 
experience. I have appreciated our shared interest in policy and connection around 
matters of faith. Thank you also for your support of my interest in teaching, especially 
letting me co-teach the Social Policy Senior Seminar. It is quite a testimony that you are 
every bit the kind and generous person as you are a scholar, which is saying a lot.  
Andy, thank you for stepping in as my primary advisor and not missing a beat. 
You always had time for me when I needed it, and I have appreciated your measured and 
thoughtful demeanor when reviewing my work or setting timelines. Thank you for the 
many letters of recommendation, both as my advisor and as department chair. Thank you 
for trusting my instincts on some things, like going on the job market, and gently 
redirecting me when that was called for. My first semester, my family and I drove up to 
your place for the annual department welcome event, but because President Obama was 
in town, traffic delayed us so much that we arrived as some guests were starting to leave. 
I fondly remember my wife and I sitting with you and Cynthia while our son played. 
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While still at LSA, I remember Cynthia once telling me something about her husband 
being a well-known sociologist. Who knew then that years later you’d end up advising 
my dissertation? 
My other committee members are incredibly important parts of this journey as 
well. Thank you all for your attention, thoughts, and time. 
Although never my advisor, Stefanie DeLuca was a fixture during my years at 
Hopkins as co-director of the Poverty and Inequality Research Lab (PIRL), of which I 
was often an absentee member. I have never been as inspired at Hopkins as when I heard 
Stefanie talk about her work—and about the work we all do as sociologists. We also 
bonded over coming from working-class backgrounds, and I’ll remember the sushi lunch 
we shared to talk about nothing in particular. If my career could have a fraction of the 
impact on the world as hers, I’d call it a success. PIRL is in good hands. 
Meredith Greif and Julia Burdick-Will joined the Hopkins faculty right around the 
time I arrived, and they were both regular participants in our weekly PIRL lunches. They 
both had ample opportunity to comment on my work in various stages of disarray, and I 
thank them for their insight, prodding, and patience. And thanks to Meredith for the 
syllabus to her housing and homelessness class, a version of which I hope to teach 
someday, and for her role on my dissertation committee. 
Thanks to Tim Nelson. Although we never found a good religion project to 
collaborate on, I am glad that my modest support of the child support work is beginning 
to bear fruit. I appreciate your knack for theory and love of teaching. I’ll be a better 
teacher for having been your TA. 
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I am grateful to all the Hopkins faculty with whom I’ve interacted, in ways big 
and small: Rina, Emily, Joel, Ryan, Lingxin, Ho-Fung, Mike, Katrina, Steve, and 
Beverly. I look forward to continuing as colleagues. Special thanks to Karl Alexander, 
Professor Emeritus but Department Chair when I applied, for his kindness and hospitality 
on my visit that helped convince me Hopkins was for me. 
Thanks to the Hopkins staff: Terri Thomas, Megan Prior, Linda Burkhardt, and 
Jessie Albee. You were each supremely helpful with all manner of things during my time 
at Hopkins and endlessly patient with my many requests for information. We’re evidence 
that—under the right circumstances—Ravens and Steelers fans can work together! 
Thanks to all the PIRLies with whom I overlapped. A huge thanks to Anna 
Rhodes, Elizabeth Talbert, Eva Rosen, and Phil Garboden, the elder stateswomen and 
man who blazed the trail ahead of me, continually available to demystify grad school and 
the academic world. To the PIRLies who came after me, including Jennifer Cossyleon, 
Christine Jang, Rachel Butler, Rhiannon Miller, Kiara Nerenberg, Jochebed Cadet, and 
Joseph Boselovic, thank you for your encouragement and friendships. And to Holly 
Koogler (you’re both before and after me in different ways), I have enjoyed our many 
conversations—on the MARC and elsewhere—about work, school, life, and kids. 
Allison Young gets her own special thanks for being on this journey with me from 
our campus visit in early 2014. I have spent as much time with you as any Hopkins 
student, and I’m the better for it. I’m glad our families have also been able to share so 
many meals over the years. Perhaps you’ll join us in the Pacific Northwest! 
Thanks to the two non-Allison members of my cohort at Hopkins: Rishi 
Awatramani and Zhicao Fang. Our interests are divergent as can be, but in the wisdom of 
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Hopkins, we got to learn from one another. I’m not sure I ever had anything valuable to 
say about your work, but thanks for your support of my work, which you had to read far 
too many times. I look forward to seeing where life takes each of you. And thanks to the 
other Hopkins graduate students with whom I shared a coffee, a class, or a conversation, 
including Sam Agarwal, Alvin Camba, Valentina Dallona, Yige Dong, Stephanie 
D’Souza, Conrad Jacober, Ricado Jacobs, Minhyoung Kang, Guowei Liang, Anne-Marie 
Livingstone, Shirley Lung, Charlie Mitchell, Sonal Sharma, Dan Thompson, Smriti 
Upadhyay, Yifeng Wan, and Xiao Yu. 
My graduate student experience has been as much about networks outside of 
Hopkins as inside. To my colleagues from the 2015 Penn Sumer Institute on Inequality—
Jasmine, Gregg, LesLeigh, Hope, Marisela, Phil, Rayven, Pedro, and Carla—it’s been so 
nice to have you as a virtual cohort as we’ve moved through the PhD process together. 
You were among the first to hear the earliest versions of this project. And thanks to Tom 
Segrue and John Skrentny for bringing such an amazing group together. 
Thanks to Janette Dill for her collaboration, the fruits of which played an 
important role in moving this dissertation forward. Thanks as well to Rachel Anderson, 
Bill Horne, Michele Kozimor-King, and Darren Slade for opportunities to write, the fruits 
of which also played a role in this project. And thanks to Monica Prasad for the invitation 
to attend the Problem-Solving Sociology Workshop, where I presented this work and 
further expanded my network to include Joe Cohen, Savannah Hunter, and Benjamin 
Shestakofsky, among others. And thanks to Lincoln Groves for friendship, as well as for 
his endless patience and encouragement during our many conversations about my work.  
ix 
 
I am thankful to my friends and colleagues at the various professional associations 
that I have been part of during my graduate school experience. I have presented some part 
of this dissertation at ASA, DCSS, PSA, and SSSP. Perhaps the best decision I made in 
grad school was to attend my first Rural Sociological Society meeting in Toronto in 
2016. Thanks to the many fabulous colleagues there who welcomed me as a peer from 
that very first moment and beyond, including Jared Friesen, Pierce Greenberg, Michael 
Lotspeich, Shannon Monnat, Lisa Pruitt, Rayna Sage, Lizzy Seale, and Emily Wornell. 
RSS and the Program on Social Inequality at Johns Hopkins deserves special recognition 
for financial support of this project. 
To my colleagues on the ASA Task Force on First Generation and Working-Class 
People in Sociology, thank you for treating me as an equal and for all the job market 
advice over the past year. I’m excited for the work we still have to do together. 
I am grateful to Janine DeWitt and the sociology faculty at Marymount 
University, where I was fortunate to teach and in whose library I wrote large portions of 
this project. 
And thanks goes to the many sociologists and scholars who were formative in 
other chapters of my education: Dean Arnold, Alex Boylanatz, Robby Jones, Jim 
Mathisen, Lisa McMinn, Omar McRoberts, Alvaro Nieves, Chris Smith, and Dorian 
Warren. Special thanks to Chad Cyrenne of the MAPSS Program at the University of 
Chicago for the invaluable help in gaining admission to graduate school, without which 
none of this would have happened. 
The topic of this dissertation grows directly from my family biography, which 
starts with my Mom. Thanks goes to her—while she still might not know exactly what I 
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do, she has always supported me over the years. Her role was more than just moral 
support—she played an integral role in making this happen by switching places with me 
for weeks at a time so I could do fieldwork and not leave my wife completely on her 
own. At least it gave you all that time with your grandson! I only wish my Dad were here 
to read these words, but I take comfort knowing he’d be proud. His four kids have two 
PhD’s, four master’s, and four bachelor’s degrees among them—not bad for being “just” 
a high school graduate. 
For Holden, it’s crazy to think you were born the January before I started at 
Hopkins, and now you’re on the verge of kindergarten. Virtually your whole life to this 
point has been lived with me working on this single project. Your Mom and I will always 
remember when you once told us, “Mom goes to work; Dad goes to coffee shops.” I look 
forward to the days when you’re old enough to better understand what Dad was doing all 
those hours in coffee shops and libraries and trips back up in Pennsylvania. You have 
always been fascinated with manual labor, which strikes a chord with this project. As of 
this writing, you still love construction and want to be a builder at a time when many of 
your peers have moved on to super heroes and Star Wars. One of my biggest regrets is 
that you’ll never get to woodwork with Grandpa Gary, but maybe I can suffice as a stand-
in someday. It’s ironic that my own opportunity to transcend my working-class roots 
through education means you’ll be one step removed from them. I hope you will always 
see the value of those who build, drive, repair, serve, and make, whatever you decide to 
do. I love you. 
Finally, Yvette has been on this life journey with me for over ten years. Little did 
she know what she was getting into when we shared that cup of coffee at Starbucks in 
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Manhattan back in 2007. Thank you for your support at every step of the way. You 
supported my desire to go back to school in my late thirties, leaving a good job in DC in 
the process; you gave me space to apply to schools around the country, even if you 
weren’t excited about some of the options; you supported me choosing Hopkins, even 
though it meant more time far away from your family; and you made it work when I had 
stretches of fieldwork in Maryland and then Pennsylvania, managing fulltime work and a 
baby at home so I could stay on track. I’m so glad our next step will take us back home 
for you, if for no other reason than as a well-deserved reward for your patience and faith 











For Dad, who showed me the dignity of work, 
and for Holden, who should be whatever he wants 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
A constellation of events over the past few years—including the 
methamphetamine and opioid crises (Rigg and Monnat 2015; Rigg, Monnat, and Chavez 
2018); the rise in so-called “deaths of despair” among non-Hispanics whites (Case and 
Deaton 2017; Monnat and Brown 2017); and the election of Donald Trump as President 
of the United States (Francis 2018; Monnat 2016)—have brought national attention to a 
group previously overlooked: rural, working-class men. While working-class men of all 
stripes face labor market challenges, rural men lag behind their urban counterparts in 
several key employment indicators, including labor force participation and employment 
(Jensen and Jensen 2011). Despite recent gains in manufacturing employment, the reality 
is that the peak years of the U.S. industrial plant are so far in the past that a whole 
generation of young men has come of age for whom there was never a promise of a 
secure, well-paying life on the line.1 Anthropologist Kathryn Dudley wrote in 1994 that 
the closure of a plant might be the closest thing America has to a national ritual to mark 
the slow death of the days when a full-time, blue-collar job was a path to the middle class 
for less-educated workers (Dudley 1994). A man born in 1988—the year the Chrysler 
plant closed in Kenosha, Wisconsin, about which Dudley was writing—would be in his 
early thirties today. The virtue of work has long been part of the American ethos 
(Ellwood 1988), and the ability to provide for one’s family has long been linked to 
working class-masculinity (Cherlin 2014; Lamont 2000; Sherman 2009). Yet what are 
                                                 
1 While US manufacturing in 2018 had its largest job gain in 20 years (Franck 2019), manufacturing still 
makes up just 8.5% of US employment, down from 30% in 1950 (Kotkin 2018). 
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men to do in a world where the availability of manual occupations that provide stable 
work with good wages are in short supply? 
One answer to this question seems to be that some men are eschewing work 
altogether. The labor force participation rate2—those who are working or actively seeking 
work—among prime-age men (ages 25-54) has dropped from 98 percent in the mid-
1950s to 89.5 in March of 2019. This decrease in labor force participation has been 
greater among the so-called working class—those with less than a four-year college 
degree—who are less likely than their college-educated peers to be in the labor market 
(Council of Economic Advisors 2016; Eberstadt 2016). By one estimate, there are 10 
million prime-age men “missing” from the labor force today who would be working if 
work rates had held at year 2000 levels (Eberstadt 2016). Yet while this phenomenon is 
well-documented, less is known about why men are choosing to leave the labor force, 
especially for extended periods of time. Even if it turns out that some of these men 
working in less traditional ways (Sugie 2018), that still represents a significant departure 
from the behaviors of working-class men from past generations, the implications of 
which should be more fully understood. 
This dissertation, “Left Behind? Working-Class Men in Rural America”, explores 
the labor force expectations and experiences of this younger generation of working-class 
men, including the decision of some to leave the labor force entirely. Using in-depth 
interviews with 61 younger, working-class men from rural Pennsylvania, I explore how 
men seek, find, keep, and lose work in the twenty-first century. Yet while this project has 
                                                 
2 This measure will be further explained later in the Introduction and also in Chapter 2. 
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a singular focus on younger, working-class men in rural America, there is also great 
diversity within these cases, which allow for contrasts and comparisons. The men in this 
study represent occupational heterogeneity, everything from law enforcement officers to 
drug dealers, teachers to truck drivers, contractors to direct care staff. These 61 men have 
worked in dozens of occupations and hundreds of jobs collectively over their lives, 
allowing important insight into the diverse trajectories and outcomes across these cases. 
There is also diversity in the work status of these men: there are those who have always 
worked, and those with significant gaps in employment, including some men currently 
out of the labor force. This diversity of occupations and work statuses allows an 
exploration—not just of those who have struggled—but those who have managed to do 
well. There is also a diversity of family structures among the men in this study, which 
sets it apart from recent work only concerned with men who have children (Cooper 2014; 
Edin and Nelson 2013; Pugh 2015). Among the men in this study are many who are 
single and childless, some who are married with children, and many who have more 
complex family situations that include blended families, multiple partner fertility, and 
various arrangements with custodial and noncustodial children. 
Work is a central aspect of life, a primary source of meaning, and an obvious 
means of support, so understanding the work lives—including the decision to leave the 
formal labor force—of working-class men is of utmost consequence. And given the 
changing nature of work and the likelihood of even greater disruption of the working 
classes due to automation and other forces (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006), 
understanding the labor force experience, including the decision to leave the work force 
entirely, is of utmost importance, especially among groups that are already at a 
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significant disadvantage in the transforming economy. With this dissertation, I hope to 
shed light on one corner of the twenty-first century labor market—that of younger, 
working-class men in rural America. In so doing, I hope to spur future scholarship of 
work and nonwork among the various populations and communities, which is imperative 
for the nation’s economic future and any attempts to address questions of poverty, 
inequality, work, and community. 
 
Research Objectives 
This dissertation has five main research objectives: 
1. Examine why rural men leave the labor force, especially when they exit for 
extended periods of time, and explore the dynamics of these spells of labor force 
nonparticipation; 
2. In light of a labor market with decreased opportunities for secure, good-paying 
jobs for those with less than a four-year college degree, explore how rural men do—and 
do not—seek to improve their labor market prospects; 
3. Examine the pathways to good jobs in rural America for the men who have 
them, and conversely, identify barriers men face in obtaining these good jobs; 
4. Explore how rural, working-class men craft their identities in a labor market 
where jobs are often unfulfilling, poorly-paid, and precarious; and 
5. Explore the political implications of the current state of rural, working-class 




The first objective concerns the declining labor force participation among less-
educated men. Labor force surveys give men some opportunity to specify why they are 
not working, but survey questions present constrained choice sets with no opportunity for 
elaboration or narrative. Surveys are also sometimes unreliable, especially for poor and 
hard-to-reach populations (Edin and Lein 1997). This study, by using semi-structured 
interviews with a focus on full-life employment histories, allows me to probe for periods 
of labor force exit and set those periods in fuller context, allowing us to see the “whole 
story”, the rich interplay of factors surveys are not suited to capture. The second objective 
concerns what men in the study did to improve their labor market prospects. While the 
employment landscape for working-class men is challenging, the men still have volition 
and can make even constrained choices to improve their labor market chances. In 
particular, do men seek additional skills and training, show a willingness to move to an 
area with more or better jobs, or consider nontraditional employment, including taking 
jobs in traditionally female-dominated occupations? The third objective capitalizes on the 
heterogeneity of the cases in this study by focusing on those men—about one-quarter of 
the sample—who have managed to secure good jobs. What are the common themes 
among the men who make at least $15 an hour? Conversely, what are the barriers and 
constraints men face who have yet to acquire a good job? The fourth objective explores 
how men craft their identities in this new world of work. The bargain struck by the 
fathers and grandfathers of many of these men—difficult and unrewarding work in 
exchange for job security, familial authority, and middle-class consumption—has broken 
down. How have men responded? Finally, the fifth objective takes up the question I am 
most often asked when I mention I study white, working-class men in rural America: 
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what are the politics of a group perceived to be part of the President Trump’s core 
support? 
 
Data and Methods 
Cases 
Data for this dissertation come from in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 61 
working-class men in rural Pennsylvania conducted between July 2016 and May 2018. 
The three screening criteria for inclusion in the sample were as follows: 1) men; 2) 
relatively young, generally under 40 years old; and 3) working class, loosely defined as 
having less than a four-year college degree, working in a blue-collar occupation, or both. 
The demographics of the cases are displayed in Table 1. The average age of the 
participants is 35. All participants are men, and virtually all are white. The modal highest 
educational attainment is a high school diploma or GED, although a plurality of the men 
had attempted or completed some type of post-secondary education or training. About 
three-quarters of the men had a job at the time of the interview, while another ten percent 
were unemployed but looking for work. Ten men were not in the labor force. Within the 
screening frame, I sought to maximize the heterogeneity of occupations (for more on 
maximum heterogeneity in sampling, see Edin and Lein 1997). As will become clear 
throughout the dissertation, the men work in a wide range of sectors, including 
construction, manufacturing, retail, health care, and law enforcement. Below I give 
additional background about the reasons for each of the three primary screening criteria, 








This dissertation is primarily concerned with the experiences of men, which 
connects it to a large body of sociological literature that has explored the lives of 
working-class men. Early treatments focused on blue-collar occupations and told of life 





(N = 61) 
 
Percenta 
   
Mean Respondent Age 35 N/A 
   
Gender   
  Male 61 100 
  Female 0 0 
   
Race   
  White  58 95 
  American Indian 2 3 
  Asian American 1 2 
   
Highest Educational Attainment   
  Less than high school 1 2 
  High school diploma or equivalent (e.g. GED) 20 33 
  Completed post-secondary credential (e.g. CDL) 11 18 
  Some college, no degree 15 25 
  Associate degree 7 11 
  Bachelor’s degree 7 11 
   
Work Status (at time of interview)   
  Full-time 35 57 
  Part-time 11 18 
  Unemployed 5 8 
  Not in labor force (NILF) 10 16 
   
a May not total to 100 due to rounding 
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Halle 1984; Komarovsky 1964; Rubin 1976). Another wave of literature—mostly in the 
1980s and 1990s but continuing to the present—tells of the disappearance of those good-
paying, secure factory or mill jobs (Alexander 2017; Chen 2015; Dudley 1994; Goldstein 
2018; Linkon and Russo 2002; Milkman 1997; Sherman 2009). These works include 
ethnographic profiles of plant closures, interviews with displaced workers, and accounts 
of company towns dealing with the loss of their dominant employers. Themes of 
precarity and insecurity dominate sociological treatments of work in the twenty-first 
century (Cooper 2014; Kalleberg 2011; Pugh 2015; Silva 2013), which depict families 
and individuals of all social classes as unmoored, navigating a world where virtually 
everything is in flux and largely out of their control. And recent work has highlighted the 
tenuous attachments of working-class men to the institutions of work, family, and 
religion (Edin et al. 2019). 
The low-wage labor market in the United States has fundamentally changed over 
the past several decades, and less-educated men have been particularly affected. Skill-
biased technological change (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Goldin and Katz 1998a) 
and other forces have reduced demand for certain types of less-skilled labor, the economy 
has transitioned from manufacturing to services, and the labor market has polarized 
between good and bad jobs (Kalleberg 2011). Manufacturing and production, which have 
traditionally been a source of good-paying jobs for less-educated men, have lost jobs in 
recent decades (Acemoglu et al. 2016; Autor et al. 2014; Kalleberg 2011; Morris and 
Western 1999; Osterman 2014; Pierce and Schott 2016), while lower-paying jobs in the 
service sector have proliferated (Autor and Dorn 2013). The United States lost 30 percent 
of its manufacturing jobs between 1998 and 2016 (Bhattarai 2016), and more than 80 
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percent of all private jobs are now in the service sector (Casselman 2016). The result is a 
relative decrease in secure, semi-skilled, middle-income jobs (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, 
and Hitt 2002; Freeman and Katz 2007; Katz and Murphy 1992; Krueger 1993; Levy and 
Murnane 1992; Tüzemen and Willis 2013; Wright and Dwyer 2003). Additionally, the 
labor force participation rate among prime-age men (ages 25-54) has dropped, a decrease 
particularly acute among the working class.3 Chronic nonparticipation—defined as 
periods outside the labor force of one year or longer—make up most of these cases. In 
2015, two-thirds of prime-age men who were out of the labor force were absent for the 
entire year (Eberstadt 2016). In fact, almost one-quarter of working-class men between 
the ages of 21 and 30 report not working at all during 2015, up from just 9 percent in 
2000 (Aguiar et al. 2017). 
 
Age 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines prime working-age as those 
between the ages of 25 and 54, the years during which one is least likely to be in school 
or retired, two of the primary reasons why those over age 16 are not in the labor force. In 
short, it is expected that most men between these ages will be working or actively looking 
for work. However, the BLS definition of prime working-age is still quite wide, 
encompassing multiple generations and different types of cases as one moves up the age 
distribution. For example, the reasons for nonwork are likely different for men who are 
54-years old and 34-years old. The latter is much more likely to have underage 
                                                 
3 There will be more about the labor force participation rate for men and women in Chapter 2. 
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dependents, hence an ostensible reason to work (or at least need to pay child support). 
The younger man is also more likely to be in better health and less likely to be on medical 
disability. The younger cohort is also less likely to have grown up with the realistic hope 
of secure, good-paying work available with a high school diploma, making an 
examination of their approach to the labor market likely different than an older 
generation who still had hope of such employment. This project limits respondent ages to 
roughly the younger half of the prime-age range, or from about 25 to 45. Focusing on 
men under age 45 narrows the scope of the inquiry to men for whom nonwork is least 
likely to be for expected reasons like disability or the loss of once-secure manufacturing 
work. It also allows a more unified story of the causes and consequences on nonwork 
than one would get were the study to include those at the upper limits of the prime-age 
category. 
 
Working Class  
The meaning of working-class is contested, but it is often operationalized in 
sociological research as those with less than a four-year college degree. This definition is 
based upon a well-established literature that finds that educational attainment, 
particularly the divide between those who complete a bachelor’s degree and those who do 
not, is a salient arbiter of social class (Massey 2007; Putnam 2016) and a primary 
cleavage for divergences in resources for children (McLanahan 2004) and family 
structure (Cherlin 2014). During the recruitment process for this dissertation, I operated 
with a more inclusive definition of working class that also includes occupation. Several 
men in the study have four-year degrees but work in working-class jobs. Additionally, 
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some men who have a four-year degree earned it in a nontraditional way, such as by 
using the GI Bill after serving in the military. Still a third definition of working-class is 
parental education (having a mother or father—or both—with no college or less than a 
four-year degree), which is the criterion used by (Silva 2013) in her study of 100 
working-class young adults. By this measure, all cases in this study would be working 
class except one. Overall, the men in this study are all safely working class by one 
definition or another. They are also working-class according to the intuition of the 
researcher in the more subjective sense that one knows working class when one sees it.  
 
Race 
There was no racial screen for inclusion in the study, but because the non-
institutional population of the study area is virtually all white, the cases in the study are 
also virtually all white. Of the 61 men, 58 identify as white, two as Native American, and 
one as Asian American. The two participants who identify as Native American presented 
as white to the researcher, but they revealed their native ancestry during the interview. 
The data provided were valuable for the study, so I opted to include both interviews in 
the analysis. When asked how they identified, both opted to be identified as Native 
American for the study. 
 
Setting 
The setting of this study is a largely rural region of northwestern Pennsylvania 
that is well-suited to explore declining labor force participation and the working class. 
Considered frontier land in the early years of the United States, northwestern 
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Pennsylvania experienced increasing European settlement and conquest—and Indian 
resistance—in the decades before and after the American Revolution. Many of the 
villages and towns in northwestern Pennsylvania today began as planned settlements, 
outposts for timber and trading companies, or military forts. The incorporation dates of 
many of these towns—1788, 1796, 1800, 1825—reveal the timing of the wave of white, 
colonial settlement that pushed the native tribes further west, most of whom eventually 
ended up on reservations in Oklahoma. Indigenous populations were replaced with 
Europeans primarily of English, Irish, and German descent. Today, the demographics of 
this region look remarkably similar: outside of the urban centers of Erie and Pittsburgh, 
the non-institutional population remains at least 95 percent white, largely untouched by 
the Second Great Migration of African Americans or other waves of non-white migration 
that have changed the complexion of other parts of rural America (Carr, Lichter, and 
Kefalas 2012). The area is bounded in the west by Ohio and in the north by Lake Erie and 
New York State. 
Northwestern Pennsylvania has a long history of a diversified, industrial 
economy.4 The world’s first commercially successful oil well was drilled in this area in 
1859 (Dickey 1959), and the region was long a national and even international hub for oil 
extraction, refinement, and distribution. The oil companies Pennzoil and Quaker State 
were both once headquartered here, and the region was also home to many midsized 
manufacturers, such as Cytemp Specialty Steel in Crawford County, which once 
                                                 
4 According to the US Department of Agriculture County Types (see https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/county-typology-codes/descriptions-and-maps/), most of the counties in this area are 
nonspecialized, meaning they do not meet the criteria to be designated as dependent on farming, mining, 
manufacturing, recreation, or government. 
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employed over 1,000 people. The region produces iron, lumber, and agriculture, yet it has 
suffered in much the same way as many former manufacturing and extraction centers: 
Pennzoil and Quaker State relocated to Texas, and Cytemp closed its doors in the 1990s 
like many plants of its kind. The counties of this area have below average rates of college 
attainment and labor force participation and above average rates of disability and poverty. 
And while the cost of living is low, these areas have above average poverty rates and 
below average median household and per capita incomes. Yet many smalltime 
manufacturers remain, as do vestiges of agriculture production and the oil and lumber 
industries. The area has several hospitals and medical centers; a few colleges and 
universities, as well as a number of technical training schools; local governments and 
school systems; and an array of big box stores, small scale retailers, and fast food 
restaurants. The unemployment rates of these counties are only slightly higher than the 
national rate.  
 
Recruitment 
The original goal of this study was a purposive sample of 60 younger, working-
class men through a mixture of snowball sampling and venue-based recruitment. I began 
by making visits to the area and speaking with key informants and local organizations, 
some of whom I already knew by virtue of my roots in the area5, some of whom were 
new to me. When recruiting, I most often said I was looking for younger men who were 
not working or had trouble finding work, but I did not exclude men who were working at 
                                                 
5 More on my ties to the area is later in Chapter 1. 
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the time of the interview to guard against sampling on the dependent variable, namely 
nonwork. In hindsight, the decision not to use employment status as a screen for the study 
was prescient, since as will be discussed in the findings, nonwork was part of the 
employment histories of many men, even those who showed strong labor force 
attachment overall. Informants provided referrals of men to interview and ideas of places 
where the men may gather. In some cases, the informants themselves qualified for the 
study and were included. Some informants were contacted in person, while others were 
initially contacted on Facebook in cases where I already had a relationship with the 
informant. Key informants and study participants were all asked if they know others who 
meet the study criteria. In the pilot phase of the project, this sampling procedure resulted 
in interviews with 28 men, which established the viability of the strategy for the full 
dissertation. About halfway through the study, I created recruitment materials to leave at 
local businesses and social service agencies, as well as recruitment blurbs that were used 
on social media. However, just a few men opted into the study through those means, a 
sign that the financial incentive alone was not enough to draw interest and that most men 
required a personal connection or referral to be persuaded to participate. The latter is not 
surprising, given the generally closed nature of some small towns and rural areas. Finally, 
part of recruitment meant me being out and about in public space. I talked with local 
business owners, nonprofit executives, chambers of commerce, pastors, and educators. I 
spent time in bars, restaurants, coffee shops, and businesses, all with an eye to possible 
study participants. Some eventual participants were recruited from this networking and 





Once respondents were identified and successfully recruited for the study, I 
conducted semi-structured, in-depth qualitative interviews with each respondent using 
what has been called narrative interviewing (see DeLuca, Clampet-Lundquist, and Edin 
2016). I began each interview with the invitation for the man to tell me the story of his 
life. From there, participants were asked about their life histories, including origins, 
education, employment, relationships, and current situation. Special attention was given 
to participants’ employment histories, including job duties, duration, hours, wages and 
benefits, coworkers and supervisors, reasons for leaving, views toward work and the 
labor market, and current work status and means of support. The interview guide is 
included as Appendix A.  
Interviews took place in a variety of places: homes, apartments, front yards, back 
yards, offices, coffee shops, restaurants, and even the interview room at a police station. 
Men came from a total of 17 different towns across a five-county area of northwestern 
Pennsylvania. Originally, the local United Way agreed to screen its caseload to look for 
qualifying men, but ultimately, no interviews were produced. At the conclusion of each 
interview, the respondent was given the option to be re-contacted, including through 
social media, so that his situation could be tracked over time. Interviews were digitally 
recorded, and I took field notes about the setting and substance of each interview as soon 
as possible after the interview was completed. Respondents were offered $25 for their 
time, although in many cases, men initially refused payment until I clarified that the 
money was not my own. Even then, a few men refused payment. Approval for project 
was secured from the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board (IRB), and 
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IRB approved of any changes or additions to the research design. Finally, although this is 
an interview-based dissertation and not an ethnography or community study, I did more 
than conduct interviews in an attempt to strengthen ties with the area and with 
respondents: I attended churches; ate or drank at numerous restaurants, bars, and coffee 
shops; and attended community events, including a candlelight vigil on Martin Luther 
King Jr. holiday, a talent show, an Eagle Scout ceremony, a community theater 
production, and even a funeral. 
 
Coding 
The recorded interviews were transcribed, assigned uniform names that included a 
case number and pseudonym,6 and uploaded into NVivo 12 Plus, a software program for 
analysis of qualitative data. Following the protocol detailed by Deterding and Waters 
(2018), I began analysis by creating a set of index codes, which are broad categories 
based upon the topics covered in the interview protocol. Index codes are meant to capture 
major themes within the interview, such as Education, Employment History, and 
Military.7 There were 32 initial index codes based on the interview guide, and I added an 
additional nine codes during the coding process to capture topics that emerged within the 
                                                 
6 Case numbers were assigned in chronological order of the date of the interview, so the first interview 
conducted is 001, the second is 002, and so on. Pseudonyms were assigned by the researcher using the 
Social Security Administration’s (SSA) list of the most popular baby names of the 1980s 
(https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/names1980s.html) because the average age of the men in 
the study is 35, making the average birth year for this cohort 1982. Before assigning names, I eliminated 
any names in the SSA’s list that were the real names of men in the study, plus any typically non-Caucasian 
names to reflect the fact that the study population is 95% white. I then assigned names to the cases, 
beginning with the first case and assigning the first eligible name from the SSA list. 
7 As Deterding and Waters (2018) discuss, this approach, which they call flexible coding, is virtually the 
opposite of the grounded theory approach, in which there are no predetermined codes and each line of an 
interview transcript is assigned a code, thus building the coding schema from the ground up. 
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interviews for which there were not adequate codes. During the initial coding, any section 
of the transcript that applied to a given code was assigned to that code in NVivo 12 Plus8; 
some sections of the transcript were assigned to multiple codes, and I made effort to 
ensure that all parts of each transcript were assigned to at least one code. Concurrent with 
this index coding, I populated a spreadsheet with what Deterding and Waters (2018) call 
attributive codes, which are categorical or numeric data connected to each case, such as 
number of biological children, highest educational attainment, and current hourly wage. 
Also concurrent with the index coding, I took notes on each case, which formed the basis 
for a Respondent Memo associated with each case. Each case also has a set of Interview 
Field Notes, which was my attempt to capture—in most cases immediately after the 
interview— as much detail as possible from the interview, including the substance of the 
conversation, as well as key details about the interview setting and respondent’s attire and 
demeanor. These four documents—the interview transcript, respondent memo, interview 
field notes, and spreadsheet of attributive codes—make up the core data for each case. 
Additionally, during coding I also created a Cross-Case Memo, which identified common 
themes across cases for later exploration and verification using the case files. 
 
Excluding Cases 
I conducted 62 interviews for this project but chose to exclude one case from the 
analysis due to concerns about the veracity of the respondent. This was not a decision 
made lightly, both because all data are valuable and because I did not want the exclusion 
                                                 
8 In NVivo, these codes are technically called “nodes”. 
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of a case to alter any conclusions drawn from the cases.9 Even in the interview itself, 
there were numerous claims made by the respondent that seemed incredulous in the 
moment, and to the degree I could, I sought clarification in the interview itself. Upon 
reviewing the interview transcript, many of the same concerns emerged about details both 
large and small. To the degree possible, I sought to verify claims independently and 
found reason to doubt key claims. I decided against re-contacting the respondent to verify 
claims for two reasons. First, I did not think it worthwhile to challenge the respondent’s 
veracity directly at risk to that relationship and relationship to others in the field. Second, 
it was my judgement that the interview was shot through with exaggeration and 
hyperbole, if not outright falsehoods; the quibble was not with one or two key details. 
This fact-checking, combined with my own researcher’s intuition and common sense, 
lead to the decision to exclude the case completely. 
Additionally, an early phase of the project included five interviews with local 
employers. The hope with including employer interviews was to capture both sides of the 
employment relationship, in keeping with Desmond’s argument that many exploitative 
arrangements are relational (Desmond 2016). It was my determination that those early 
interviews were not useful, especially given the tendency for employers to find fault with 
employees and not with themselves. It was unlikely that employers themselves would 
admit to substandard pay or working conditions, and the amount I could glean about the 
area was minimal. Since I could not independently observe the hiring process, I decided 
to abandon the employer portion of the study, and I did not use data from the employer 
                                                 
9 This latter concern is less applicable in this study because it is a non-random sample. 
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interviews in this dissertation. Future research may attempt to capture the employer 
perspective of the employment relationship. 
 
Confidentiality Considerations 
In the strictest sense, this dissertation is an interview-based study. But there is 
another way in which it is much more than that, as I was born and raised in northwestern 
Pennsylvania, and it is where much of my family still lives. In his study of the boarding 
school he attended, Shamus Khan (2010) realized partway through his fieldwork that 
attempts to conceal the school’s identity, which was his initial plan, would prove 
impossible given his connections to the school that would emerge in the writing of the 
project. That is true here, although the reason for revealing my connection to this place 
goes much deeper. Although not an ethnography in the strictest sense, the interviews for 
this dissertation sit on a foundation of two decades of lived experience in northwestern 
Pennsylvania. For my first eighteen years, northwestern Pennsylvania was the only home 
I knew, never living elsewhere and rarely traveling far from home. In the years since high 
school, I lived in the area one summer during college and another summer in my early 
twenties. I have made countless visits to see family and friends. 
Initially, the decision to choose northwestern Pennsylvania was one of 
convenience. In the Johns Hopkins program, by the fourth year each doctoral student is 
required to complete a Trial Research Paper, which is a journal-length piece of original 
research. I knew I wanted to study declining labor force participation among working-
class men in rural America, but living outside Washington, DC and going to school in 
nearby Baltimore, there were no rural places nearby. Given my familiarity with the area, 
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it made practical sense to use my hometown as the basis for my Trial Research Paper. 
Further, with limited research funds, I could stay for free with family and use my 
mother’s car for fieldwork.10 There was also the sense that being known to those in the 
area brought credibility. Seth, one of the participants in the study who I did not know 
personally, confirmed as much during my interview with him:  
… and when I saw your picture I remembered you. Because it’s… small town 
football games and stuff like that. Like, I remember him. And so, like I said, it 
took me a hot minute to think about it, and then I messaged you and I thought, 
“You know, if he’s writing a paper for something, as a guy who struggled in high 
school, sick, and it took me a long way to get where I am. I mean it really, really 
did. Or I would probably still be, I mean I got, there’s guys I went to school with, 
they are still piling lumber and making 12 bucks and eight bucks an hour, you 
know. Just scraping by every day. 
 
My Trial Research Paper was based upon the first 28 of these interviews, and at that 
point, it made the most sense to add cases in the original field site rather than start anew 
elsewhere.  
One methodological dilemma has been whether to reveal my relationships with 
the field site and some of the respondents. There has been a recent move toward more 
transparency in ethnographic research11, I agree with Jerolmack and Murphy (2017) and 
other advocates of greater transparency that unmasking of place adds greatly to the sense 
of trust. Identifiers like “Northern City” or “Pleasant Valley” are unhelpfully unmoored 
from actual social, physical, and cultural context. However, research in rural setting 
raises unique confidentiality and transparency concerns. Many national datasets suppress 
individual records for low-population counties to protect confidentiality, so what does 
                                                 
10 Partway through the project, my wife and I bought a second car in part to make future fieldwork, 
including travel to and from northwestern Pennsylvania, possible. 
11 For a helpful overview of this discussion, see Contreras (2019). 
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that mean for qualitative researchers who want to study those places? But even with these 
risks, the demographics and economies of rural places vary greatly, and it matters 
whether the work was done in farm country, coal country, oil country, mining country, a 
new immigrant destination, or a magnet for amenity tourism. Anonymizing place is one 
option, but that can create issues in cases like this dissertation where the researcher feels 
compelled to disclose a personal connection to the place as a matter of transparency. My 
solution for this dissertation is to specify a region that includes several counties and 
dozens of towns, boroughs, and villages. This degree of masking the field site—partial 
but not total—allows a sense of “real-ness” while still guaranteeing anonymity to 
respondents in the eyes of the average reader of this work. 
Another question about masking is, “Who is confidentiality for?” The default for 
qualitative research has long been to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, but this is 
being questioned. Contreras (2019), who writes about confidentiality considerations in 
the context of studying violence and crime, offers suggestions for partial measures of 
confidentiality that enhance confidentiality but protect researcher and subject. He 
wrestles with the fact that place matters to his work, but on the other hand, he is dealing 
with subjects where confidentiality can be life or death matter. This dissertation, as a 
study of working-class men, does not rise to that level of sensitivity. While some men 
have engaged in deviant or even criminal activity, this is generally a study about legal 
activities and pursuits. Perhaps the most sensitive information disclosed in these 
interviews concerns wages and salaries, but the topics are generally mundane. I am not 
concerned that general readers of this dissertation will be able to identify respondents, but 
what if study participants or others from these towns read this work and recognize—or 
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think they recognize—one another? Is the confidentiality promised to respondents meant 
to shield them from general readers being able to figure out who they are, or does it also 
apply to other residents in the field site or even other respondents in the study? In a rural 
setting, because “everybody knows everybody,” there is likely no degree of masking that 
can protect every identity without altering someone beyond recognition. This remains an 
open question. 
Studying one’s hometown area as a social scientist brings benefits and challenges. 
As many ethnographers have written, there is no objective place from which to study a 
people or a place. There is some chance that my familiarity with this place might make 
me less able to see certain things, which is why basing analysis on the interviews—for 
which there are transcripts—is important. Yet being a local also brings benefits, such as 
access that might be denied to outsiders. There were practical ways being familiar with 
the area was useful, even down to knowing how to get around the rural roads and find 
sometimes out-of-the-way places. I knew my way around the towns and back roads, had 
many relationships on which to draw, and had a sense of ease and comfort in a place that 
might have seemed quite foreign to an outsider. During the interviews and in reviewing 
the transcripts, my knowledge of the area’s past and present made it easy to pick up on 
references to people, places, and things that an outsider would have missed or had to ask 
for clarity about. And I could set men’s comments in the context of a knowledge of the 
field site earned over decades. Perhaps most importantly, northwestern Pennsylvania—
and rural place more generally—is not exotic or strange to me; it does not confound me 
why people would live there or think the way they do, since I once lived there and likely 





Labor Force Participation Rate12 
The civilian non-institutional labor force participation rate (LFPR), which is 
captured in the Current Population Survey (CPS) and reported by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), is the percentage of the population age 16 and older who are not in 
prison, the active duty military, or other institutions (e.g. mental health facilities) and 
who are either currently employed or unemployed according to the BLS definitions. To be 
employed, one must have worked—whether fulltime or part-time—for pay or profit 
during the survey reference week. Also considered employed are any who were 
temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, bad weather, a 
labor dispute, or various personal reasons, whether or not they were paid for the time off. 
The unemployed are those who did not have a job during the survey reference week, 
made at least one specific active effort to find a job during the prior 4 weeks, and were 
available for work (unless temporarily ill). Also considered unemployed are all those who 
were not working during the survey reference week but were waiting to be called back to 
a job from which they had been laid off. (In this case, they do not need to be actively 
looking for work to be classified as unemployed.) The employed and unemployed 
together constitute the labor force; in other words, the labor force level is the number of 
people who are either working or actively seeking work. All those who are neither 
                                                 




employed nor unemployed according to the above definitions are considered not in the 
labor force (NILF). There are many reasons why someone might not be in the labor 
force, such as retirement or staying home to care for children or others. Being in school is 
itself not a reason someone would be considered not in the labor force; what matters is 
one’s work status. Therefore, a college student working part-time would be considered 
employed, and thus, in the labor force. 
 
Disability Benefits13 
The federal government administers several large programs that offer benefits to 
those considered disabled. The central program is the Social Security Disability Insurance 
program (often just “SSDI” or “DI”), which provided over $11 billion in benefits to over 
10 million beneficiaries as of late 2014. SSDI pays benefits to workers over the age of 18 
who have sufficient work history.14 SSDI is administered by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) and funded through the contributions of workers to the Social 
Security Trust Fund in the form of FICA Social Security taxes. The percentage of those 
in America receiving SSDI has increased significantly in recent decades, from 2.2 percent 
in the late 1970s to 3.5 percent in the years immediately preceding the 2007–2009 
recession and 4.4 percent in 2013 (Liebman 2015).15 Benefit levels are determined on a 
                                                 
13 Eberstadt (2016) provides a brief but helpful overview of the primary U.S. disability benefit programs. 
Also see the Social Security Administration’s webpages about disability benefits 
(https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability/). 
14 For more on how the government calculates whether a worker has enough “work credits” to qualify for 
SSDI, see https://www.disabilitysecrets.com/page10-13.html. 
15 For a helpful summary of current SSDI trends, including debate about the drivers of increased receipt of 
SSDI, see Liebman (2015). 
25 
 
formula basis related to one’s work history; most recipients receive between $800 and 
$1,800 per month, with the average benefit in 2019 being $1,234 monthly. 
The two other largest programs are Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI), which 
in 2014 provided $4.4 billion to eight million individuals, and the Veterans 
Administration, which provided $4.5 billion to 3.5 million beneficiaries. Like SSDI, the 
SSI program is run by the Social Security Administration, but rather than based on work 
history, SSI is means-tested, meaning eligibility is based upon need. SSI pays benefits to 
disabled adults and children who have limited income and assets. SSI pays benefits from 
general fund taxes, not the Social Security Trust Fund. The monthly payment amount for 
SSI is based on the “federal benefit rate”, which is $771 per month for individuals and 
$1,157 for couples in 2019.16 The VA Disability Compensation program17, administered 
by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, offers monthly payments to veterans who 
have illnesses or injuries as a result of military service (or in cases where military service 
exacerbated an existing condition). Veterans can qualify for benefits based upon both 
physical and mental health conditions developed before, during, or after service. 
Compensation rate is determined by a disability rating based on the severity of the 
disability. Finally, in addition to SSDI, SSI, and VA, there are some smaller disability 
programs at the federal level, as well as state-level workers’ compensation programs. 
 
                                                 
16 There are certain deductions and supplements to these figures based on several factors. For more, see 
https://www.disabilitysecrets.com/question18.html.  




The Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program (often “UI”) provides 
unemployment benefits to eligible workers who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own. Within federal guidelines, each state administers its own UI program, including 
eligibility requirements, benefit amounts, and the length of time benefits are available. In 
most states, the benefit is funded solely through a tax imposed on employers, although 
Pennsylvania is one of three states (along with New Jersey and Alaska) to require a 
minimal employee contribution. In 2014, the percentage of jobless workers receiving UI 
hit an all-time low of 26 percent, when 800,000 families used unemployment insurance 
(Stettner 2016). In Pennsylvania, qualifying for benefits is a three-step process that 
involves having enough wages and weeks of work to qualify (called “financial 
eligibility”); having a “qualifying separation” from employment, which cannot include 
quitting, being terminated for misconduct or failing a drug test, or a strike; and properly 
maintaining eligibility if approved, which involves filing biweekly claims, registering for 
employment search services within 30 days of applying for benefits, and actively 
searching for work.19 According to the federal UI guidelines20, benefits are generally 
based on a percentage of an individual’s earnings over a recent 52-week period up to a 
state maximum amount. Benefits are paid for up to 26 weeks in most states, although 
                                                 
18 For more on UI, see the federal UI website at https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/unemployment-
insurance. For more about unemployment compensation in the state of Pennsylvania, the site of this study, 
see https://www.uc.pa.gov/Pages/default.aspx.  
19 For more information, see the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Handbook at 
https://www.uc.pa.gov/unemployment-benefits/handbook/Pages/default.aspx. These are the current 
requirements for UC in Pennsylvania, but for some men in the study, they qualified for UC at times in the 
past when certain requirements may have differed. 
20 See https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp. 
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additional weeks of benefits may be available during times of high unemployment. 




One approach to defining rural is place-based, grounded in a defined geography, 
often a census tract or county. As might be expected, there is no agreement about these 
measures, even within the United States government. The government measures rural in 
at least three different ways depending on the federal agency; the U.S. Census Bureau, 
the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) each have their own method. The first two of these agencies – the Census 
and ERS – use what Isserman (2005) calls a negative approach, meaning that rural is 
simply all that remains after the urban or the metropolitan is defined. However, each of 
these agencies has a different way of carving out those “desired” urban geographies. The 
Census, using a layered criteria to create census tracks, defines two types of urban areas: 
Urbanized Areas (UAs) of 50,000 or more people and Urban Clusters (UCs) of at least 
2,500 and less than 50,000 people. The remainder is “rural.” The USDA ERS uses a 
county-based system and chooses to refer to rural counties as nonmetropolitan. For the 
USDA, nonmetropolitan areas include some combination of open countryside, rural 
towns (places with fewer than 2,500 people), and urban areas with populations ranging 
from 2,500 to 49,999 that are not part of larger labor market areas (metropolitan areas). 
Lastly, OMB also uses a county-based measure, but it divides the country into different 
statistical areas, which effectively combines urban and rural areas together based on 
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economic and social ties. A second approach to defining “rurality” is by its character 
rather than as a fact of geography. A helpful example of this in practice is Lichter and 
Brown (2011), who approach the rural through an examination of “symbolic and social 
boundaries—the distinctions between urban and rural communities and people and the 
processes by which boundaries are engaged” (2011: 565). They identify and discuss ten 
“common conceptions” (and in some cases misperceptions) of the rural: rural as cultural 
deposit box, backwater, engine of urbanization, exurbia, place of consumption, new 
immigrant destination, ghetto, food basket, repository of natural resources, and dumping 
ground. The focus on symbolic boundaries is a helpful reminder of what can be lost in 
more conventional geographical measurements. 
Rural America accounts for seventy-five percent of America’s land area and is 
home to over 50 million people. Contrary to narratives of uniform rural decline, the local 
economies in rural America are on diverse trajectories (Hamilton et al. 2008). Some rural 
places are thriving, buoyed by natural resources, tourism, or other geographic or 
economic advantages. Yet those thriving rural places notwithstanding, rural America 
faces stiff economic headwinds, even when compared to its urban counterparts. Rural 
America has experienced economic restructuring, demographic changes, and the 
increasing concentration of poverty (Burton et al. 2013), and the economic recovery after 
the Great Recession was slower in rural places (Kusmin 2014). The reasons for the 
changes in rural economies are not altogether different than the urban: “the protracted 
exhaustion of the Fordist era’s structure of economic production, state intervention, and 
institutionalized social relationships; globalization; and pro-market neoliberalism” 
(Lobao 2014). Rural places have seen the change from an economy of production to one 
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of services (Slack 2014). And just like their urban counterparts, rural places have seen the 
effects of these economic changes on social institutions such as the family. In fact, many 
of the dynamics in the inner-city in which work fled to the suburbs (Wilson 1987, 1996) 
are also present in rural areas. Albrecht and Albrecht (2000) suggest that agricultural 
declines in rural America were met with limited manufacturing opportunities and the rise 
of the service sector, which is positively correlated to female employment, negatively to 
male employment, and inversely to sex ratio.  
These economic changes drive changes to family structure. In fact, Snyder and 
McLaughlin (2004) find that family structure in nonmetropolitan areas has gradually 
come to look more like that in metro areas such that it is no longer accurate to think of 
rural families as more “traditional” than urban or suburban families. The rise of female-
headed households and cohabitation cross-cut geography and are more likely to be 
influenced by other factors than rural-urban designation (Snyder and McLaughlin 2006). 
And just as people of means fled urban poverty for the suburbs, there has been a net 
outmigration from rural areas (Johnson and Lichter 2019), meaning that immigration 
might be the savior of rural America (Carr et al. 2012). Hispanics drove most of the rural 
population growth of the 2000s (Carr et al. 2012), although Hispanic migration was 
primarily to areas of agriculture and agribusiness, which is hardly uniform throughout 
rural America. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
The five remaining chapters of this dissertation match the research objectives 
outlined above. Chapter 2 concerns the declining labor force participation rate among 
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prime-age, working-class men, which is near its lowest point on record and has generated 
concern among scholars and policymakers. I examine why men leave the labor force, 
especially when they exit for extended periods of time, and explore the dynamics of these 
spells of labor force nonparticipation. Given the well-documented challenges men with 
less than college degree face in today’s labor market, Chapter 3 explores how men do—
and do not—seek to improve their labor market prospects. In particular, I focus on three 
primary ways men might attempt to improve their labor market position: 1) by upskilling, 
meaning getting additional education or training, thus making themselves more 
employable or more competitive for better jobs; 2) by geographic mobility, or moving to 
an area where jobs are more plentiful or of better quality, a tactic especially applicable for 
men living in rural areas with limited opportunities; and 3) by occupational flexibility, or 
taking jobs not traditionally done by men, such as in female-dominated occupations like 
care work. Almost one-third of the men in the study have job that pays an effective 
hourly rate of at least $15 an hour, and Chapter 4 examines the pathways to these “good 
jobs” for the men in the study who have them. This chapter also examines characteristics 
of the low-wage labor market for the majority of men in the study who have what I call 
bad(ish) jobs that pay less than $15 an hour, including the barriers men face in escaping 
bad(ish) jobs. Given the many changes in working-class work for men who have come of 
age in the twenty-first century, Chapter 5 explores how working-class men craft their 
identities in a labor market where jobs are often unfulfilling, poorly-paid, and precarious. 
Finally, any treatment of the white, working-class in 2019 must touch upon the 
implications for politics. Drawing upon conversations with these men about the 2016 
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election, which occurred early in the dissertation fieldwork, Chapter 6 explores the 
political implications of the current state of working-class men.
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CHAPTER 2: MISSING MEN? REASSESSING HOW WE MEASURE, 
EXPLAIN, AND UNDERSTAND THE DECLINING LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION RATE AMONG PRIME-AGE MEN 
While the unemployment rate for men has been below 6 percent since late 2014, 
this obscures the fact that millions of men are not counted in this statistic because they 
are deemed to be not in the labor force, meaning they are not working or seeking work. 
The labor force participation rate among prime-age men (ages 25-54) has dropped from 
98 percent in the mid-1950s to 89.5 in March of 2019. This decrease in labor force 
participation has been greater in rural areas (Jensen and Jensen 2011), and it is also 
greater among those with less than a four-year college degree (Council of Economic 
Advisors 2016; Eberstadt 2016). Additionally, chronic nonparticipation—defined as 
periods outside the labor force of one year or longer—make up most of these cases of 
nonwork. In 2015, two-thirds of prime-age men who were out of the labor force were 
absent for the entire year (Eberstadt 2016). In fact, almost one-quarter of men between 
the ages of 21 and 30 without a four-year college degree report not working at all during 
2015, up from just 9 percent in 2000 (Aguiar et al. 2017). 
Why are so many men dropping out of the labor force? Survey data reveals the 
existence of these nonparticipating men and suggests some about who they are and what 
they are doing, but there is not consensus on why these men are not working or seeking 
work. Explorations of this phenomenon, mostly by economists, tend to favor either 
supply-side or demand-side hypotheses. Supply-side explanations for nonwork argue that 
men have largely chosen to leave the labor force voluntarily, enticed by a combination of 
government benefits; financial and housing support from family and household members; 
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and the allure of video games and other leisure activities. Some supply-side proponents 
have also suggested that there is declining interest in work (Winship 2017) and a rising 
social acceptability of nonwork, a change from prior generations (Eberstadt 2016; Murray 
2012). Demand-side explanations emphasize the role of structural changes to the 
economy, such as reduced demand for less-skilled labor, stagnant wages, globalization, 
and mismatches between the employment expectations of low-skilled men and the types 
of jobs that are available at their skill and educational levels. Cross-cutting these supply 
and demand explanations are what some have labeled institutional factors (Council of 
Economic Advisors 2016), such as the rise of mass incarceration and the burden of child 
support arrears. Recent evidence also suggests primary roles for poor health, pain, and 
addiction in labor force nonparticipation (Krueger 2017). In one recent review of the 
evidence, economists Abraham and Kearney (2018) attribute the decline in the male 
employment rate since 1999 as one-third demand-side and less than one-tenth supply-
side, but much of the overall trend remains unexplained given available evidence 
(Abraham and Kearney 2018; Austin, Glaeser, and Summers 2018). 
This chapter explores the “economic mystery” (Noguchi 2016) of declining labor 
force participation using in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 61 working-class men 
from rural Pennsylvania. This qualitative examination is designed to inform findings 
from survey research and administrative records about declining labor force participation 
by setting labor force decisions within the context of men’s lives, families, and 
communities. I will emphasize chronic churning, a phenomenon in which men leave the 
labor force for extended periods but almost always return and often persist in formal 
employment. While there is evidence of men moving in and out of the labor force in the 
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shorter term (Coglianese 2017), the discovery of chronic churning contributes a unique 
explanation of what may be driving increased rates of nonparticipation in the labor force. 
Among the men in this study, permanent labor force dropout was rare, but many men in 
the study left the labor force for extended periods of time. This finding suggests that even 
long bouts of nonparticipation are not permanent, and men who have such spells outside 
the labor force have not lost their desire to work. It also challenges the implicit notion 
that workers and nonworkers are relatively fixed categories that are stable over time and 
pushes back against analyses that have reified these survey categorizations of “worker” 
and “nonworker” into de facto social classes with qualitative commonalties. The picture 
that emerges in this study is that most men are working most of the time, but a closer 
examination of lifetime labor force narratives finds that periods of nonwork, including 
those lasting one year or more, are often “hidden” in plain sight within the histories of 
otherwise working men.  
The question remains as to why men make these extended labor force exits of one 
year or more. A second contribution of this chapter is the ability, using the life histories 
of these men, to set these men’s decisions to leave the labor force in context. I find that 
the four reasons men leave the labor force are 1) to pursue education or training; 2) 
struggles with substance abuse; 3) the receipt of disability benefits; and 4) what I term 
elective nonparticipation, which are periods of labor force dropout where men elect to 
leave the labor force for a time. Most elective nonparticipators show a relatively high 
degree of labor force attachment, and most often return to the formal labor force sooner 
or later. A final group of men, about ten percent of the total, are who I call marginal men, 
who have tenuous attachments to the labor force over time. These men tend to be 
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younger, unmarried, and childless, thus resembling the popular depiction of nonworking 
men, although the exact reasons why these men have forsaken formal work vary. In 
looking across all cases, one unexpected finding was the role that unemployment 
insurance (UI) plays as a livelihood strategy, a theme I explore at the end of the chapter. 
And while this chapter is devoted to the proximate reasons why men leave the labor 
force, these decisions occur in a broader labor market context that has few predictable 
ladders of advancement and where the financial rewards of work are limited, even for 
those men who remain attached to the labor force and show loyalty to a single employer. 
I explore this broader context in other chapters, along with the ways in which this context 
has changed the way working-class men approach work. 
 
Literature Review 
Trends in American Labor Force Participation21 
The civilian non-institutional labor force participation rate (LFPR), which is 
captured in the Current Population Survey (CPS) and reported by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), is the percentage of the population age 16 and older who are not in 
prison, the active duty military, or other institutions (e.g. mental health facilities) and 
who are either currently employed or unemployed but actively seeking work. The 
American labor force participation rate has been marked by two dominant trends since 
the 1950s: a steady decline in labor force participation among men and a dramatic 
increase in labor force participation among women, especially since the 1970s (Council 
                                                 
21 For a helpful overview of this topic, see Council of Economic Advisers (2014). 
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of Economic Advisers 2014). Figure 1 shows the civilian labor force participation rate for 
men and women from January 1948 to January 2019. In January of 1948, 86.7 percent of 
men age 16 and over and 32.2 percent of women age 16 and over were in the labor force. 
However, over the second half of the twentieth century, men’s labor force participation 
dropped by almost 12 percentage points, from 86.7 to 74.8, while women’s labor force 
participation nearly doubled, going from 32.2 percent to 60.1 by 2000. Since 2000, men’s 
labor force participation has continued to recede, dropping from 74.8 in 2000 to 69.2 
percent in the first quarter of 2019. Meanwhile, women’s labor force participation has 
also declined since its turn-of-the-millennium peak, dropping to 57.4 percent in 2019. 
 




                                                 
22 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate: Men [LNS11300001], 
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300001, 
April 13, 2019. 
37 
 
Scholars have sought to better understand these trends by parsing out the relative 
contributions to the declining labor force participation rate due to cyclical factors, like the 
ups and downs of the economy, and demographic factors, like the aging of the population 
(for examples, see Aaronson et al. 2014; Abraham and Kearney 2018; Juhn and Potter 
2006; Moffitt, Davis, and Mas 2012). The year 2008 brought two additional shocks to the 
American labor force. First, the Great Recession saw the loss of millions of jobs, which 
sent the official unemployment rate into double digits and the U-6 unemployment rate23 
to almost 20 percent. Less noticed but equally important in terms of the labor force, 2008 
was also the year that the first of the so-called Baby Boomers—those born starting in 
1946—began to turn 62 and become eligible for early Social Security retirement benefits. 
The retirement of the Boomers begins a significant demographic shift of millions of 
workers from employment to retirement, thus removing many of them from the labor 
force. In the period from the final quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2014, the 
overall labor force participation rate fell from 65.9 percent to 62.8 percent, a decline of 
3.1 percentage points. An analysis of this decline by the White House Council of 
Economic Advisers (2014) finds that about three-quarters of this decline in labor force 
participation from 2007 to 2014 was due to a combination of the aging of the population 
(the retirement of the Boomers) and the business cycle (the Great Recession and its 
aftermath), leaving about one-quarter of the decline not explained by demographic 
changes or cyclical factors. Among the factors at play in this “unexplained” quarter of the 
decline in labor force participation are the rise of automation, the role of disability 
                                                 
23 The U-6 unemployment rate is a more expansive measure of unemployment that includes two groups – 
marginally attached workers and involuntary part-time workers – who are not included in the standard 
unemployment rate that is popularly reported. For more, see https://www.bls.gov/lau/stalt.htm.  
38 
 
insurance programs, changes in social norms, drug use, and the rise of mass 
incarceration, which are all more likely to affect prime-age men.  
 
Declining Labor Force Participation Among Prime-Age Men 
While the decline in the overall labor force participation rate has drawn interest 
from researchers and policymakers, particular focus in recent years has been directed at 
the decline in the labor force participation among the prime-age population, or those 
between the ages of 25 and 54. These are the ages when men—and increasingly 
women—are most likely to be working. Figure 2 shows the activity rate24 for prime-age 
men and women in the United States from 1960 to 2019. The patterns are largely similar 
to those in Figure 1: men’s labor force participation has declined over time, while 
women’s rose dramatically from 1960 to about 2000, since which time it has plateaued. 
In particular, the activity rate for prime-age men has decreased from 96.9 percent in 1960 
to 89.4 in the first quarter of 2019, a drop of 7.5 percentage points. While this decline is 
arguably small in absolute terms, it is more pronounced in relative terms: fewer than one 
in twenty prime-age men were not working or seeking work in 1960, compared with 
more than one in ten prime-age men in 2019. 
 
Figure 2.2: Activity Rate for Men and Women, Ages 25-54, 1960-201925 
                                                 
24 The activity rate is another term for the labor force participation rate. The activity rate are those people 
employed (the active) and those unemployed (potentially active) as a percentage of the total population. 
25 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Activity Rate: Aged 25-54: Males for the 
United States [LRAC25MAUSM156S], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 






This decline in labor force participation is even more extreme when stratified by 
education. Figure 3 (Ziliak 2018) shows trends in employment rates for men and women 
ages 25 to 64 from 1967 to 2016 by metropolitan status and level of educational 
attainment. There is a clear relationship between labor force participation and educational 
attainment: those with more education are more likely to be in the labor force among men 
and women in both urban and rural settings, a trend that has grown over time. Men of all 
education levels in 1967 were at least 90 percent in the labor force, but now, men with 
less than a high school degree have labor force participation rates below 70 percent for 
urban men and around 50 percent for rural men. For those men with a high school 
diploma, rates for urban and rural men are around 70 percent. Rates for men with some 




Figure 2.3: Employment Rates, Men and Women Ages 25 to 64, by Metropolitan 
Status and Educational Attainment, 1967 to 2016 
 
 
Explanations for the decline in labor force participation among less-educated, 
prime-age men tend to emphasize either supply or demand explanations.26 The supply-
side argument emphasizes the allure and availability of alternative means of support, 
most centrally disability benefits. As Eberstadt (2016) points out, there is uncertainty 
about the extent to which nonparticipating, prime-age men depend upon disability 
benefits, in part because there are several disability programs that are not centrally 
tracked. According to the White House Council of Economic Advisors (2016), 3.3 
                                                 
26 Eberstadt (2016) and Council of Economic Advisors (2016) both provide excellent overviews of the rise 
in nonemployment among prime-age males. 
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percent of prime-age men who are not in the labor force receive SSDI payments, up from 
just one percent in 1967. Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
Eberstadt (2016) finds a rate about double: in 2013, 6.3 percent of prime-age men 
reported disability payments. However, Eberstadt finds what he calls “an explosion” 
(2016: 118) of disability recipiency among the households of nonparticipating men: 57 
percent of prime-age, nonparticipating men live in households reporting disability 
benefits. Further, previous research has shown that increases in receipt of SSDI has led to 
lower labor force participation, especially among veterans (Autor et al. 2016; Autor and 
Duggan 2003) and lower earners (Gelber, Moore, and Strand 2017). There is also 
evidence that household members and unearned income are important in supporting 
nonworking, prime-age men (Council of Economic Advisors 2016; Stewart 2006). 
Finally, there is evidence that the current opioid crisis and declining labor force 
participation rates are intertwined (Krueger 2017), including the fact that about half of 
prime-age men not in the labor force take pain medication on any given day (Krueger 
2017), an indication of the role of poor health in incentivizing the move to disability 
benefits. 
Supply-side proponents also point to the fact that there has been a decrease in 
nonparticipating men who report wanting a job over time (Council of Economic Advisors 
2016). In fact, according to the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), only 15% of men who did not work at all in 2014 said 
it was because they could not find a job (Eberstadt 2016). The most common reason 
prime-age men in poverty give for nonwork is disability or illness (Rachidi 2016). Yet 
there is no evidence that men out of the labor force are doing more care work or 
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housework than their participating peers (Council of Economic Advisors 2016; Eberstadt 
2016; Stewart 2008), and substitution of men for women’s time does not appear to be a 
driver of the growing nonparticipation rate (Blau 1997; Council of Economic Advisors 
2016; Juhn and Potter 2006). Finally, there is evidence that the biggest divergence of time 
use between nonparticipating men and their participating peers is in leisure, particularly 
video games, which some have interpreted to argue that nonparticipating men have been 
enticed from the labor market by gaming and recreational computer use (Aguiar et al. 
2017; Hurst 2016). There is also evidence that nonparticipating men engage in more 
illegal drug use than their participating peers (Eberstadt 2016). Taken together, this 
evidence paints a picture of unhealthy, perhaps unmotivated, and even addicted men who 
have chosen to withdraw their labor force participation in favor of disability benefits, 
drug use, and gaming (or some combination of all three), but not increased care work. 
Demand-side explanations emphasize reductions in demand for low-skilled labor 
and the low return for work for those at the bottom of the wage distribution. Research 
shows that skill-biased technological change (Autor et al. 2008a; Goldin and Katz 1998a) 
depresses wages for occupations that require manual or routine labor, which hits less-
educated, prime-age men particularly hard. This is concentrated in industries most 
exposed to foreign competition and international trade (Autor, Dorn, and Gordon H. 
Hanson 2013). Further, less-educated Americans have seen a reduction in wages relative 
to other groups (Council of Economic Advisors 2016; Greenstone and Looney 2011a). 
Previous studies have linked declining labor market opportunities for low-skilled workers 
and stagnant real wage growth as the most likely driver in the 1970s and 1980s (Juhn et 
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al. 1991; Juhn and Potter 2006), and then decreased demand for middle-skill jobs in the 
1990s (Aaronson et al. 2014).  
Countering the supply-side argument that nonparticipating men are being 
supported by partners or spouses, there is evidence that the share of nonparticipating men 
with a household member in the labor force has fallen over time (Council of Economic 
Advisors 2016), and previous evidence concludes that reliance on spousal income does 
not seem to be a factor in nonparticipation trends (Juhn and Potter 2006). While there is 
some disagreement about the effect of SSDI on prime-age male labor force participation, 
skeptics of this explanation claim the increase is prime-age men receiving disability is not 
enough to explain the decline in labor force participation among this group (Council of 
Economic Advisors 2016). Further, a closer look at the employment-to-population ratio 
tells a story of cyclicality in tune with recessions: each recession knocks some prime-age 
men out of the labor force, some of whom do not come back. SSDI applications follow 
the economic cycle (Olsen 2016), suggesting weak labor demand could be the driver of 
disability rolls, not the reverse (Bernstein 2016). Both supply and demand-side 
proponents agree that the rise of mass incarceration has played a role in the declining 
labor force participation rate (Council of Economic Advisors 2016; Eberstadt 2016), 
especially in explaining the U.S. rate relative to other OECD countries. The incarcerated 
population is not counted when the BLS calculates the labor force participation rate, but 
the indirect effect occurs when men (and women) are released and face barriers to 




Findings and Analysis 
The findings in this chapter are organized into six sections. First, I explain in 
more detail how the BLS identifies labor force nonparticipation, and then I apply this 
measure to the labor force histories of the men in this study to determine their labor force 
attachment. Second, I briefly discuss the relatively small group of men in this study who 
have never experienced a spell outside the labor force, the Never-NILFs27. Third, I 
explore what I call episodic nonparticipation, defined as periods out of the labor force of 
less than one year. Fourth, I explore chronic nonparticipation, defined as periods of a 
year or more. For these chronic spells of nonparticipation, I examine the main reasons 
why men leave for extended periods: the pursuit of education and training; substance 
abuse; the receipt of disability benefits; and a fourth reason I term elective 
nonparticipation. I also describe a group that I call marginal men, about ten percent of 
those in the study, with tenuous attachment to the labor force. Fifth, I describe chronic 
churning, the phenomenon in which men leave the labor force for extended periods of 
time but come back and often persist in formal employment. Finally, I examine the 
blurriness of defining nonwork, including the role of unemployment insurance plays in 
the lives of many of these men. 
 
Labor Force Participation 
When the government determines someone’s labor force status for the purposes of 
calculating the labor force participation rate, the respondent is asked whether they did any 
                                                 
27 NILF is the acronym for Not in Labor Force. 
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work for pay or profit during the survey reference week.28 Those with jobs are considered 
employed, regardless of whether the job is full-time, part-time, temporary, or seasonal. 
Also considered employed are those who have a job but were not at work during the 
reference week for reasons like being on vacation, taking maternity or paternity leave, or 
involvement in a labor dispute. Those who do not have a job but who are actively looking 
for work and available to start a job are labeled as unemployed. Actively looking for 
work is defined as having taken one from among a series of concrete measures toward 
finding work over the preceding four weeks. The employed and unemployed together 
make up the labor force. Not included in the labor force are those who are neither 
employed nor unemployed, meaning those who do not have a job and are not actively 
looking for work. Common reasons for being not in the labor force according to the BLS 
definition include being retired, staying at home to care for children or others, and being 
in school (although one’s labor force status is determined irrespective of educational 
status, so a student with a job or looking for one is considered in the labor force). By 
definition, the purpose of the BLS is to sort respondents into two discrete categories: 
those who are participating in the labor force during the survey reference week, and those 
who aren’t. 
A key feature of the interview protocol in this study was a thorough questioning 
about the respondent’s full work history, with probes for periods of unemployment or 
nonwork. Based upon the respondent’s lifetime labor force history as described in the 
interview, I asked of each case if there would have been any times when the BLS would 
                                                 




have determined the respondent to be outside the labor force.29 Using this process, I first 
sorted the cases into two primary categories: 1) those men continuously in the labor force 
since high school (or whenever they left high school if they dropped out), and 2) those 
men for whom there was at least one period of a month or more since high school where 
they would have been determined to be outside the labor force had they been surveyed by 
the BLS. Based on this analysis, I determined that 13 of the 61 (21%) men have been 
continuously in the labor force since high school. Conversely, four-fifths of the of men 
(48 of 61, or 79%) have spent at least one month outside the labor force since high 
school. Next, I categorized each period outside the labor force by its length: episodic 
spells of nonparticipation are those periods outside the labor force of up to one year, and 
chronic spells are those periods one year or longer. Using these definitions, 34 of the 61 
men (56%) have had at least one spell of episodic labor force nonparticipation, and 28 of 
the 61 men (45%) in the study had at least one spell of chronic labor force 
nonparticipation. Fourteen of the 61 (23%) had spells of both episodic and chronic 
nonparticipation. 
                                                 
29 In most cases, determining the respondent’s labor force status at a given time is unambiguous: if they 
were working full- or part-time, they were employed. If they did not have a job but were actively looking, 
they were unemployed but still part of the labor force. Some episodes of nonwork are also easy to identify. 
However, there are cases in which determining labor force status for a particular man during a particular 
period is more challenging for several reasons that will emerge in this chapter. To the degree possible, I 
used probing questions during the interview itself to clarify these ambiguities in the moment, knowing that 
a primary goal of the study was exploring labor force nonparticipation. In these probes, I often asked the 
respondent how he would have characterized his situation during those periods in which his labor force 
status was unclear. However, even after seeking clarification, ambiguity sometimes remained. For the 
purposes of assigning those ambiguous periods to a labor force status, I used my knowledge of the BLS 
questions and the context of the man’s case to make an educated judgment. The analysis in this chapter 
does not hinge of whether my determination for every ambiguous case matches what the BLS might have 
found if the man had been interviewed in a given month. In fact, as will become clear in this chapter, these 
instances where labor force status is unclear provide the opportunity to expose how realities “on the 
ground” are often more complex than surveys allow. 
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Before exploring these spells of labor force nonparticipation in more detail, the 
first finding in this chapter is that relatively few men in this study have either been 
always working or always nonworking: most men have moved back and forth between 
these labor force statuses during their lives. As noted, all but twelve of the men in this 
study have at least one period outside the labor force since high school, and nearly half of 
the men in the study have had at least one period outside the labor force of a year or 
longer. Yet, on the whole, the men in this study show a high degree of labor force 
attachment. The labor force statuses of the men in the study at the time of the interview 
are in Table 1. Nearly 80 percent of the men were employed at the time of the initial 
interview, and five percent did not have a job but were actively looking for work, 
meaning they would be considered in the labor force by the BLS. Thus, about 85 percent 
of the men in this study would have been considered in the labor force at the time of the 
interview using the BLS definition, whereas only eight of the 61 men in the study—about 
13 percent—would have been considered not in the labor force at the time of the 
interview. Yet nearly 80 percent of the men in this study have spent at least one month 
outside the labor force since high school, and nearly half of the men in this study have 
had a spell of nonwork lasting a year or more. In short, nonwork is woven into these 




Table 2.1: Labor Force Status at Time of Interview 
 
 
This finding of fluidity in labor force status over time has at least two important 
implications for the measurement of nonwork. First, because the categories of worker and 
nonworker are not static, and a full accounting of declining labor force participation must 
consider this movement in and out of the labor force over time. This finding is consistent 
with recent work (Coglianese 2017) suggesting that existing literature about the declining 
labor force participation rate has overlooked an important third category of worker: those 
who participate in the labor force some but not all of the time, or “in and outs”. Yet these 
“in and outs” might only be part of the story of labor market fluidity. The CPS data that 
the BLS uses for the labor force participation rate is a rotating panel design, which 
follows households for a total of eighteen months: four months on, eight months off, and 
four months on.30 Using this data, Coglianese finds a group of men who take short breaks 
from work: “Most in-and-outs take an occasional short break in between jobs but are 
otherwise attached to the labor force” (2017: 1). While this finding is analogous to those 
                                                 





(N = 61) 
 
Percent 
   
Work Status (at time of interview)   
  Full-time 36 59 
  Part-time 12 20 
  Unemployed 5 8 
  Not in labor force (NILF) 8 13 




in this study who have periods of episodic nonparticipation, it still misses those with 
longer gaps in employment—chronic nonparticipation—who might not show up in the 
CPS at all. The lifetime labor force histories of the men in this study allows this set of 
cases to speak to labor force status over the long run in a way that can be missed in the 
CPS. As we will see in this chapter, there are men who would look quite differently to the 
BLS at different times in their lives, yet they are the same person.  
The finding that many men move in and out of the labor force over time has a 
second implication for understanding nonwork, namely that we should resist any 
impulse—implicit or explicit—to reify the categories of worker and nonworker. 
Categories in survey research must be mutually exclusive by definition; the BLS uses a 
series of questions to sort all respondents into the categories of in or out of the labor 
force. This is necessary but carries at least two risks. First, without the full context of the 
stories of these workers, important nuance and ambiguity can be lost in individual cases. 
As will emerge over the course of this chapter, there are cases where the actual labor 
market situation of men is complex, so simply assigning them as a “worker” or 
“nonworker” misses important context. Second, this finding also suggests that the men 
who are in and out of the labor force are not the same men from year-to-year or even 
month-to-month. There are cases discussed in this chapter where a man might have been 
largely out of the labor force for long stretches during one period of life but then fully 
attached during a different period. A cross-sectional survey of the men in this study 
would not only find different rates of nonwork at different times, but the men in and out 
of the labor force would also be different. For much of the remainder of this chapter, I 
use the rich detail of the cases in this study to explore the context for these periods of 
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nonwork, although I begin with the thirteen men who have not had a period outside the 
labor force since high school. 
 
Never-NILFs 
Thirteen of the 61 men in this study have been continuously in the labor force, a 
group I dub the Never-NILFs. These men are displayed in Table 2, arranged by current 
hourly wage, along with their age, highest level of education, and current occupation. 
There are a few themes that link these cases. First, relatively few of these men pursued 
post-secondary education or training. While this may seem counter-intuitive given this 
group’s continuous labor force attachment, one of the main reasons men in this study had 
a period of episodic nonparticipation is the pursuit of education or training. From the 
perspective of the BLS, one’s educational status is immaterial when determining labor 
force status; what matters is whether someone—student or not—worked for pay during 
the survey reference week. However, we know that those in school often take time off 
from work when pursuing their studies. With this context, it is not surprising that most of 
the Never-NILFs did not pursue education after high school, which removes one of the 
main reasons why men leave the labor force. Of the thirteen Never-NILFs, four pursued a 
short-term credential and only two pursued college. In all cases, the men worked at least 
part-time during the full duration of their education or training, thus remaining 
continuously in the labor force. However, in most cases, these men went from high 
school directly into the labor force. 
A second theme among these cases is that a disproportionate number of the 
Never-NILFs are self-employed when compared with the cases overall. While this is not 
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causally related to their status as Never-NILFs, it makes intuitive sense when assessing 
labor force status. If one is “the boss,” it is less likely one loses his job, even if business is 
slow. Two of the Never-NILFs are self-employed contractors; another runs his own 
trucking business; two work for family businesses; another consults with microbreweries; 
and another receives disability but makes money consistently on the side out of his house. 
While self-employment creates the potential for volatility on other variables like income, 
it makes labor force status—at least from the perspective of the BLS—arguably more 
secure. Finally, about the same percentage of Never-NILFs have good jobs as the sample 
overall, indicating that continuous attachment to the labor force, while perhaps a social 
good in-and-of-itself, does not make a man in this study more likely to earn a relatively 
high wage. There is one man among this group for whom I do not have income 
information, but of the remaining twelve, four of them—33 percent—have jobs that pay 
over $20 an hour. More about “good jobs” will be discussed in Chapter 4, but it does not 
appear that continuous labor force attachment itself is a predictor of having a better job. 
As the focus of this chapter is on nonwork, I now turn in greater detail to men with 









This section examines the shorter-term spells outside the labor force that I call 
episodic nonparticipation, defined as periods outside the labor force that lasted at least 
one month but less than one year. A majority of the men in this study—34 of 61, or 
56%—had at least one such spell of nonwork. Of those 34 men with at least one spell of 
episodic nonparticipation, 14 also had at least one spell of chronic nonparticipation, or a 
period outside the labor force of a year or more. This section only considers the 20 men 
in the study who only had spells of episodic nonparticipation but no spells of chronic 
nonparticipation. Among the 20 with only episodic nonparticipation, by far the most 





Highest Level of 
Education 
 
Current Occupation Current Wage 
     
Steve 47 High school Unemployed $0.00/hour 
Anthony 26 High school Self-employed $70/two weeks 
Jordan 24 BA Self-employed ~$1,000/month 
Randy 37 AA Self-employed $11.25/hour 
Paul 39 High school Front desk attendant $13.00/hour 
Doug 30 High school Chef $29,000/year 
Nick 38 Credential Heavy equipment operator $14.65/hour 
Cameron 33 High school Self-employed $36,000/year 
Thomas 32 High school Self-employed ~$20.00/hour 
Sean 39 Credential Law enforcement $26.00/hour 
Jeff 25 Credential Carpenter $29.61/hour 
Todd 46 High school Self-employed $150,000/year 
Brett 32 Credential Self-employed Unknown 




secondary education or training. As mentioned above, one’s labor force status is 
independent from whether one is in school, but students are often less likely to be 
working. These shorter-term spells of nonwork for reasons of education take several 
different forms. In some cases, men went to college after high school, only to learn that 
college was not for them and pivot quickly to the labor force. For example, Derek did one 
semester at a technical college before leaving school: “I just didn’t like it. I didn’t like the 
schoolin’.” When Derek got a job offer at a local tool and die shop, he left school for 
work and has been continuously in the labor force ever since, despite being laid off twice. 
Don’s time in college was also short-lived. He went to college after high school to pursue 
a degree in wildlife technology, but he also realized it was not for him: “But I literally 
partied my way out of school. But I was done with school. At 12 years, you know, I hated 
it. I went to college because I was supposed to and I didn’t last very long there.” As with 
Derek, things worked out for Don: he worked on a farm for a couple years, and then got 
an offer to work in the oil and gas industry, a job he has had for the last 22 years. While 
both Derek and Don have been stably employed for years, they technically have not been 
continuously in the labor force due to their brief times pursuing higher education after 
high school. For other men, the pursuit of high education was more enduring. Phil, who 
went to school to be a registered nurse, worked his way through school except for one 
summer when he chose not to work. He finished with his associate degree in five 
semesters, but because of his summer off, he technically has not been continuously in the 
labor force since high school in the eyes of the BLS. 
Another reason a few men in the study took shorter times out of the labor force 
related to their military service. Larry and Blake, who served in the Army and Coast 
54 
 
Guard respectively, both took a little time off before and after their military service. Both 
men had a gap between when they enlisted and when they started boot camp, and each 
took that time to relax. Larry joined right out of high school, so he took the month off 
between graduating and starting in the Army. Blake had a longer wait, and he primarily 
used the time to get into better physical shape. Similarly, after getting out, both men had 
saved up some money and took the opportunity for a break. As Larry said, “So, then I 
come back here, and I’m like, I have some money saved up, so I might as well take a 
month off and just not doing anything.” It was a chance for both men to make up for lost 
time. As Blake explained,  
And then I just went hunting, just kind of hang out. And, you know, just getting 
back with family… I missed my brother's wedding, I missed my brother's 
graduation, all that kind of stuff. So just, able to catch up. And then after that it 
was in January, I started looking for a job… 
 
Scott’s time out of the labor force was less voluntary. He joined the reserves after 
high school and was working in fast food when he was called up to active duty. After 
serving a tour in the Middle East, he was advised by the military to take a break before 
starting work:  
Um, so they said you know, we’ve seen people go back, and um, jump straight 
back into working, it just doesn’t work, so you really should think about if you 
can afford it, like they were talking about the families that had bills to pay and 
stuff. If you can afford it, don’t work for at least a month. 
 
Scott neglected this advice and went straight back to McDonald’s. Calling it 
“definitely the worst decision of my life,” he found the transition too much: “Um, 
transitioning from being out in the middle of a desert back into um, especially a job like 
McDonald’s, where things fast paced... um, I wasn’t ready for it.” He made it a couple 
months and quit. He tried a factory job, but he found he also hated that work, so he 
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moved to Florida where he lived with a cousin and blew off steam before returning to 
Pennsylvania and resuming work. 
In a few cases, men were laid off from work and took the opportunity to pursue 
more education or training, which took them out of the labor force for a relatively short 
time. Dan had worked for seven years at a warehouse, and when the company did some 
restructuring, they offered voluntary layoffs. He took the layoff, drew unemployment 
insurance, and used the opportunity to take a six-week course to earn his Commercial 
Driver’s License (CDL), after which he started as a long-haul truck driver. Similarly, 
Gary was laid off when the salvage operation where he worked for closed their local 
office, so he drew unemployment insurance and used the time to pursue what he called 
“nurse’s training.” However, in Gary’s case, his unemployment ran out before he could 
complete the training, so he had to abandon his studies and find another job to support his 
family. He was clearly upset by this development and had a different impression of the 
terms of his unemployment: “I was told if I started school, then my unemployment would 
keep going until I was done with school. I got comments, Obama said that uh, we’re 
cutting all, we’re not giving any extensions on unemployment. That’s cruel. I’m trying to 
better myself.” Both of these instances involve unemployment insurance, which provided 
temporary income that allowed Dan and Gary to seek retraining, not immediately jump 
into another job. Whether or not these episodes should be viewed as nonwork from the 
perspective of the BLS is complex, a topic I address in more detail later in this chapter. 
Overall, a consistent picture emerges of the men who only had episodic spells of 
nonparticipation: almost all of them have been continuously attached to the labor force 
except for brief but understandable periods away from work for education or recovery 
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from military service. This resonates with the work of Coglianese (2017), who finds that 
there are a growing number of men who take short breaks from work but are otherwise 
attached to the labor force most of the time. Further, Coglianese finds that the rise of in-
and-outs is driven partly by partner earnings in cases where men are married or 
cohabiting, and partly by virtue of living with parents for men who are single. This 
generally comports with the findings in this study, although given the younger nature of 
the men in this study, virtually all of the episodic nonwork among this group occurred 
among men who were single and childless at the time; only Gary had children at the time 
of his episodic nonparticipation. 
Three of the twenty cases of men who only have spells of episodic nonwork do 
not fit the general pattern. These three men are all young—under 27—and have struggled 
to consistently attach to the labor force. They do not have chronic nonparticipation 
because they have had periodic jobs or shown periodic work effort, but on the whole, 
they have either been unemployed or out of the labor force for long stretches of their 
early adult lives. Because these three men are qualitatively different than the others, I will 
treat their cases later in the chapter when I discuss those who I am calling marginal men, 
meaning those men in the study who are marginally attached to the labor force, regardless 
of whether their spells of nonwork are episodic or chronic. I now turn to consideration of 
those longer spells of nonwork, chronic nonparticipation. 
 
Chronic Nonparticipation 
While episodic nonparticipation is important to understand, it is chronic 
nonparticipation—spells outside the labor force of one year or longer—that is of greatest 
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interest to observers of the declining labor force participation rate among prime-age men. 
It is understandable and perhaps not surprising that men who are otherwise attached to 
the labor force for years at a time might occasionally take time out of the labor force for 
the reasons found above. It is less explicable why men in their prime-earning years would 
go for one or even more years without working or seeking work. Despite the high degree 
of labor force attachment of the men in this study at the time of interview (85%), an 
examination of the full labor force narratives of these 61 men finds that 28 of the 61—or 
46%—have had at least one spell of chronic nonparticipation since graduating from high 
school. In this section, I explore the four primary reasons for these extended labor force 
exits among the men in this study: the pursuit of education and training; struggles with 
substance abuse; the receipt of disability benefits; and what I call elective 
nonparticipation, in which men chose to spend time not working, often enabled by some 
combination of under-the-table work and support from family and friends. 
 
Education 
The least surprising and most socially acceptable reason why men in this study 
had extended time out of the labor force was for the pursuit of education or training. As 
we saw above, this was the primary reason why men had episodic spells of 
nonparticipation as well. In some cases, episodic nonparticipation for reasons of 
education was because the pursuit of the education itself was short-lived, such as when 
men realized that they were not suited for college and quickly pivoted to the labor force. 
In other cases, men completed their education but also worked to put themselves through 
school, meaning their time out of the labor force was short-lived even though they 
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finished their credential or degree. This story is similar among those who took longer 
periods out of the labor force for school. About half of the men who had a spell of 
chronic nonparticipation for education ultimately earned their degree, while the other half 
did not. In this sense, spending a longer time out of the labor force for education did not 
necessarily increase the likelihood of earning the degree. However, unlike the men who 
had a short spell of nonwork for education, most of the men who had a chronic spell 
pursued at least an associate degree, often a bachelor’s degree. 
Kyle went to a nearby state university after high school. He started as a business 
major but switched to sociology. He did not work during his first few years of school, but 
when his girlfriend got pregnant, Kyle needed to find a job. He found a customer service 
job and tried to stay in school, but that lasted for about six months before he found it to 
be too much: 
… because I was taking night classes, I was driving to [school], I have to work 
about two nights a week, and I was just absolutely beat, I had fallen asleep almost 
behind the wheel, so I had to stop that, it wasn’t worth it. And then I was irritable, 
and you know what I mean, an asshole, like I got home and tired, tired dealing 
with everybody. 
 
Kyle dropped out with about a year and half to go before earning his degree. He 
has worked several customer service jobs in the years since leaving school and currently 
works part-time at a grocery store for $10 an hour. Now 29, Kyle doesn’t see himself 
going back: 
Uh, I don’t, I can’t see myself going back right now. Um, just you know, I don’t 
know, I can’t see myself going back, being around eighteen-year olds again, I 
don’t know how well I would fit, um, and then just the time, and not being able to 
work, you know what I mean? Time to bring up a paycheck. 
 
Kyle isn’t the only man who took extended time out of the labor force but still 
ended up short of his bachelor’s degree. Victor, one of the few men in the study not 
59 
 
originally from northwestern Pennsylvania, has dabbled in school over the years, 
eventually earning an associate degree in business administration from a community 
college in Florida while working as a bartender before moving to northwestern 
Pennsylvania, where his wife was raised. He was just a few classes short of his bachelor’s 
degree in Florida, but he was turned off from finishing after taking an internship from a 
commercial real estate company. The company told him they would hire him after he 
finished his degree, but the starting salary would have been half of what he was already 
making as a bartender. He said, “I was like four classes away or something like that, and I 
was just like, ‘This is silly.’” He is currently unemployed but had a lead on a good-paying 
sales job at the time of our interview. Jeremiah completed five semesters of college 
between two different schools but never earned a certificate or degree. He didn’t work 
during that time, having been awarded an insurance settlement from a car accident. It was 
a time he described as his “reverse retirement,” “just kind of hanging out and traveling 
around.” Concerning the schooling itself, he said, “I kind of got to the point where I 
wasn’t sure what I wanted to do; I had no focus or direction, and I decided to take a break 
and I stopped.”  
A few of the men were more successful in earning a degree in return for their time 
out of the labor force, although it was not without obstacles. Dustin started at a local 
branch campus taking general education courses and figuring out what he wanted to do. 
He decided to pursue industrial arts and transferred to a state university a few hours away 
with a corresponding degree program, but when the cousin he was living with left the 
school, Dustin was “homesick on my own” and ended up moving home. For the next two 
years, he worked at a couple local manufacturers, eventually getting laid off. It was 
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during this time he saw an ad for an associate degree program in x-ray technology, so he 
enrolled. With the benefit of living at home and having unemployment insurance from his 
layoff, he did not have to work as he completed his degree. Likewise, Dennis had the 
benefit of his GI Bill and unemployment insurance drawn from his military discharge that 
allowed him to complete his associate degree without working. 
 
Substance Abuse 
For a few of the men in the study, addiction to drugs or alcohol made maintaining 
labor force attachment a challenge, which connects these findings with existing work that 
highlights the role of drug abuse with declining labor force nonparticipation (Krueger 
2017). When Sam graduated from high school, he said the only things he cared about 
were drinking and playing baseball. But after drinking himself out of two universities, he 
landed back in his hometown, where he enrolled in a local university and got a job at his 
family’s business. His drinking was taking its toll on his performance at work, and he 
wondered why some of his coworkers seemed to recover so quickly from nights of hard 
drinking. When he learned that it was because of crystal meth, it began his descent into 
addiction and eventually making and selling the drug. For two and half years in his early 
twenties, Sam dropped out of the labor force to make, sell, and take crystal meth. These 
were not idle times, as he was driving countless miles to buy the components of meth and 
then making and selling the drug. Sam explained, 
I mean, it was a lot of work. I had to deal with a lot of people that I didn’t want to 
deal with, like scummy, dirty people. But I needed to get my ingredients so I 
could have more, and I couldn’t go without it and if I wanted to pay my bills, I 
had to have you know, I had to have product to sell. So, it was either me 
producing it or trading what I had to somebody else who was producing it to get 
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product. I mean, it was a job, it was horrible. I mean it was the worse job in the 
whole world. 
 
A brush with law enforcement in his mid-twenties caused him to get a job and 
stay clean for a few years, during which time he finished his bachelor’s degree. However, 
in his late twenties he started using again, this time including other drugs like cocaine. 
For another two years, Sam was out of the labor force due to his addiction. This period 
ended abruptly when he was arrested on more serious charges, for which he eventually 
was sentenced to five years in prison, of which he served three and a half. (Those who are 
in residential facilities, including prison, are not counted in the labor force participation 
rate.) Released from prison in his early thirties, Sam finally managed to stay on the 
straight and narrow. Now over six years later, he is married with a child and works in 
management at a local manufacturer. 
Curtis has a similar experience with drugs, although his addiction started with a 
prescription. He had already smoked weed and moved to Ritalin when he was prescribed 
Vicodin for a disability when he was a teenager, which began his decade-long descent 
into drug use: 
It was a good time back then because, I mean, it just made you feel good. But uh, 
ended up getting really bad into it. And I ended up starting to sell drugs to make 
money for, you know, better ones obviously. And just got deeper and deeper until 
eventually that’s just what I did. There was a good stretch where I was probably 
spending a good five to $800 a day to maintain the habit. It was a, yeah, it was 
crazy. 
 
Curtis dropped out of high school at 17 and had so many run-ins with law 
enforcement: “I don’t even remember all of them now.” He moved among a number of 
apartments and had attempts to get clean, but nothing worked. During this time, he 
unknowingly participated in some controlled drug buys, and eventually, his apartment 
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was raided. He got out on bail but kept using until “my dad pretty much forced me” into a 
rehab program. Even that did not stick:  
But still um, like I would come back home on visits or whatever and like they 
give you a little bit of time every now and then to come back home on a visit and 
I would know I would hook up in and take it back to rehab and do the same stupid 
thing, but started struggling with it more at that point. Um, like not really wanting 
to go back to it, but that’s what I knew. 
 
He returned from rehab and waited for his court date. Once the court date arrived, 
Curtis was expecting a harsh sentence, but he was let off easy due to some mistakes made 
by the police. Curtis still had to spend a few days in jail, which for him marked a turning 
point: 
But, so while I was in jail, um, that was the huge turning point, turning point in 
my life. I mean everyone in there was just crazy. Like it was they were—I knew 
most of them, but they were just, they didn’t care. Like they just, it was just a 
little state of them, like they did something stupid and they were planning on 
going out and doing the same thing and they just didn’t even care. 
 
Curtis was released and has managed to stay away from drugs, even when he was 
prescribed Vicodin when his wisdom teeth were removed. He got a job at a local 
manufacturer that he has held for almost seven years. Now married with a young child, 
Curtis has been attached to the labor force almost as long and he was absent from it due 
to his addiction. 
Alex, now in his early forties, went for over fifteen years without being able to 
hold a job due to his alcoholism. Between finishing high school in the early 1990s and 
entering residential treatment in 2007 and again in 2010, he attempted jobs at no less than 
twelve businesses, but none of them stuck for any significant length of time. The jobs 
ranged from fast food to entry-level manufacturing, but none paid well and none lasted. 
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Married with children during this time, even those familial duties could not pull Alex 
from his addiction. He explains,  
I had my... with the drinking struggles, so, I probably just, uh, I would...I would 
collect unemployment and I wasn’t really rushing to get a job. But, what that did 
was, it put more time to me for myself and then when the kids go off to school, is 
when maybe I’d want to drink more because I wouldn’t really have anything to 
do, I was bored. So, it’s easy for someone to get in a rut like that. And then 
go...and then it to go on forever and, you know. 
 
After two stints in residential treatment, Alex finally managed to get clean in 2010. His 
marriage had ended and he moved back in with his parents, where he still lives. However, 
once clean, Alex has managed to stay stably employed for the last six years as a direct 
care staff at a local nursing home. 
Not all the stories involving substance abuse unfolded in same way as Sam, 
Curtis, and Alex. For example, not all men in this study with substance abuse problems 
have reattached to the labor force. Although still just 22, Frank has never held a job other 
than as a drug dealer aside from short stint in construction. He said he has tried most 
every drug and is a recovering opioid addict. Now he just smokes weed, and even that he 
tries not to do too often. But for Frank, selling drugs is what he knows: 
So, just sold weed for a while and, like, I don’t know, that’s just—that’s just how 
I supported myself. It’s how I knew to do it. It was easy. You could literally, like, 
do it, to where you’re only dealing with three people, and you’re not getting in 
trouble. And that’s just—that was it. It will support you. 
 
Because the work is so easy, Frank admits it’s hard to move to legitimate work: “I 
don’t know, like, when you start, it’s very difficult to go to a minimum wage job from 
doing that. It’s very difficult.” Yet he also expresses his desire to get a legitimate job and 
avoid going to prison. Not all struggles with substance abuse among the men in the study 
have resulted in labor force exit. For example, Don has struggled with alcoholism for 
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years, but it never cost him his job, due in part to the fact that he has a job where he is 
mostly on his own. He admits being hungover at work, but since his work is solitary, he 
admits he’s been lucky: “I probably could have failed a DUI test midday the next day. 
But it really… I’m lucky. I never got a DUI.”  
A couple men in the study not yet mentioned also are recovering from opioid 
addictions, but they were out of the labor force for other reasons before their addictions 
occurred. Brad, now 37, describes himself as an alcoholic when he was young; he says he 
stopped drinking about the time it would have been legal for him to start. Back problems 
in his early twenties qualified him for SSDI, after which he developed his addiction: 
“You start off normal. Just because of it being prescribed for pain. But that’s how it 
always starts with everybody. And it’s the worst thing anybody can put on me. Since I’ve 
been off, I actually hurt less than I ever did taking them.” Clean for eighteen months, 
Brad has reentered the labor force while keeping his disability; he works very limited 
hours at a local tattoo parlor, less for the money and mainly for the company and the 
structure. Carl, 31, was addicted to opioids from ages 17 to 30, a time during which he 
was often out of the labor force, although that was less due to drugs and more to his 
general attitude toward work. It was the birth of his daughter that he says woke him up 
about his addiction; he said he knew he would die if he did not get clean. The first step 
was admitting he had a problem: “And the funny thing was, the entire time I was like, 
‘These fucking drug addicts’, you know? But it took a long, a long, long time for me to 
admit to myself that I was a drug addict.” He lamented: 
But it’s amazing to me, ah, how many people even in this town right now, the 
older folks and stuff like that, that are taking these pills daily because it’s 
prescribed to them and they think, “Well, it’s fine, I’m allowed to.  It’s being 






Another reason why some men were outside the labor force was the receipt of 
disability benefits, although as I will discuss later in the chapter, several men who receive 
these benefits have returned to the labor force, formally and informally. Some men were 
originally diagnosed for childhood disabilities that have persisted into adulthood; some 
receive disability for trauma related to military service; and some for other health 
problems or workplace-related injuries. 
Three men—Anthony, Richard, and Trevor—received disability diagnoses as 
children that qualified them for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Anthony, now 26, 
was diagnosed with a brain tumor at age nine and rushed into surgery. He recovered but 
still attends therapy and cannot drive due to his risk of seizures. He lives at home with his 
parents and younger brother and gets between $500-600 per month in benefits, plus a 
small amount in food stamps. He has worked in the formal labor market on occasion, 
including several years as a part-time dishwasher at a local restaurant. But his primary 
pursuit is as a self-employed craftsperson and researcher. Anthony makes crafts and sells 
them online, as well as conducts genealogical research for hire. While he estimates he 
only brings in about $70 every two weeks through these jobs, he treats them seriously and 
most weeks can be found pursuing them diligently. In fact, despite receiving SSI, 
Anthony is a Never-NILF for the purposes of this study, as he has been doing work “for 
pay or profit” consistently since finishing high school. 
Richard and Trevor have also shown a fair degree of work effort despite having 
disability diagnoses as children. Richard’s mother experienced birth complications that 
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resulted in Richard being born with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Richard 
receives a full suite of services, including SSI, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), and housing assistance. Nonetheless, Richard has made several 
attempts to work, although all have been short-lived:  
Yeah, I’ve been disability, on disability almost for my whole life. But I, I stopped 
disability a few times for the, like um, jobs I had, and then I didn’t work out with 
them jobs, so I’d get put back put on Social Security disability because, because I, 
I, I didn’t, I, I couldn’t, I couldn’t handle them jobs… 
 
Trevor was born blind in one eye, which he says qualified him for support. Yet 
Trevor mostly worked from the time he dropped out of high school until a series of back 
problems in his thirties pushed him back onto disability as an adult: 
I’ve always had disability because of my eyes. I just chose to work instead of, 
instead of collecting the disability. Soon as my eyes got bad enough to the point 
where I couldn’t see… and I had the vertebrae removed in my bottom of my back, 
I just couldn’t – I just – I got disability instantly because I’ve always had it, you 
know, I mean, I’m blind. 
 
Trevor, who showed me photos of his surgical scars and clearly has trouble with 
mobility, currently survives on a combination of his disability and “buying and selling 
stuff” where he salvages items from the “side of the road… people moving out throw 
stuff out and don’t know what it’s worth.” He does this side hustle as his health allows: 
Yeah, there’s, there’s months that I really struggle, you know, and have to borrow 
money or something like that, but, but for the most part I can usually make 
anywhere from twenty to a hundred bucks a day you know, if um, if I’m 
physically able and capable of going around looking for stuff to sell. 
 
Two men in the study receive disability benefits from trauma experienced in 
military service. Brandon, served eight years as an Army mechanic, including two tours 
in Korea and one in Afghanistan. He says loved the military, but he didn’t realize the toll 
it took until he returned: 
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You don’t really notice until you get back. While you’re over there, you’re kind 
of in an alert stance the whole time you’re there. When you come back, you’re 
kind of settling down a little bit. You’re done with this. That’s when all the stuff 
starts kicking in. Like when I got back, I'm like damn. Glad I made it out of there 
ok. 
 
Upon his discharge, Brandon went to the Veterans Administration to sign up for 
benefits: 
It’s pretty much like I have to go see a behavioral health specialist and talk about 
stuff down in Afghanistan. All my problems and stuff. Then you go, I guess 
there’s a pension... a pension and compensation place that you go to. Tell them 
your story. They put it into a board I guess, and they decide if you’re going to get 
any kind of disability for it. So, I got like seventy percent just for my depression 
and anxiety alone. Not to mention like I didn't even put in for PTSD. 
 
Brandon mentions potentially using his GI Bill to pursue computer repair or nursing, but 
these days, he does not go out much: “I am much the closest thing you’ll probably find to 
a hermit apart from living in a cave, you know.” He says, “I don’t really deal with people 
too well.” He puts in a job application from time to time and recently did piecework for a 
local manufacturer, but with his disability, he says work is more for something to do.  
A couple other men who served in the military have applied or considered 
applying. Scott, who works in fast food, said he had knee surgery while in the military, so 
he “can always reapply for disability.” Justin, another veteran and currently elementary 
school teacher who thinks he probably has grounds for a claim, is uneasy with benefits of 
any kind, hence one reason why he resists disability: 
I don’t like to be a burden… I don’t push to get partial disability for my hearing 
loss or anything like that either. Um, I also have post-traumatic stress disorder, 
which is very thrown around these days. Who doesn’t, right? Um, but yeah, I 
don’t push that and mostly because ah, all the only thing... is that I can’t really 
watch firework displays very well, and someone pops a balloon, it’s gonna ruin 
my day for a couple of minutes, but I don’t... I don’t feel the need to take money I 
don’t need just because I can, if that makes sense.  I think that’s part of the 




A few men in the study receive disability benefits for health problems or 
workplace injuries. Jared was making good money as a long-haul truck driver when a 
series of heart attacks and strokes pushed him from the road to the disability rolls. It took 
him multiple attempts to qualify for benefits, a process that ultimately took about two 
years, during which it was a struggle for him to make ends meet. He lived on savings, but 
he also relied on the help of others, including getting help from a family who themselves 
relied on government assistance. Brad, who we met above because of the addiction to 
opioids he developed while on disability, applied for disability originally due to his 
“multiple back surgeries” from working for a company that installed rubber roofs on 
commercial buildings. Curtis, who we also first encountered because of his addiction to 
drugs, qualified for disability benefits at age 18 for a birth condition that affected his leg. 
Although his leg still bothers him, he gave up his disability seven years ago to work in a 
factory after he got off drugs and avoided prison time. 
As we see in these cases, there are several paths to the receipt of disability 
benefits, but receipt of benefits itself is not a permanent off ramp from the labor force. 
Disability provides an income floor for men with various diagnoses, but the fact also 
remains that most men in this study who receive disability benefits currently work—some 
above and some under-the-table—or have tried to work in the past. In some cases, the 
work is primarily for the money, but in others, it is as much for community and structure. 
Previous work on livelihood strategies in rural America shows that disability receipt is 
one of the least morally acceptable ways of making ends meet, ranking below 
unemployment insurance and just above welfare (Sherman 2006, 2009). And there is 
longstanding evidence that poor and working-class people are often the harshest judges of 
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those who are believed to unjustly receive government benefits (Edin and Lein 1997). 
These findings often focus on the ways racial stereotypes about African Americans 
influence white views on welfare (Gilens 1996), but in this study, these views also exist 
within racial groups, as 95 percent of the study participants and those in the field site are 
white. Men expressed everything from mild suspicion to scorn for those who receive 
benefits, although often couched in language indicating that benefits should exist for 
those who really need them. Jeff, for example, a union carpenter, was suspicious of his 
neighbor who receives disability: 
Um I, it comes down to every individual person. I could sit down and judge 
people all day. I don’t know their whole story. Um, I have a neighbor who lives 
that way, like directly that way, he injured himself. He’s forty-five and he’s a dull 
head now and he doesn’t work. He collects disability; it’s not a lot of disability, 
but I feel like he could do something. He’s able, he’s willing, but he’s just so 
wrapped up all the time. He’s, he’s in good shape. I mean, stuff like that really 
fries me. I’m going to work, making an effort to live, and then there’s people like 
that that really don’t give a crap. I get that. I feel like it’s for the, for the single 
mom, things like that. Or for the disabled people, not somebody that’s able. I 
mean, I know that he’s got some problems, but I feel like a lot of people are that 
don’t need to be on it and I’m helping to pay for it. It’s enough to piss you off. 
  
But as Jared, the former truck driver now on disability, made clear in his 
interview, those who think he has it made don’t understand the realities of living on 
disability: 
I only make nine nineteen a month to live on and stuff. Before I met her [his 
wife], that’s what I was living on, paying rent, paying bills and what was left over 
I lived on, you know? And everybody, I mean, I wake up a lot of people. Oh, 
“you’re on disability, you got it made.” No, I don’t, dude. You know, I mean, I’ve 
worked for what I got, but still, it’s rough. I don’t have no extras or nothing and 
stuff like that. And I would, I mean you can ask [my wife], I would love to be out 
there working. You can ask her. There’s days I sit there at the park watch trucks 
go by just wishing I was still driving, you know. Seeing my friends drive, you 
know, and waving at them and shit like that. It’s just, forty-three years old and 







A final reason why men have spells outside the labor force of a year or longer is 
what I call elective nonparticipation, which are periods where men drop out of the formal 
labor force, enabled by some combination of under-the-table work and support from 
family or friends. About half of the spells of chronic labor force dropout among men in 
this study are due to elective nonparticipation. Elective nonparticipators generally show a 
high degree of labor force attachment, but for various reasons, they have at least one long 
period out of the labor force for reasons other than education, substance abuse, or 
disability. Jeremy, in his late 30s when interviewed, has worked most of his life but had 
two stints of labor force nonparticipation in his 20s that lasted about two years each. In 
both cases, he had been laid off from a low-wage job and initially qualified for 
unemployment insurance. Single and still living at home, he chose to delay his job search 
in favor of living on his UI, supplemented with under-the-table work. His only bill was 
his truck payment, so expenses were low. He says he probably worked about every other 
day: “If I wanted to work, it was available.” He helped the household (“I brought in 
enough to help out around the house and do whatever I wanted to do”), but he also did a 
lot of fishing and four-wheeling. He admitted he was uneasy about the arrangement, but it 
was also easy to get accustomed to it, especially given the comparatively low return for 
his labor in the formal marketplace. He explained, 
I’d gotten accustomed to it. It was easy. I can see how some people get into the 
mindset of, ‘Well, if I can get this for doing very little, why should I go, why 
should I get a job, a full-time job and have to get up at o-dark-thirty every day and 
get home in the dark and whatever and not have much to show for it.’ Cause I was 
doing all these part-time jobs and odd jobs and things like that and that was 
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bringing in almost the same amount of money and only working maybe fifty 
percent of the time. 
 
Jeremy eventually went back to work after each spell of elective nonparticipation. 
The first time he simply re-entered the labor force into a manual job that paid just above 
the minimum wage. It was his layoff from that job four years later that prompted his 
second stint of elective nonparticipation. His second reentry into the formal labor force 
coincided with meeting the woman who is now his wife. In fact, his wife helped him 
apply for non-civil service jobs with the state, one of which he eventually got. His hourly 
rate, while still relatively modest, is almost twice the minimum wage, but the benefits 
make the job worthwhile: 
Benefits are real good. That is one of the main reasons why I’m still there. My 
benefits cover the full family, including my two step-children, my two step-
daughters.  My union benefits, well my union dues and things like that, my 
medical benefits that includes health, vision, dental, prescription, the whole nine 
yards. 
 
Although he is trying to move to a different department because of conflict with his 
current boss, he has no plans to leave: “Wherever I go, I plan on staying within the state 
system. I plan on retiring from the state.” 
Like Jeremy, Seth has a story of spending many years churning through a series 
of low-paying jobs before finally attaching to more remunerative work. After high 
school, Seth worked a series of jobs, including time in manufacturing, manual labor, 
customer service, and sales. Some work paid better than others, but none of the jobs 
offered a clear path forward. When he was laid off from the sales job, Seth drew 
unemployment insurance and stayed out of the formal labor force for a year and a half: 
“Year and a half I floated. Totally floated.” Seth did what he needed to do to bring in 
enough income to supplement his UI: 
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Just cash. Nothing really crazy to report. Nothing. I mean, if I was gonna make 
eight or $9,000, I probably would’ve reported it. But a lot of it was all cash 
transactions. Just here’s 50 bucks. Mow the grass. Clean the garage. You know, 
haul that junk out to the pile and burn it. Okay, I could do that all day long. And I 
was that guy that always did the outdoor work. 
 
Without much intention, Seth slowly worked his way back into the formal labor 
force. One of the jobs he did on occasion was piling lumber, a common entry-level job in 
the area that many men in this study have done at one time or another. One of the men 
Seth worked for as a piler eventually hired him onto a traveling crew, and at that point, 
Seth wanted things to be on the books: “I was worried if we worked so long for 
somewhere for some guy, you know, it was all cash transactions and it was gonna bite 
me.” Seth spoke well of his boss’s “down-to-earth” nature, but at the same time, Seth 
complained about the disparity between his pay and the boss’s wealth: “… he’s building 
a $40,000 fireplace, he’s only paying me $12 an hour to pile lumber as fast as I can move 
all day.” Seth, by then in his early 30s, knew he was “going nowhere” and needed 
something better. He worked on the lumber crew for a couple years, but he was applying 
for jobs constantly: “I couldn’t figure out why am I not getting hired for all these jobs. 
I’m applying everywhere. I did some interviews.” He got more savvy about his resume, 
and he feels like that helped get himself in the door working in the warehouse of a local 
manufacturer. Fortunately for Seth, it is a union employer, so he started at $15.65 an 
hour. In the years since, he was switched positions, had his employer pay for additional 
education, and now makes $21.65 with additional incentives for working second shift. 
Ryan has worked most of his adult life but has had two stints of about a year each 
outside the labor force. The oldest of six kids, Ryan grew up in a trailer outside of a small 
town. Ryan’s dad did long-haul trucking so was often gone, but Ryan enjoyed time with 
73 
 
his dad when he was home: “that’s where the good part came in.” However, Ryan’s dad 
died when he was sixteen, throwing the family into turmoil. The family moved into the 
nearby town, but his mom was using drugs and would disappear for long stretches such 
that he and his brother would have to handle the household. Both he and his brother 
dropped out of high school and began working to support the family; the money his mom 
received in survivor’s benefits went to drugs and gambling. Ryan’s first job was at 
factory for minimum wage, after which he worked for several years as a pool installer for 
$8.00 an hour with no guaranteed hours, overtime pay, breaks, or lunches. He moved on 
to telemarketing but was fired for swearing on a call. By this point, he was on his own 
and living with his girlfriend, who was expecting their first child. He got a job, but it 
required travel, so he decided he would rather be home:  
After having a daughter, I’m like, “You know, I really need a job, but this is kinda 
neat, you know. I’m not gonna go back to it. I wanna, you know, spend two 
weeks to a month with my daughter anyways, growing up, you know. [The travel 
job] wasn’t a job for somebody who just had a kid anyways, being on the road a 
week at a time. So, I didn’t work there for a while…” 
 
He eventually got a job in maintenance at a motel for minimum wage, but when 
that job ended, Ryan again had a spell outside the formal labor force. During these 
stretches of elective nonparticipation, Ryan’s girlfriend worked nights at a local 
restaurant, so he helped with the kids during the day: “With her working and I wasn’t 
working, we had somebody to sit with the kids, you know, the house stayed clean. I-I, 
you know, I was watching the kids, cleaning the house, cooking dinner, breakfast, all 
that. You know, Mr. Mom stuff.” Ryan would sometimes take day labor, depending on 
the weather and who had money:  
I mean, it seemed one month, it might be I was working steady for two weeks 
straight at a time, and then I’d take a week off, and they’d want me back. And 
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then the next, it might be where we don’t have money, or “we want you to do this, 
but the weather’s looking pretty rough,” you know? 
 
This combination of his girlfriend’s work and his piecework made things manageable: 
“So, I mean, things worked. We got by. We were never rich.” Ryan eventually split with 
his girlfriend; for the last year, he has worked part-time stocking shelves at a grocery 
store for $7.50 an hour. 
George is another man in the study who has worked most of his life but took one 
extended break from the labor force to help at home. George has almost always worked 
in customer service at grocery stores and other big box retailers. However, he never made 
much more than minimum wage, and he always has had the sense that there were limited 
paths of upward mobility for him: “I was not somebody they viewed as management 
material, and I think I’d hit the glass ceiling as far as somebody who was going to go 
without getting into management.” After he went through a period of churning through 
several customer service jobs in short order, his wife—who worked for a nonprofit—
suggested that he stay home. George, who said he “always had a close relationship with 
my kids,” stayed home for about a year before returning to work, again in food service. 
Years later, George transitioned to manufacturing, having managed to get a job through a 
temp agency that became permanent. He makes $12.50 an hour, the most he has ever 
earned, with good benefits and opportunity for overtime.   
For a couple of the elective nonparticipators, their employment histories include 
long stretches of unemployment that illustrate the sometimes-blurry line between 
unemployment and nonwork. Charles graduated from high school and attended a few 
years of college, working during the summers. However, when one of his parents was 
killed, he moved home and took eighteen months out of the labor force to grieve and be 
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close to family. He eventually finished his degree at a different university, but he said he 
looked for a job in his field for four years: “It was very stressful. I spent a lot time going 
on the internet. And a lot of time applying for jobs. I got very familiar with Monster dot 
com.” Living at home, Charles actively looked for work while working under-the-table: 
“You know, little gigs here and there, but, you know, like, ah, you know but, ah, nothing 
formal.” After years of searching, the best he could do was a telemarketing job about an 
hour’s drive away. Although he did not like the commute and it paid just $10.28 an hour, 
he worked the job for four and a half years before being let go in a mass layoff. He was 
on unemployment for eighteen months, again unsuccessful at finding work. He worked 
briefly in quality control, but said it “just wasn’t the right job for me.” He did some temp 
work and eventually worked for about a year for a temp agency itself, but again, he was 
let go and spent about a year looking for work: “I’ve been applying for jobs left and right 
around here. There’s, you know, there’s not too many jobs, but the job... you know, but 
when I last saw something that I thought I would be qualified for, I would apply.” At the 
time of the interview, Charles had just started a job for $9 an hour in a local 
manufacturing facility in a position he hoped would lead into management. Overall, 
Charles has spent more years unemployed than employed, although he claims to have 
been looking for work during all his years of unemployment. His more tenuous 
connection to the labor force stands in contrast to the elective participators, who show a 
pattern of long stretches of employment punctuated by discrete periods of nonwork. 
Christian is another man in the study who has education, skills, and experience, 
yet he has been largely unsuccessful at finding work in northwestern Pennsylvania. He 
went to a trade school after high school but got impatient for income and left school for a 
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factory job just before earning his degree. When he was laid off from the factory, he 
enlisted in the military, serving in the Air Force for four years. Through an Air Force 
connection, he got a good civilian job in Virginia after his discharge that took him all 
over the world. During his time in the service, he got romantically involved with a 
woman from home. She lived with him in Virginia for a time, but when they got pregnant 
with their first child, they wanted to be closer to home. Christian started working out of 
Erie, the closest town to home with an international airport, but management changed and 
required all employees to work out of Virginia. Christian commuted for a time, but when 
their second child was on the way, he quit and they moved back to their hometown. The 
time since moving back has been much more uncertain. While his wife had a good job, he 
took about three years out of the labor force to be a stay-at-home dad and use his GI Bill 
to earn a degree online. His first foray into the local labor force was as a self-employed 
electrician for a time, but he found he did not like the collections side of the job and left 
that work after about eighteen months. From there, Christian was hired as an electrician 
at a local manufacturing plant, where he worked for a couple years. He was recruited 
away by another manufacturer, only to have them lay him off after a short time, a 
decision about which he never learned the reason: “I asked for an explanation. They don’t 
need to give me one. It’s a right-to-work or state or whatever that is.” Unemployed and 
drawing unemployment insurance for the last four months, Christian—at age 41—is 
again looking for work. While he has worked more consistently than Charles, his time out 
of the labor force and bouts with unemployment give his labor force history certain 





A small group of the men in this study—about 10 percent—have labor force 
histories that qualify them as marginal men, meaning they have been marginally attached 
to the labor force over time. These men often have long gaps of unemployment or 
nonwork, but it is less clear when compared with the elective nonparticipators that these 
men are looking for work or would take a job if one were available. While these men 
have held jobs, usually their periods of employment are short-lived. Of all the men in this 
study, this group mostly closely resembles the working-class men discussed in a recent 
piece by Edin et al. (2019) as having tenuous attachments to the institutions of work, 
family, and religion. Additionally, although other men in this study have had traumatic 
and unfortunate circumstances, the stories of the marginal men seem particularly beset 
with trauma. Yet even this relatively small group is not homogeneous when it concerns 
their reasons for nonparticipation in the labor force. 
Gabe graduated from high school in 2009, and in the nine years since, he has 
worked a total of about fifteen months across three different employers. Living at home, 
it took him about five years after high school to get his first job: “So, the employment 
thing stayed that way for a while, even after that, because by that point, I’m putting in 
applications and stuff, and who’s gonna hire a 23-year-old with no experience?” About 
one year of his work experience has been with Wal-Mart, divided between two different 
six-month stints. The first time, he said he “worked there for five, six months and started 
having panic attacks and um, so that’s, that ended that.” He got a second chance, but he 
violated their attendance policy by missing too many days, so he was let go. Gabe has 
battled depression, which he described in some detail: 
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I don’t know, I just never have been on any pills, I just kind of worked myself out 
of it over time. And thing about depression, it never goes away, it will always be 
there, it’s just a matter of do you fight it, or do you let it take over? And most 
days, I fight it. Most days I can get a handle on it, it’s just every so often, it just 
sneaks in. It’s manageable. Depression is manageable without pills, it can be 
done. But it’s just not a lot of people have that support system to help them either. 
I had, the first time I didn’t really have much of a support system, so that’s why it 
took so long. The second time… I had people around me that wanted to talk to 
me, that wanted, I had a pretty decent-sized support system. It honestly does help 
to have people to talk to or people who will listen. It’s so helpful, and I’m really 
grateful for that, they helped me out of a really dark spot. 
 
When asked about his periods of unemployment, Gabe says that his understanding 
with his Mom, who works a demanding job, is that he keeps house when he is not earning 
anything: “Keep the dishes clean, make sure the laundry is done, cook dinner once and a 
while.” But he also watches a lot of TV, which he connects with his depression: “Um, uh 
the depression. A lot of sitting around the house watching whatever happened to be on 
TV. At one point, I had the TV line-up down, like for an eight-hour period on a weekday, 
because it was the same thing every day.” At the time of the interview, Gabe had been 
working part-time for a chain store for a few months, earning minimum wage. He likes 
the atmosphere at the store, describing it as “a family-style deal” when compared with 
Wal-Mart’s “military-like deal”, where managers treat you like you’re an app”. He likes 
his co-workers and finds the job fulfilling: 
The people are friendly, and um, I feel like to you can’t have fun with your co-
workers, you’re not in the right place. But that’s part of what keeps the job 
interesting, is uh, being able to have fun with your co-workers. But um, just uh 
getting to help people out, and uh watching the people smile. I like seeing people 
smile. So, like having, having them come through my line, and be like, “Did you 
find everything okay today?” And “Okay, sure.  Thanks,” and then they smile and 
walk out the door, and I’m like, “Cool.” That’s nice, I like that. 
 
Like Gabe, Adrian and Jeff are in their mid-twenties and have struggled to attach 
to the labor force. Originally from the American southwest, Adrian, 24, did three 
79 
 
semesters of community college before dropping out. For about the next five years, his 
main job to speak of was as a delivery driver for Pizza Hut, which lasted about a year-
and-a-half. He had a very short stint trying to sell knives door to door, but it was only for 
commission and was not a good fit for his introverted personality. He moved to 
northwestern Pennsylvania after meeting someone from the area through online gaming. 
Most recently, Adrian worked a seasonal job in a warehouse, but that ended five months 
ago. His situation had grown increasingly precarious: he is living at a boarding house but 
has no ability to pay, so he is contemplating selling his car or living in it: 
I mean, I’m trying to sell my car and I’m trying to get work, but like right now, is 
one of those times where I’m not in the comfortable part. I feel like someone’s 
breathing down my neck all the time. I really am trying to get work but nothing’s 
biting yet. So truthfully, I don’t know either—I figure either I sell the car and I get 
the rent paid or I get kicked out and live in the car, so. 
 
He describes himself as anti-social, which affects his interest seeking work: “I don’t like 
being in crowds, I don’t like being around people. And going out and getting work is 
going around people and not hiding in your room.” With no interest in returning home 
and few local connections, Adrian’s immediate future is uncertain. 
Jeff, 26, had an early life marked by family trauma. His parents divorced when he 
was young, and his step-dad was later severely injured and become abusive, ultimately 
going to prison for attacking a family friend when Jeff’s mother fled the home with the 
kids. As an adult, Jeff’s sometimes volatile relationships with his family has made his 
residential history unstable, often moving back and forth among different family 
members. Like Gabe and Adrian, Jeff has struggled to stay attached to the labor force. In 
his first years after high school, he worked temp jobs on-and-off, which he followed with 
stints at Wal-Mart, a factory, and a couple short-lived manual jobs. He admits, “Yeah, 
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I’ve bounced around way too much.” His current stretch of unemployment has lasted nine 
months, and there is no evidence he is actively looking for work. Living with the parents 
of a friend, he receives food stamps and medical coverage but has no cash income, aside 
from “random times” when he does odd jobs for cash. 
A few of the marginal men have children, which further complicates their 
situations. Cody has lived what he termed a “transient” life. Raised in the Northeastern 
United States, he has mainly worked in construction, which has taken him to New 
Orleans, Alabama, and later, Pennsylvania. His lifestyle was unconventional, which 
included partying and drugs, but he always managed to make a living and provide for 
himself: “I can put a roof on a house, outside the house I can build additions, I’ve done 
concrete work, everything. Anything to make a buck, man.” His situation changed when 
he fell for a woman when living in northwestern Pennsylvania and they found themselves 
pregnant: “You know, which I wasn’t planning, I wasn’t practicing safe sex with her, I 
wasn’t thinking right.” For the first year of their child’s life, they lived with her parents. 
But according to Cody, the mother of his child went on a drug-fueled binge and is 
currently incarcerated. Having moved out from the parents of his ex-girlfriend but 
without work or support, Cody and his son were recently evicted from their apartment: “I 
looked up there and it was like bags and bags and bags of shit, and it’s all my shit.” Cody 
and his son have found temporary respite living with a friend, but the future is uncertain. 
Having last worked “about a year and a half ago”, Cody has struggled to balance child 
care and work: “I have nobody to babysit.” He admits he is struggling.  
Finally, a couple of the marginal men seem to more actively spurn traditional 
employment in favor of alternative visions of work and sustenance. Keith, just 22, has 
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already had a couple long stretches of unemployment since graduating high school, 
totaling about two-and-a-half years. Keith has never had a driver’s license, which limits 
the scope of his employment prospects, although he says he diligently applies to all the 
places he can. In addition to working a couple food service jobs, he has tried manual 
labor, selling knives, and reselling items online. But Keith strikes a critical note about his 
experiences with conventional employment, expressing his desire to eventually live 
sustainably: 
But, uh, I always felt like I was in a hamster wheel. Uh, it just felt like, um, I see 
where the money goes, in a general sense, it seems like it all goes to a very small 
group of people. It seems like, no matter where you spend your money, no matter 
where it’s going, it’s going to, you know, this guy owns this company and this 
guy owns this company, but there is a guy above them who probably owns all of 
it. It’s – you know, they say a trickledown economy or whatever, but I just didn’t 
– I don’t see it like that. And so, I always thought, “Man, if I just worked really 
hard for myself, you know, I always thought it would go a lot further… you need 
to just nonstop work, work, work, work, and it’s a lot of work. You’re doing a 
whole lot of stuff. Uh, and I thought, you know, if you were – if you were just 
doing that in your own yard and doing – in your own land, it would be something 
completely different. And – and, uh, oh, man, that’s a – so, that’s – that’s – that’s 
my view on – on, you know, what – what you’re getting out of the work in the 
current economy. Here, it’s – it’s, uh, whew, it’s – you’re not – your work you put 
in it, it does not seem to be – to be worth – worth, uh, the money, you know? So, I 
don’t know, I don't know, uh, exactly how I am going to get to my goal, but my 
goal is to own my own plot of land, with people sustaining off of our own self-
sustaining economy, you know? Grow our own food, have our own animals, uh, 
the whole nine yards, there’s plenty more than that. 
 
Keith currently lives at home, which he also seeks to recast as an opportunity to help his 
parents: 
But my parents are kind enough to have me at the house for now, and so that, um 
– I notice that there’s an idea that is put in everybody’s heads which is that you’re 
a bum if you live in your parents’ house, but I also look at it as in, well, my 
parents are also getting up there. 
 
Keith continues to look for work, but he is also content gardening with his father and 
helping around the house. He says his needs are simple, and he is happy: “I have no 
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source of income, and I am not a needy person, I don’t spend money, like, on stuff. Like, 
I don’t need money to be happy, you know?” 
Carl, 31, also marches to the beat of his own drummer. In the dozen or so years 
since high school, Carl has rarely held a conventional job for any length of time, 
something to which he readily admits: “I’ve always had trouble keeping a job of sorts 
that you have to be here for this X amount of time.” He explains, “I daydream a lot. So, 
it’s hard for me to be stuck in a place.” Calling himself a “young hippy”, Carl expresses 
little interest in conventional employment. Carl’s lifestyle has been enabled by having a 
free place to stay that is owned by his working-class parents. When he needs money, he 
finds odd jobs or does tattoos and piercings. His attempts to attach to the labor force have 
been complicated by a long-standing addiction to opioids, although he says he has been 
clean for about a year. Recently a new father, Carl still seems unconcerned with the 
future. When asked his plans, he says he doesn’t even know what he is doing later today, 
let alone years down the road. He adds, “I think it’s easier for my life to do that.” 
Echoing Keith, the closest thing to a plan Carl mentions is to one day have “a little farm-
type deal” with chickens, bees, and a garden. For now, he is content to go where the wind 
blow and “just get rid of things, things, things, things.” 
 
Chronic Churning 
Almost half of the men in this study had at least one spell of chronic 
nonparticipation at some point since high school. As discussed at length above, the 
reasons for these spells vary: some pursued education or training; some qualified for 
disability benefits; some had battles with substance abuse; and some elected to leave the 
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formal labor force for a period of time. Yet perhaps as important as why men leave the 
labor force is whether or not they return, something less detectable in the rotating panel 
design of the CPS. In this study, by virtue of having the full labor force narratives of 
these men, I can not only provide a fuller context for these decisions to leave the labor 
force, I can track whether men reenter the labor force after extended exits. Table 3 lists 
the 28 men in the study with a period of chronic nonparticipation after high school. These 
men are grouped by labor force status at the time of the interview: not in the labor force 
(NILF); unemployed; working part-time; or working full-time. Recall that unemployment 
here is used as the BLS defines it: not working but actively looking for work, such that 
these unemployed men would be considered part of the labor force. Within these four 
labor force categories, men are arranged by their tenure at their current job in ascending 
order.  
There are three important findings in this table. First, of the 28 men in this sample 
who had at least one period of chronic nonparticipation, all but six were in the labor force 
at the time of the interview, evidence that even extended labor force exits are often not 
permanent. This challenges notions—implicit or explicit—that the categories of worker 
and nonworker are fixed or that nonworkers rarely reenter the labor force. I label this 
phenomenon chronic churning. This finding complements the discovery of the “in-and-
outs” (Coglianese 2017), and together, these findings suggest that a full accounting of 
declining labor force participation must consider the movement of men in and out of the 
labor force, some for relatively short periods (“in-and-outs”) and others for longer spells 
(“chronic churners”). The second finding is that many of the men who have returned to 
formal work after an extended labor force exit have shown longstanding labor force 
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attachment. In Table 2, not only have many chronic nonparticipators returned to the labor 
force, they have persisted in work: 16 of the 19 men with a job have been at their position 
for at least one year, and 10 of the 17 have been at their job for at least five years, which 
is additional evidence that extended labor force exits are not fatal to men’s work 
aspirations. Third, as denoted by the asterisks, eight of the 28 chronic nonparticipators are 
current or former recipients of some form of disability benefits. While we saw earlier in 
the chapter that disability is one reasons for chronic labor force exits, it is notable that 
more than half of the men who currently receive disability also are in the labor force, an 








    
Name Age at Time of 
Interview 
Labor Force Status at 
Time of Interview 
Tenure at Current Job 
or in Current Status 
    
    
Jeff 26 NILF 10 months 
Cody 37 NILF 1.5 years 
Richard* 35 NILF 1.5 years 
Trevor* 41 NILF 3 years 
Frank 22 NILF 4 years 
Jared* 43 NILF 6 years 
    
Brandon* 35 Unemployed 1 month 
Christian 41 Unemployed 5 months 
Victor 40 Unemployed 10 months 
    
Gabe 27 Part-time 3 months 
Kyle 29 Part-time 8 months 
Evan 28 Part-time 1 year 
Ryan 26 Part-time 1 year 
Carl 31 Part-time 1 year 
Brad* 37 Part-time 1.5 years 
William* 39 Part-time 2.5 years 
Patrick** 39 Part-time 5 years 
    
Charles 39 Full-time 6 weeks 
Jeremy 39 Full-time 4 years 
Sam 37 Full-time 5 years 
Jeremiah 38 Full-time 5 years 
George 40 Full-time 6 years 
Seth 40 Full-time 6 years 
Alex 43 Full-time 6 years 
Curtis** 33 Full-time 7 years 
Dennis 33 Full-time 9 years 
Zach 43 Full-time 11 years 
Dustin 46 Full-time 15 years 
    
* Indicates current receipt of disability benefits 
** Indicates former receipt of disability benefits 
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Unemployment Insurance as Livelihood Strategy 
One theme that emerged among these cases is the role of unemployment 
insurance (UI) as a livelihood strategy for the men in this study. Economists have long 
studied UI, and there is consensus that while UI is an important feature of modern 
welfare states, it represents a trade-off between consumption smoothing for unemployed 
workers and the moral hazard of increasing unemployment by discouraging job search 
(Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2018; Schmieder and Von Wachter 2016). Previous work 
on UI in the sociological literature has been scarcer. In her study of how members of a 
mill town cope with poverty in rural California (“Golden Valley”), Sherman finds that “a 
large proportion of local men” (2006: 898) receive unemployment insurance, driven by 
the seasonal nature of the dominant industries. While technically government assistance, 
UI is perceived as earned income by her respondents and does not have the stigma of 
other forms of assistance, such as welfare or even disability. UI is less likely to be a 
strategy for the extremely poor (Edin and Shaefer 2015), who do not have enough 
attachment to the formal labor force to qualify for benefits. Recent work shows that the 
populations receiving SSDI and UI are largely non-overlapping (Mueller, Rothstein, and 
Von Wachter 2016), meaning that an investigation of UI is different in kind than one of 
SSDI. 
Although the work of men in this study is less seasonal than it was for Sherman’s 
respondents in Golden Valley, UI was still common: at least one-third of the men have 
drawn UI at least once, with many men drawing it multiple times. Perhaps more 
important than its presence is the way in which UI was used strategically by both 
employees and employers. Several men in this study used their time on UI to pursue 
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education or training rather than immediately look for work. Dan took a voluntary layoff 
from his warehouse job and used the time on UI to earn his Commercial Driver’s License 
(CDL). Drawing UI allowed Dustin not to have to work while he was in school as an x-
ray technician: “I was able to collect unemployment almost the whole two years that I 
went to school.” As we saw earlier in the chapter, Gary drew UI after a layoff and 
enrolled in a nurse’s training program, although his benefits ran out unexpectedly before 
he completed the training, pushing him back into the labor force without the credential: 
“That’s cruel. I’m trying to better myself.” 
Several men drew UI after being discharged from the military. Justin drew UI for 
six months after getting out of the Army: “I actually had 6 months of unemployment that 
I totally utilized because I actually made more on unemployment than I did the year I was 
in Afghanistan.” He said it would have been irresponsible for him not to take the benefit: 
“But...it would have been irresponsible for me to find a job around here until that [the UI] 
was gone, so when that was gone, I got a job at [a fast food restaurant] and went to 
school.” He said he took a big pay cut moving from his UI based on his military pay to 
his fast food work. Austin also drew UI for six months after his discharge: 
So, I was starting up college, but, uh, I got called into the unemployment office in 
August, and they were nice, and they – they – I – I was impressed with the 
unemployment office, and there was, like, six or seven of us sitting there, and 
everybody was like, “Well, you guys have to start a re-training program or some 
sort of education.” I was like, “I start college in two weeks.” [They said], “Get out 
of here.” 
 
Like Justin, Austin noted that between the UI and his GI Bill benefit, he was making 
more after discharge than he did while he was enlisted. And Dennis also drew UI after his 
military service: “I actually – the first – I think the first six months I was out of the 
Marines, I actually collected unemployment, you know, I’m eligible for that.” 
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Employers also used UI strategically. As mentioned, rather than do full layoffs, 
Nick’s employer, a local manufacturer, asked workers to work every other week when 
business was slow. As Nick explained, 
I worked there for four years. They started going downhill. It was kind of, you 
know, an economy thing. They were getting less business, less jobs that we were 
actually doing work for. So, they asked us to take a... it wasn’t a full layoff. It was 
every other week. So, when we work for a week and was laid off for a week. I’d 
get a regular paycheck from working. I’d collect an unemployment check. It’s 
every other week like that for a while. 
 
The precarity eventually led Nick to get his CDL and pursue a different career. Jeff, a 
union carpenter, draws UI in between his union job assignments, which allows him to 
complete continuing education related to his trade but also allows some rest and 
relaxation: 
Um, I think my, my biggest amount of time being laid off uh I think was probably 
three or four weeks, and I absolutely loved it. If, if you have other things to do, 
it’s the perfect time. I mean you still have about half the money you see on your 
check coming in, which is nice. 
 
Another union member, Seth, was laid off for about a year, during which time he 
collected unemployment insurance and took advantage of the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program.31 He said, “when I got laid off it was the perfect time for me to get 
laid off, because I knew I was gonna be collecting unemployment.” Seth used the time to 
get additional training, worked under-the-table, and collected UI until he was called back 
to work by his employer. 





As discussed earlier in the chapter, UI also enabled some men in the study to have 
extended spells outside the formal labor force. Informal employment has long been a 
focus of rural scholars (McGranahan 2003), and for many men in this study, UI (and to a 
lesser degree, disability benefits) allowed them to combined formal and informal 
approaches. Jeremy had two extended stints outside of formal work, both initiated by a 
layoff and qualification for UI. The jobs from which Jeremy was let go paid only slightly 
more than the minimum wage, so when Jeremy combined his UI with under-the-table 
work, he was making roughly the same money for a fraction of the time, which further 
incentivized him to maintain the arrangement. Charles has also had long stretches of 
unemployment where he has drawn UI and worked under-the-table construction while 
looking for formal work. While men appreciated having the income from UI, there was 
still the reality of needing to make a relatively little money goa long way. As Seth 
described his time on UI: 
You know, if you had bills to pay and you know, the rent was due when you only 
had 60 bucks in your pocket, the mind’s turning. What can I do? Can I go split 
some firewood? Sure. Can I go do this? Yeah, okay. You know, there’s a whole 
bunch of old tin laying at the camp, and let’s haul that in for scrap, you know. 
 
An issue that underlies most of these cases concerns the fact that an active job 
search is an on-going requirement of maintaining unemployment insurance benefits32, 
thus meaning any person on UI is technically in the labor force when receiving the 
benefit. However, as we have seen in the cases of many of the men in this study, 
employment and unemployment situations are often complex. While some men very 
                                                 
32 For current requirements of the Pennsylvania unemployment insurance program, see 
https://eligibility.com/unemployment/pennsylvania-pa-unemployment-benefits, although it should be noted 
that the men in this study have drawn UI at different times when rules might have varied. 
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adamant about their sustained, genuine job search effort while on UI, other men 
suggested they were less diligent. As Alex said, “I would collect unemployment and I 
wasn’t really rushing to get a job.” Justin, the veteran who drew UI for six months after 
his discharge, said he “didn’t do much” during that period. And Victor, who was let go 
from a good job when the company closed its local branch, saw his time on UI as a bit of 
a reward for having experienced the layoff: “I had unemployment kind of as a, ‘I’ve been 
through this, whatever, I’m just going to take it easy.’” As he admitted, “In my personal 
opinion, once you get into the unemployment part of it, it makes it really hard to go back 
to work.” For many men, there is a tradeoff when drawing UI. For men who are only 
likely to earn low wages in the formal labor market, the combination of UI and under-the-
table work creates a financial disincentive to return. For men who were earning more 
when they were laid off, there is less incentive to leave for UI for a low-wage job when it 
might not be more than they get on UI from a higher-paying job. As Victor explained, 
“I’ve been able to put some money aside, so I’m like, “What’s the point of going to work 
somewhere for $20,000, $10 an hour, whatever the case is?” Victor actively looked for 
work during his time on UI, but he was not willing to give up UI for just any job. He 
turned down several job offers while on UI that were not up to his standards. 
Several men talked at great length about how they navigated the state’s 
employment system during their time receiving UI benefits. Victor described needing to 
show adequate work effort using the state’s online system: 
You know, you have to go through their Keystone job site or whatever and apply 
for a few jobs there, or – and then, once they – they see that you’re making some 
kind of, uh, initiative, then they just kind of put you along. And then, if they audit 




As mentioned, Victor applied for jobs and even turned down offers, but it did not make 
sense to him to leave the program except for a worthwhile opportunity. In fact, it took 
Victor several months after his UI had run out to find the type of job he wanted, but he 
had saved money and his wife was working, so he was glad he waited for the right 
opportunity. Similarly, Seth demonstrates the ambiguity of the job search in this extended 
exchange: 
Seth: Yeah. I, I floated for at least a year and a half.  
 
Interviewer: Yeah. And then – 
 
Seth: Could be closer to two. But I floated. I took full advantage of the, you know, 
they kept offering all the extensions for the unemployment. All I had to do a 
search for work, but nobody was hiring. I mean I had to… I had to do three job 
searches every week. I did some in person. I had to keep in touch with the 
CareerLink. And they had me take some classes there to help me out too. When I 
originally got laid off [from my most recent job], I had to do all the stuff at 
CareerLink. When I got laid off the first time [from a previous employer], I didn’t 
have to do nothing. 
 
Interviewer: Oh really? 
 
Seth: I just called in, job search, write it all on a piece of paper. You know I kept 
track of all that because I knew if something when haywire they were gonna ask 
me, “Where did you search for jobs July 10 through July 17?” I know. But I kept 
a nice ledger and I kept all my stuff. 
 
Interviewer: So you had to show some, but – 
 
Seth: Sure. Oh, I was looking for work. If I would’ve found a job somewhere, 
anywhere that was gonna pay somewhat decent, I was gonna take it, you know. I 
mean I fished a lot and I, I traveled. I worked with [a friend]… like a month 
straight restoring houses. 
 
Interviewer: Nice, yeah. 
 
Seth: I did take advantage of a little bit of the cash under the table deal, but as 





Dennis, the Marine who drew UI after his discharge, described how even unemployment 
staff themselves helped him navigate the system: 
So, and then, like, the unemployment office was real good with me, and they’re 
like, “Well, what do you got going on?” I’m like, “Well, I’m in college.” They’re 
like, “Okay, well, thank you for your service, you know, as long as you kind of 
apply for a couple of jobs once in a while, we’re okay with it.” I’m like, “Okay.” 
 
Dennis used savings from his time in the military, his GI Bill, and six months of UI to go 
back to technical college, earning his associate degree in eighteen months. 
This demonstration of the blurriness of the job search as also plays into the 
primary topic of this chapter, namely the investigation into rising rates of nonwork 
among prime-age men. Technically, someone would be considered in the labor force 
when receiving unemployment insurance, but as we have seen, a person’s actual status 
can sometimes be less clear, regardless of what determination the BLS might make about 
the situation of any particular case in a given month. While these men expressed some 
level of conscientiousness about how they were handling the UI system, there is also 
evidence among some men that they were adept at doing what it took to maintain 
appearances so as not to jeopardize their benefits.  
There is reason to suspect that similar pressure exists when men, for example, 
answer the questions of survey researchers about their employment status. This is 
underscored by Jeremy, who had two extended spells out of the labor force during which 
he drew some UI and worked under-the-table. He admitted being uneasy about his time 
out of the labor force, which suggests that nonwork remains at least somewhat socially 
unacceptable contrary to claims otherwise by some observers of declining labor force 
participation (Eberstadt 2016; Murray 2012). The following exchange not only 
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demonstrates the desire to save face with family during these spells of unemployment, 
but sensitivity to maintaining compliance in the eyes of the state: 
Interviewer: Yeah, okay. So, so if someone had, if someone had asked you during 
that two years if you were working, what would you, how would you have 
answered? 
 
Jeremy: Depends on the individual that asked. 
 
Interviewer: Okay, who would you have said yes to and who would you have said 
no to? 
 
Jeremy: Friends, family I would tell them that I was working part-time. But when 
it came to like, we’ll say, CareerLink, I was unemployed. 
 
Interviewer: Okay, so if like a government worker had called you and said, “are 






The declining labor force participation rate among prime-age men has been an 
empirical and policy puzzle for many years, and in this chapter, I have asked with many 
others, “Where have all the workers gone?” (Eberstadt 2016; Krueger 2017). Using the 
lifetime labor force narratives of 61 working-class men in rural Pennsylvania, I explore 
the ways in which these men move in and out of the labor force over time. First, I identify 
the phenomenon of chronic churning, in which men leave the labor force for one year or 
more yet reenter the labor force. This finding complements the discovery of the “in-and-
outs” (Coglianese 2017), and together, these findings suggest that a full accounting of 
declining labor force participation must consider the movement of men in and out of the 
labor force over time. Rather than a labor force composed of two classes of men with 
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distinct characteristics—workers and nonworkers—the prevalence of chronic churning 
suggests that labor force dropout is not confined to a small number of men, but that it has 
become part of way men navigate the labor market in the twenty-first century. Chronic 
churning also shows that extended periods of labor force nonparticipation are not fatal to 
work aspiration, and even extended labor force disconnection is usually not permanent, 
even for reasons of disability or substance abuse. Overall, chronic churning paints a 
picture of the labor force experiences of working-class men as more dynamic than 
previously understood, where the line between work and nonwork is often less clear than 
survey research suggests. 
Second, using the benefit of the extended labor force narratives of 61 working-
class men, I offer context for why men leave the labor force, especially when they do so 
for longer periods of time. I find four reasons why men leave the labor force: education 
and training, substance abuse, disability benefits, and elective nonparticipation, in which 
men elect to leave for a period of time but eventually return. An important first step in 
addressing labor force dropout is a deeper understanding of the proximate reasons why 
men leave work. A theme across these cases, regardless of the reason for dropping out of 
the formal labor force, is that nonparticipation in the labor force, even for reasons of 
disability, does not always mean nonwork. Whether in the formal labor force or not, all 
men need to support themselves, and in some cases, their families. Yet while most of the 
men in this study work most of the time, there is also a small group of men—about ten 
percent of the cases—who are marginally attached to the labor force. Some of these men 
show little interest in work, while others more actively reject certain cultural norms 
around work. I explore how these men understand their identities vis-à-vis the changing 
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nature of work in Chapter 5, but for the next two chapters, I turn to how men seek to 
improve their labor market prospects (Chapter 3) and how some men still manage to find 
“good jobs” (Chapter 4).
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CHAPTER 3: MOVING ON UP? HOW AND WHY RURAL, WORKING-CLASS 
MEN DO—AND DON’T—SEEK TO IMPROVE THEIR LABOR MARKET 
PROSPECTS 
The growth of “bad jobs” for men without a college degree has been well-
documented. Numerous studies—both quantitative and qualitative—have described 
dismal job prospects for low- and middle-skill workers, including low wages, few 
opportunities for wage growth or advancement, few benefits, and low job security (Autor 
2011; Autor and Dorn 2009; Chen 2015; Kalleberg 2009, 2011; Newman 2009; Silva 
2013). Men without a college degree are particularly vulnerable in today’s labor market 
because of declining job availability and job quality in the manufacturing sector, leading 
to stagnant or falling wages (Morris and Western 1999; Pilat et al. 2006). The decrease in 
manufacturing has been accompanied by the rapid growth of the service sector, where 
jobs traditionally have had lower wages and fewer benefits as compared with 
manufacturing (Autor and Dorn 2009). The challenge facing working-class men is 
particularly acute in rural places, where employment opportunities have generally been 
worse than in urban America (Slack 2007) and where wage growth continues to be 
slower (Cromartie 2017). 
Despite this dismal outlook, men with less than a college degree are not without 
recourse to improve their situations. Rational choice theory predicts that men facing poor 
employment prospects or low wages will seek to improve their situations. In particular, 
there are three primary ways men might attempt to improve their labor market position: 
1) by upskilling, meaning getting additional education or training, thus making 
themselves more employable or more competitive for better jobs; 2) by geographic 
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mobility, or moving to an area where jobs are more plentiful or of better quality, a tactic 
especially applicable for men living in rural areas with limited opportunities; and 3) by 
occupational flexibility, or taking jobs not traditionally done by men, such as in female-
dominated occupations like care work. Researchers and policymakers have stressed these 
paths of employment uplift, yet available evidence suggests that men have largely been 
resistant to these avenues of social mobility (Austin et al. 2018; Bound and Holzer 2000; 
Doar, Holzer, and Orrell 2017; Ganong and Shoag 2017), although the reasons why are 
less understood. 
This chapter explores the ways in which rural, working-class men do—and do 
not—seek to improve their labor market position. With the benefit of the full educational 
and labor force narratives of 61 working-class men in rural Pennsylvania, I paint a robust 
picture of what men are—and are not—doing to improve their earning potential, 
including the reasons some men are not pursuing the strategies academics and 
policymakers think they should. While much existing work on this topic focuses on 
outcomes—such as whether or not low-employment men complete a credential, move, or 
take a nontraditional job—the narratives on which this chapter are based allow me to also 
show process, such as when someone starts a credential but does not finish, moves away 
but returns, or takes preliminary steps toward a nontraditional job but does not follow 
through. The evidence presented in this chapter shows that men are often doing more to 
improve their labor market position than outcome-based accounts allow, which 
demonstrates an agency among less-educated men previously underappreciated. First, I 
find that a majority of men in this study have pursued some sort of postsecondary 
education or training; however, rather than pursuing post-secondary education as a means 
98 
 
of economic uplift, I find that this is often a means of vocational discernment for men 
who are not afforded the same space to explore careers as their college-going peers. Yet 
even though men use education and training to explore, they are still practically-minded 
about their post-secondary plans, quick to abandon paths that they do not see as leading 
to employment. And for both employees and employers, there is reason to suspect that 
certain training or credentialing may prove less valuable in rural places where an ability 
to do the job is more important than credentials on paper. Second, despite evidence that 
Americans in general are moving less for work (Austin et al. 2018; Ganong and Shoag 
2017), the men in this study often took one of a set of what I call mobility measures to 
improve their labor market opportunities, such as enlisting in the military, taking jobs that 
require travel, or moving away for brief periods on what I call prospecting trips in which 
men move without a job in search of better opportunities. I also find that men who 
attempt a mobility measure are usually drawn back to the area by several factors, 
including the “stickiness” of rural place and obligations to custodial and noncustodial 
children. Finally, I find that while few men have worked nontraditional jobs, many more 
have considered such jobs and even taken preliminary steps toward such work. This said, 
the few men in this study who are in female-dominated occupations testify to resistance 
from family and peers, indicating that certain cultural barriers remain entrenched. Given 
the cultural cost in switching to female-dominated careers and the availability of at least 
some blue-collar work that pays well, it may take even more time and further decimation 






The Decline in Job Quality for Low- and Middle-Skill Men 
Over the past few decades, a series of economic changes have resulted in a 
different employment landscape, especially for low- and middle-skill men. The American 
labor market has been marked by a decrease in middle-skill jobs (Jaimovich and Siu 
2012); a decline in routine occupations, which tend to be middle-skill (Albanesi et al. 
2013; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003); and a polarization between good and bad jobs 
(Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Kalleberg 2011). The result is an economy in which 
precarity and insecurity have increased for many workers (Cooper 2014; Hacker 2008; 
Kalleberg 2009; Silva 2013). These changes have been particularly acute for low- and 
middle-skilled workers, who have experienced a reduction in wages relative to other 
groups (Council of Economic Advisers 2016). Manufacturing and production, which 
have traditionally been a source of good-paying work for less-educated men, have lost 
jobs in recent decades (Acemoglu et al. 2016; Autor et al. 2014; Kalleberg 2011; Morris 
and Western 1999; Osterman 2014; Pierce and Schott 2016). Meanwhile, lower-paying 
jobs in the service sector have proliferated (Autor and Dorn 2013). The United States lost 
30 percent of its manufacturing jobs between 1998 and 2016 (Bhattarai 2016), and more 
than 80 percent of all private jobs are now in the service sector (Casselman 2016). The 
result is a relative decrease in secure, semi-skilled, middle-income jobs (Bresnahan et al. 
2002; Freeman and Katz 2007; Katz and Murphy 1992; Krueger 1993; Levy and 
Murnane 1992; Tüzemen and Willis 2013; Wright and Dwyer 2003). 
The reasons for these economic changes are varied and debated. Skill-biased 
technological change has depressed wages for occupations that require manual or routine 
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labor (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Goldin and Katz 1998b), a phenomenon 
concentrated in industries most exposed to foreign competition and international trade 
(Autor, Dorn, and Gordon H Hanson 2013), particularly expanded trade with China 
(Acemoglu et al. 2016; Autor et al. 2014; Pierce and Schott 2016). These pressures of 
global competition have lead employers to seek to lower labor costs, including by moving 
operations to lower-wage countries (Kalleberg 2009). Employers have also increasingly 
moved away from standard employment arrangements to those characterized by 
employee flexibility and reduced wages and benefits (Benner 2008; Gordon 1996; Katz 
and Krueger 2016; Osterman 2014). And even though manufacturing employment has 
been rising again since about 2010, the return of production has not meant the return of 
jobs, as technology replaces low-skill workers (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017; 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). The concurrent decimation of private sector unions 
since the 1970s as the “core equalizing institution” vis-à-vis corporate actors (Rosenfeld 
2014) has meant increased income inequality (Kollmeyer 2018) and a decline in the value 
of the minimum wage (Card 2001), which also hurts nonunion workers (Western and 
Rosenfeld 2011).  
These changes have extracted a large cost for low- and middle-skill men. Real 
male earnings today are lower than in the 1970s (Greenstone and Looney 2011b; Mishel 
et al. 2012), and among full-time, full-year male workers, all but college-educated men 
have experienced double-digit decreases in inflation-adjusted mean earnings since 1969 
(Greenstone and Looney 2011b). Job quality has also declined: the adequacy of 
employer-sponsored health insurance benefits has decreased (Collins, Gunja, and Doty 
2017); there is less job stability for men (Hollister 2011); and there has been a growth in 
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involuntary part-time jobs (Glauber 2017) and a large decrease in the share of men 
working full-time (Greenstone and Looney 2011b) or looking for work at all (Abraham 
and Kearney 2018; Council of Economic Advisors 2016).  
The declining job prospects that low- and middle-skill men have faced over the 
last four decades further deteriorated during the Great Recession, which began in 2008 
(Hout, Levanon, and Cumberworth 2011). Recessions are typically characterized by 
significant income losses, high unemployment, investment losses, high rates of home 
foreclosures, and declines in credit availability. The recessionary period between the end 
of 2007 and 2009 has been identified as the worst financial shock in the United States 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s and is widely referred to as the “Great 
Recession” (Hout, Levanon, Cumberworth, et al. 2011). The unemployment rate was 
about double the pre-recession rate, hovering at 5.0 percent in January of 2008 and 
climbing to 9-10% in 2009 through 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Home 
foreclosures were exceptionally high (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011). While job loss 
and unemployment were widespread for workers across the educational spectrum (Kroft 
et al. 2015),  no demographic group of American workers was as adversely affected by 
the recession as less-educated males, especially young men (Sum et al. 2011). One of the 
reasons why low- and middle-skill men were more adversely affected during the Great 
Recession was because of declines in industries that have traditionally employed these 
men, including manufacturing and construction (Goodman and Mance 2011). Goods-
producing industries usually experience the largest declines in employment during 
recessions, and the Great Recession was no different, with construction and 
manufacturing both experiencing their largest percentage declines of the post-WWII era 
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(Barker 2011; Goodman and Mance 2011). Construction was among the hardest hit 
industries, as both residential and nonresidential construction declined rapidly during the 
recession (Hadi 2011). 
 
Upwardly Mobile Pathways in Today’s Labor Market 
Despite the focus on labor market polarization and the decline in job quality for 
low- and middle-skill men, there are ways for men with less than a four-year college 
degree to improve their labor market position short of earning a bachelor’s degree. The 
three tactics most prominent in literature on employment are 1) upskilling, the addition of 
skills and credentials; 2) geographic mobility, the willingness to move to places where 
jobs are more plentiful or of better quality; and 3) occupational flexibility, taking jobs in 
occupations or industries not traditional to one’s personal characteristics. 
 
Upskilling 
Contrary to pessimism about the availability of jobs for those with less than a 
four-year college degree, there is evidence of the existence of a robust middle-skill job 
market33 (Autor 2015; Burrowes et al. 2014; Holzer and Lerman 2007, 2009). Holzer and 
Lerman (2007) estimate that approximately half of all jobs as of 2006 were middle-skill, 
with projections that demand for middle-skill jobs will remain robust into the future. 
They show that the traditional middle of the job market—composed primarily of 
                                                 




construction, production, and clerical jobs that require little education—has indeed been 
declining rapidly. But another set of middle-skill jobs—in health care, mechanical 
maintenance and repair, and some services—that require some postsecondary education 
or training is consistently growing, as are skill needs within traditionally unskilled jobs 
(Autor 2015; Holzer 2015b; Holzer and Lerman 2007, 2009). Men with more education 
are more likely to be in the labor force (Burke 2017), and even among men who have a 
high school degree or less, past research has shown that a substantial percentage of these 
workers are able to move out of low-wage jobs and into better ones over the course of 
their career (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005; Newman 2006a). 
The evidence is mixed about the roles of education and training in improving 
earnings for low- and middle-skill workers. Early research on the returns to vocational 
training within high school showed no effects, and past research shows few benefits for 
much sub-baccalaureate training (Dar and Gill 1998; Norton Grubb 1997). However, 
subsequent work has shown positive wage and employment effects of the vocational 
track (for a review, see Eichhorst et al. 2015), and some training programs lead to higher 
wages (for a review, see Holzer 2012). In particular, sector-based training, in which 
employers in a particular sector partner with training providers and intermediaries to link 
trained individuals with particular jobs, has shown wage increases for low-skilled men 
that persist over time (Hendra et al. 2016; Maguire et al. 2010). In general, while the 
evidence is inconclusive on training given the diversity of approaches, it is a durable 
finding that more formal education generally leads to higher lifetime earnings (Ma, 
Pender, and Welch 2016; Norton Grubb 1997), and the idea that less-educated and hard-
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to-employ men should seek additional skills and training is common among academics 
and policy makers (Doar et al. 2017; Wessel 2016). 
 
Geographic Mobility 
While American history has been marked by many waves of migration—the Gold 
Rush, the Depression, postwar westward expansion, the Great Migrations of African 
Americans—evidence shows that both intra-county and intercounty migration rates have 
dropped significantly in recent decades (Austin et al. 2018), including migration to high-
income areas (Ganong and Shoag 2017). Reasons for this slowdown are myriad34 but 
include the high cost of housing in some areas (Glaeser and Saiz 2003) and land-use 
restrictions (Herkenhoff, Ohanian, and Prescott 2018). Yet despite these barriers to 
mobility, there is a still a sense among observers that less-educated men living in areas of 
limited employment opportunities would do well to move (Yglesias 2013), especially 
because regional income convergence has slowed (Berry and Glaeser 2005; Moretti 
2011) and place-based nonparticipation in the labor force has become durable (Austin et 
al. 2018). There is evidence that the college-educated (Cadena and Kovak 2016; Wozniak 
2010) and immigrants (Cadena and Kovak 2016) are much more willing to move for 
economic opportunities than non-graduates and non-immigrants, and there is a sense that 
those with skills and aspirations need to leave rural places in order to succeed (Carr and 
Kefalas 2009). From a policymaking perspective, some have proposed offering moving 
subsidies to help the long-term unemployed move to stronger labor markets (Strain 
                                                 
34 For a fuller discussion, see Austin, Glaeser, and Summers (2018). 
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2014), while others—conceding that most workers will not move—recommend place-
based policies (Austin et al. 2018). 
 
Occupational Flexibility 
Despite some changes in gender differences in occupational employment over 
time (Wootton 1997), there remains a relatively high degree of gender difference in 
certain occupations (England 2010; Wootton 1997). Past research has shown that low- 
and middle-skill men are reluctant to enter female-dominated industries because of lower 
pay and prestige (England 2005; Gatta and Roos 2005; Simpson 2005), and leading 
gender theorists have argued that men’s resistance to entering occupations staffed largely 
by women reflects the persistent devaluation of roles and activities that are seen as 
feminine (Peters and Dush 2010; Ridgeway and England 2007). This is despite the fact 
that men who enter so-called pink-collar jobs experience more job security and wage 
growth than in blue-collar work (Dill, Price-Glynn, and Rakovski 2016), and men 
generally have unseen advantages—“the glass escalator”—in female-dominated 
occupations (Williams 1992, 2013). Yet there is a cultural script within masculinity about 
the types of work “real men” do (and do not) do (Williams 2010), which makes 
adaptation to a changed labor market not just a case of sheer economics (Cherlin 2014). 
There is a tendency for workers to look for jobs like they used to have, not ones that 
currently exist (Kroft et al. 2015), which is in keeping with the idea that many men—
especially white, working-class men—compare their labor market prospects less to the 
available options and more to the types of job their fathers and grandfathers held (Cherlin 
2018), even if it means living in less optimal economic situations. For those men who do 
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work in traditionally-female jobs, there is evidence of role strain (Simpson 2005), but 
men also employ a variety of strategies to reestablish masculinity in those employment 
situations (Simpson 2004). 
 
Findings and Analysis 
In this section, I examine the degree to which men in this study have adopted 
strategies to improve their labor market position. In particular, I examine 1) whether men 
have sought additional skills and credentials; 2) if they have moved or traveled in search 
of better opportunities; and 3) the degree to which they have—or expressed a 
willingness—to take nontraditional jobs or work in female-dominated occupations. I find 
that most of the men in the study have attempted one or more of these strategies, although 




The most common of the labor market advancement strategies in this study is 
upskilling, which is any training or credentialing beyond a high school diploma or 
equivalent.35 The highest level of educational attainment of the men in the study is 
displayed in Table 1. The modal level of highest educational attainment is a high school 
diploma or equivalent, which make up a little more than one-third of the cases; however, 
                                                 
35 Not included as upskilling for the purposes of this study is any on-the-job training, which imparts job 
skills but is not independently sought by the employee. 
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a plurality of the men in the study has attempted or completed post-secondary education 
or training. About one-fifth of the men in the study earned a credential; another one-fifth 
attended some college but failed to earn a degree; and another one-fifth earned an 
associate or bachelor’s degree.36 Only one man dropped out of high school and failed to 
return for his GED. 
 
Table 3.1: Highest Educational Attainment 
 
 
Among those who earned credentials, the most common was a commercial 
driver’s license (CDL), earned by five men. Three of the five acquired their CDL to do 
long-haul trucking, while the other two drive locally, defined as routes that do not require 
                                                 
36 As discussed at more length in Chapter 2, this set of cases—despite 20 percent having earned at least an 
associate degree—is still solidly working class: virtually all men come from a working-class background 
according to parental education and occupation; work in traditionally blue-collar or working-class 




(N = 61) 
 
Percent 
   
Less than high school 1 2 
GED 3 5 
High school diploma 18 30 
Some training, no credential 1 2 
Post-secondary credential (e.g. CDL) 13 21 
Some college, no degree 11 18 
Associate degree 7 11 
Bachelor’s degree 7 11 
   
Total 61 100 




an overnight stay, even if sometimes they require travel to other states. Several men 
earned a credential in auto mechanics; two men became Emergency Medical Technicians 
(EMTs); and two completed training at the police academy. For those who earned an 
associate degree, most were for vocational or technical training, and most were earned 
from for-profit entities. Most of the bachelor’s degrees were from nonprofit schools, all 
within the state of Pennsylvania. 
Given the particular challenge for those who take on the debts associated with 
higher education but fail to earn a meaningful credential to take into the labor market 
(Fry 2014), an important subgroup of cases are those men who have completed some 
college but did not earn a degree. In this study, this group includes a range of cases, 
which mirrors national trends (Shapiro et al. 2014). A couple men in this category 
enrolled in a local university but failed to complete any credits; in both cases, the men 
took on a relatively small amount of debt, and both have since paid off those obligations. 
This differs greatly from others who attended several years of college, often getting very 
close to earning a degree before leaving. 
 
“On-the-Job” Adulthood 
How do the men in this study speak about their decisions to pursue post-
secondary education or training? There has been a well-documented “college for all” 
push in recent decades (Reynolds and Baird 2010; Rosenbaum 2001) so pervasive that 
the aspiration to attend college persists well into adulthood, even among low-income 
students who have failed to make progress toward a degree (Alexander, Entwisle, and 
Olson 2014; Deterding 2015). Further, for those low-income students who pursue a post-
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secondary credential, many find themselves taken in by predatory, for-profit schools that 
often leave students with debt and no viable credential (Cottom 2017; Holland and 
DeLuca 2016; Nguyen 2012). Yet despite these poor returns of education for low-income 
and working-class youth, recent work by (Silva and Snellman 2018) argue that working-
class young adults still cast the decision to go to college in terms of their “salvation”—as 
the way out of the grim realities of working-class life, a tool that allows them to generate 
efficacy and optimism about the future, despite the fact that most do not have the 
knowledge or practical guidance to successfully navigate the landscape of higher 
education.  
In contrast to this picture of working-class young adulthood in existing literature, 
the men in this study evince neither the “college for all” mantra, nor do they see college 
as a means of salvation from working-class life. In fact, these men embrace their place 
within the working class, and for them, education and training is one way to explore 
vocational interests at a time of life when many of their college-going peers are doing the 
same, but the latter in the context of college, as they switch majors, take internships and 
summer jobs, and make their first forays into the working world. Upon examining the 
narratives of the men in this study, I argue that the fact that a plurality of the have tried 
some type of post-secondary education should not be understood as an attempt to escape 
working-class life or accrue a credential that set them apart from working-class peers, but 
as an exercise of vocational exploration in an employment landscape that no longer 
answers the vocational question for them by guaranteeing a lifetime job simply by 
walking across town from the high school to the plant. 
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Some men in this study have little opportunity to explore vocations, as life 
circumstances or personal choices thrust them into adulthood much sooner than expected, 
limiting opportunities for personal growth. For example, Ryan and his older brother, 
whose dad had already passed away, both dropped out of high school to work when their 
mom became addicted to drugs, leaving them to raise their younger siblings and bring 
income into the home. Frank and Curtis both got into drugs while in high school, pursuits 
they carried into young adulthood that derailed more legitimate efforts at vocational 
exploration and discernment.  
But for most men in the study, there was a period of exploration after high school 
and well into adulthood that usually did not follow a straight-line path, even for those 
who eventually earned a degree or credential. Only one of the seven men in this study 
with a bachelor’s degree enrolled directly after high school and finished in four years. Of 
seven men with an associate degree, less than half went straight into the program after 
high school and finished on time. And of the thirteen with a credential, only four earned 
their credential right after high school and then used it in the labor market after earning it. 
While one perspective on this is that these men are poorly equipped to navigate the world 
of post-secondary education (Silva 2013; Silva and Snellman 2018), another is that these 
men simply do not know what they want to do and are trying out options, some of which 
require education and some of which do not. 
A good example of this type of meandering path of vocational exploration is 
Justin. Justin, now 34, was born to a steelworker father and homemaker mother. Two 
weeks after high school, he enrolled in a culinary school in Pittsburgh with the thought 
that he “wanted to be a chef on a cruise line,” mostly because he wanted to travel. 
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However, he left after just one term, finding he didn’t like cooking other people’s recipes, 
plus he “spent way too much money there.” (He took out $6,000 for school; he paid down 
about $2,000 of the total, and then his parents eventually paid off the rest.) Justin moved 
home and got a job as short order cook for a local restaurant, but he had a falling out with 
the owner and then took a job unloading trucks at a warehouse. He was contacted by a 
military recruiter when he was having a bad day and was talked into taking the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), even though he was quite unsure about 
the military. When he scored well, he enlisted “on a whim” and ended up serving five 
years, including thirteen months deployed to Afghanistan. Once he was discharged, he 
was still unsure his next step: 
So yeah, but then once I got out of the Army, I came back home, got a job, found 
out that I couldn’t really get a shop job where I could just shut my brain off when 
I get home and be with my family, so I went back to school with the intention—I 
thought I was going to be a nurse—but I was walking a dog, which... a dog I 
brought back from Hawaii and it had a little too big a bowel movement and I 
vomited so I knew that I probably shouldn’t get into nursing. 
 
Using his GI Bill, he earned a degree in elementary education while supporting himself 
by working as a manager at a fast food restaurant. Justin now teaches at an elementary 
school; he was the first in his family to earn a bachelor’s degree. 
There are many other examples in this study of men on this winding vocational 
path. After high school, Dan worked briefly a lumber mill and then at a warehouse. After 
seven years at the warehouse, he was still only making $8.50 an hour, so when the 
company gave the option for a voluntary layoff, he took it: “So I took… voluntary layoff 
that summer, and then I seen, actually my brother-in-law found it online, was transporting 
trucks… and from there I got my CDL.” He drove long-haul trucks, but that only last for 
six or seven months: “I enjoyed it at first, but just being away from home too long.” 
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Despite making good money as a truck driver, he left the job and found local work for 
less money at an auto garage. Meanwhile, he put in applications, including at a steel mill, 
where he was hired as a general laborer. Dan, now 40, has complaints about the schedule 
at the mill and has a few health problems that making standing all day difficult (“You 
suffer through it, it’s a job”), but the job is close by, has full benefits, and pays well 
enough ($13.75 an hour); he’s been there over ten years. But it is still not his dream 
vocation: he spends his spare time tinkering on cars in his makeshift home garage, and 
he’s in the process of putting in an application to do maintenance for one of the nearby 
municipalities. The last chapter of his vocational journey is likely yet to be written. 
Sean, 39, also has had a winding vocational path, but in contrast to Dan, Sean 
landed in work he truly loves. Sean got his Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) 
certification in high school, and a week after high school he was working as an EMT. He 
liked the work, but he was never paid for than $7.00 an hour and was always considered a 
part-time casual employee despite working more than fulltime hours. He left after four 
years and bounced among a few jobs, including shipping and receiving and detailing cars. 
He moved to North Carolina and worked for an energy company, but he was drawn back 
to Pennsylvania. He—like many men in this study—got a job piling lumber (“wasn’t the 
greatest job, but it was somethin’”), but Sean managed to work his way up over several 
years into middle management. Still, despite making a salary in the $40,000s, he was not 
content vocationally. (Sean told of a particularly difficult time when he had to fire a man 
in his 50s whose wife was sick: “And it, I had a follow what the company wanted, and I 
had to let him go, and, and it was hard. You know, it was ugh. I don't like doin’ it to 
anybody.”) Through a friend, he got an opportunity to interview for a local law 
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enforcement position. He always wanted to be a cop, but he felt like he could not afford 
to take the time to go back to school. However, he was told if he got the job, they would 
cover the cost of his training as part of his employment. He got the job, and now years 
later, he’s happily working in local law enforcement making over $25 an hour. 
This “on-the-job” vocational exploration mirrors recent work examining the 
educational and career aspirations of low-income urban youth (DeLuca et al. 2016). 
DeLuca and her colleagues find that many of the youth in their study have an eagerness 
to launch into the labor market, often driven by a financial necessity or a need to get out 
on their own. But for the youth who pursue some post-secondary education or credential, 
they find that the four-year horizon of a bachelor’s degree is too long (and expensive), so 
most opt for a shorter timeline by pursuing a credential with a concrete occupation in 
mind with the goal of getting into the labor force as soon as possible. This lines up with 
the behavior of the men in this study, at least insofar as very few of them moved from 
high school immediately into a college or university with plans for a four-year degree. Of 
the 61 men, only seven took that path, although other men in the study went back to a 
four-year college or university later, as we saw with Justin. But DeLuca and company 
also find that this strategy of “expedited adulthood” costs these urban youth in the long 
run by not allowing them time to adequately explore vocations that fit their interests and 
abilities. Particularly troublesome for these urban youth is the trap of predatory, for-profit 
colleges (Cottom 2017; DeLuca et al. 2016; Holland and DeLuca 2016). In this sense, the 
men in this study both conform and diverge from their urban counterparts: while these 
men do sometimes get off track in ways that costs them in the long run, most of them 
manage to land on their feet. 
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The most common paths of post-secondary education among the men in this study 
were a credential or an associate degree in a trade. In some cases, men launched into 
education or a credential, only to recognize that it was not a good fit. Derek did one 
semester at a technical college before leaving for a job: “I just didn’t like it. I didn’t like 
the schoolin’.” When Derek got a job offer at a local tool and die shop, he left school for 
work. Don went to college after high school to pursue a degree in wildlife technology, 
but he also realized it was not for him: “But I literally partied my way out of school. But I 
was done with school. At 12 years, you know, I hated it. I went to college because I was 
supposed to and I didn’t last very long there.” Some credentials turned out not to be what 
the men expected: several of the men to earn a CDL found they did not like long-haul 
driving, so they either switched to driving locally or stopped driving and found other 
work. But many followed through on their credential or education; some used it for a 
time and eventually moved on to other work; and some continue to use their credential or 
education directly.  
It is difficult to know why the men in this study fared relatively well with their 
post-secondary plans, especially relative to the urban youth in other studies. These men 
are not as disadvantaged as those studied by DeLuca, Clampet-Lundquist, and Edin 
(2016), but they are still solidly working-class from modest roots who arguably share the 
traits of those who face disadvantages navigating the landscape of higher education 
(Armstrong and Hamilton 2013; Calarco 2018; Lareau 2011). One observation is that 
most of the men who pursued higher education sought a well-recognized credential, such 
as a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) or Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), 
rather than more obscure or less-employable credentials. CDLs seemed particularly 
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effective because employers sometimes paid for the cost of the credential in exchange for 
some commitment to drive for the company. Similarly, Sean found that the cost of 
attending the police academy was covered by his employer, as long as he was the one 
chosen for the job. Even for those men who pursued an associate degree at a for-profit 
school, virtually all were at recognized institutions, such as Triangle Tech or Erie 
Institute of Technology. Several men pursued vocational degrees at branch campuses of 
reputable schools like University of Pittsburgh and Penn State University, perhaps 
testament to the value of established schools investing in branch campuses and extension 
programs. Among those men who chose to go the route of a four-year college or 
university, all but one went to a school among the state university system in 
Pennsylvania, again evidence of the value of a relatively low-cost, state-funded education 
system as a ladder for many first-generation and working-class students. Finally, it is 
notable that virtually all men pursued their post-secondary credential within the state of 
Pennsylvania, many within driving distance of home, which suggests the importance of 
having reputable institutions nearby. 
It also could be the case that white, working-class men in rural Pennsylvania are 
simply not the targets for predatory, for-profit schools in the way minority, urban youth 
have been. Virtually none of the men in this study appeared to be taken in by overtly 
predatory schemes, even those who attended for-profit colleges. As we see in these 
narratives, perhaps the military is the most predatory institution for this population by 
aggressively recruiting men into the armed services, even those who are unsure. None of 
the men in this study who served ended up making the military a career, some developed 
or exacerbated substance abuse habits while enlisted, and several served in active duty 
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roles and suffered traumatic experiences that remain with them today. That said, the 
military service is not without any benefit: those who served qualify for healthcare 
through the Veterans Administration (VA), and the GI Bill that enabled a number of men 
in this study to return to school and earn and education without taking on student debt, no 
small matter in a time when student debt is crushing many young adults (Fry 2014; 
Shapiro et al. 2014).37 
To be clear, this process of “on-the-job” vocational exploration does not work out 
for everyone. Christian, 41, is an example of someone for whom the vocational 
exploration process has continually hit dead ends. After high school, he enrolled at 
Pennsylvania College of Technology to get an associate degree in electrical technology, 
but he said he was tired of being broke, “got impatient”, and returned home to work 
before earning his degree. He got a factory job but was laid off, so he took the ASVAB 
while receiving unemployment insurance benefits. He served four years in the Air Force, 
then continued working for the military as a civilian in Virginia. Family ties drew him 
back to northwestern Pennsylvania in 2010, where he struggled to catch on to the right 
opportunity: “since then, it’s been this trying to find something.” At one point, Christian 
spent about three years out of the labor force caring for his kids and using his GI Bill to 
get an associate degree in IT from the University of Phoenix online, but that credential 
has yet to prove useful.38 He also had a job for a local manufacturer for a time where they 
                                                 
37 The military will be discussed in more detail below as a mobility measure.  
38 While most of the men in this study who earned associate degrees did so at for-profit entities, 
Christian’s experience with the University of Phoenix is arguably a case of predation. Christian himself did 
not speak poorly about his experience, but the University of Phoenix is among the for-profit universities 
that has been under investigation for deceptive practices (Lobosco 2015). Notably, the Trump 
administration has been more friendly to for-profit colleges and universities. 
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trained him in robotics, but inexplicably to Christian, soon after they laid him off. When 
we spoke, Christian was unemployed but hopeful about a job lead in maintenance at a 
local hospital. Altogether, he has one-and-three-quarters associate degrees, plus on-the-
job training from the military and in robotics, but stable employment has been elusive. 
Christian is one of the relatively few examples of “credential collecting” (Edin et al. 
2019), a phenomenon describing the ways in which some working-class men amass 
credentials seemingly without rhyme or reason in hopes something works out.  
Overall, the picture that emerges among these men’s forays into post-secondary 
education is one in which they are at times aimless but not without agency. In the vacuum 
created by the lack of a dominant local employer, these men are forced to confront 
questions about vocational and career aspirations in ways many of their fathers did not. 
Yet contrary to depictions of working-class young adults being “profoundly lost” (Silva 
2013) when navigating educational institutions, most men in this study seem to have 
adapted to this new “winding path” toward working-class adulthood, and few if any 
express “the vehement anger, defensiveness, and profound betrayal” (Silva 2013) found 
in other depictions of working-class young adults. This is not to gloss over the ways in 
which these men make mistakes, but in important respects, the lack of a clearly defined 
career path or employer has given these men the experience of vocational exploration 
long afforded their college-going peers.  
There is also an important sense in which the frame of vocational discernment I 
suggest here cannot be separated from the labor market churning discussed in Chapter 2. 
As we see in the stories of Justin, Dan, and Sean, while they all sought at least one post-
secondary credential, they did so within a labor market context that offered a relatively 
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poor set of choices. In fact, it was poor pay—even after years of service—that led Dan to 
leave the warehouse for trucking and Sean to leave behind his EMT credential for a series 
of jobs that ultimately landed him in law enforcement. However, it is also clear in these 
cases that income and wages is only part of the story. Dan left long-haul truck driving 
after just a few months because he did not like being away from home, even though it 
paid more than anything he has done before or since. And Sean left middle management 
at a lumber company to take a chance on law enforcement because he thought the latter 
would be more fulfilling than the former. and many others in the study. I explore these 
themes of work, identity, and vocation more fully in Chapter 5. 
Why do the men in this study seem to approach the path to adulthood differently 
than has been found in other work about the working-class (DeLuca et al. 2016; Silva 
2013; Silva and Snellman 2018)? I argue it is the way in which rurality and masculinity 
intersect in the identities of the men in this sample. First, as opposed to seeing working-
class identity as something to be transcended (Silva and Snellman 2018), these men 
embrace being working class—or at least a particular vison of working class—as 
evidenced by their post-secondary choices. These men pursue credentials to be drivers, 
medical technicians, auto and bicycle mechanics, and police officers. They pursue 
associate degrees in electrical technology, welding and fabrication, X-ray technology, 
and wildlife management. A couple men in the study pursued higher education in art, 
once even earning an associate degree, yet both use that training primarily as tattoo 
artists. For many of the men, these interests can be traced back into high school, when 
many were part of the vocational-technical programs, pursuing everything from 
computer-aided drafting to the culinary arts to automotive technology. While the local 
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plant no longer exists as a place to live into a working-class destiny, these men still see 
themselves as working-class men, working out that identity in a broader world of 
employment and post-secondary choices. As I explore in Chapter 5, these men continue 
to want working-class jobs, and although the remuneration of those jobs is less than in the 
past, they still value the nature of such work: working with their hands, often outside, 
sometimes autonomous. Post-secondary education is a means to strengthen—not create 
distance from—working-class vocation. Second, there is a clear sense that most of these 
men—rather than seeing their rural hometowns as places to escape through education—
see rural place as where they want to be, even for those who have been offered or 
exposed to other opportunities. This is a theme I explore more below. 
 
Show Me, Don’t Tell Me, What You Can Do 
A second major theme about men’s decisions to pursue post-secondary plans 
concerns what the men expect to gain from these pursuits. While a majority of men in 
this study have pursued some sort of postsecondary education or training, most of the 
men sought such training for the practical skills, not more esoteric reasons like bettering 
themselves or simply to escape their stations in life (Silva and Snellman 2018). While I 
argue that these men’s post-secondary choices should be understood in terms of a type of 
vocational exploration—and thus a more open-ended attempt to find a skill or job that fits 
them—there is a still the sense that these men see education as a means to an end, not an 
end in itself. For these men, the pursuit of education is most often to gain a practical skill 
or trade that can be transferred in an immediate and obvious way to the labor market. In 
this sense, these men are much like the youth studied by (DeLuca et al. 2016), who most 
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often pursued higher education with a concrete occupation in mind and were eager to 
enter the labor market as soon as possible. For that reason, some men were quick to 
abandon education if they felt it was not serving these practical ends. And even for some 
who obtained the degree or credential, sometimes there was criticism in retrospect that 
the program did not teach them anything new. In this section, I detail the ways these men 
understood what they wanted from the post-secondary programs they chose. 
Additionally, because some of these men are employers as well as job-seekers, I draw 
upon the perspectives of a few of the men as employers to further show that formal 
educational credentials may be less valuable—and in fact, even seen as a disqualifier—in 
rural places where there is a premium placed on practical knowledge rather than paper 
credentials. 
There are several the men in the study who exemplify the approach to post-
secondary education as a practical pursuit of occupational or vocational skills for the 
labor market. Derek, Mark, and Christian are examples of men who left their post-
secondary pursuits before completion because they received job offers in the fields they 
were training to enter. Derek did a semester at a technical college, and besides not feeling 
suited for more classroom schooling, he was convinced to leave school when he got a job 
offer:  
… and then when I got that phone call that really made my mind up that I was 
definitely done because I can go learn as an apprentice. In that industry, they’d 
rather see an apprenticeship than a degree. You know, this is hands on, this guy 
knows what he’s doing, so that’s another reason I took the job. 
 
Mark was involved in firefighting as far back as high school, and he enrolled in a 
community college across the state to study firefighting. However, just two months into 
the program he was recruited to be a paid firefighter, so he left school for work. 
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While Derek and Mark were just beginning their schooling when they got jobs, 
Vince, Victor, and Christian had nearly finished their degrees before leaving school for 
work. While it may seem puzzling why they would leave so close to completing their 
educations, all three chose work over the credential. Vince, the only man in the study 
with both parents holding bachelor’s degrees, has a more typically middle-class path to 
post-secondary education.39 He did well in high school and always assumed he go to 
college, but he “never had a clear idea of what I would do for a job.” Having already 
attended two universities and switched majors several times, Vince landed a job. As he 
explained: 
I was working on the side… part-time at Staples and part-time at a little Mom and 
Pop computer store, and the computer store offered me a full-time job for more 
money-ish than what some of my college graduate friends were making at the 
time. So, it was like, okay, I’ll go try that. 
 
Interestingly, when that computer shop folded not long after Vince left college for 
the job, he decided to move home and look for work rather than finish his degree. He has 
since settled into a successful career and doesn’t see the need to go back: “it’s one of 
those things where I feel like the expected thing, or the quote unquote right thing, would 
                                                 
39 Vince, despite having two parents with bachelor’s degrees, is included in the study based on his highest 
educational attainment—“some college, no degree”—which qualifies as working class according to one 
accepted definition in the literature. (See Chapter 1 for more discussion of definitions of working class and 
the screening criteria for the study.) Even though aspects of Vince’s biography make him atypical among 
the men in this study, the goal of this study was heterogeneity of experiences within the sampling 
parameters. My approach when screening men into the study was to be as inclusive as possible in order not 
to unnecessarily eliminate variation were I to have used a narrower definition of “working class.” In 
general, if a man was under 50, living in the field site, and “working class” according to at least one 
definition, I screened him into the study. Once interviewed, I viewed that data as supremely valuable, so the 
burden for removal was on the side of removal. One option would be to exclude Vince entirely, but it is the 
judgment of the researcher that the loss of data outweighs the ways in which Vince might be less 
characteristic—in some ways—from other men in the study. The fact remains that he is a younger man 




be to go back and finish that, but I still don’t have a strong push to do that because I’m 
kind of now established in a career and I don’t know, you know, I don’t know.” 
Victor, one of the few men in the study not originally from northwestern 
Pennsylvania, has dabbled in school over the years, earning an associate degree in 
business administration from a community college in Florida while working as a 
bartender before moving to northwestern Pennsylvania, where his wife was raised. He 
was just a few classes short of his bachelor’s degree in Florida, but he was turned off 
from finishing after taking an internship from a commercial real estate company. The 
company told him they would hire him after he finished his degree, but the starting salary 
would have been half of what he was already making as a bartender. He said, “I was like 
four classes away or something like that, and I was just like, ‘This is silly.’” And as we 
saw above, Christian—who has pursued multiple avenues of post-secondary education 
and training—left his initial attempt at schooling just shy of his associate degree because 
he grew impatient: “I wanted money; I’d work, instead of be broke and be in school.” 
Additional evidence that many of these men see post-secondary education as a 
means to an end comes in the form of those who complained that the training did not 
teach them new or needed skills. Randy admitted several times when talking about his 
experience studying to be an electrician at a local technical school that he had an unfair 
advantage, given that his father and grandfather before him were electricians in a family-
run business. However, he found the education lacking: “… when you have teachers 
instructing you and you feel that you know more than they do, it’s just a little awkward to 
be there, but I had an unfair advantage.” Randy said he often found himself wandering 
the halls because he was “so bored.” However, he stuck with the program because his 
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family wanted him to have the credential, so Randy made the best of it, bonding with 
another student who also brought in advanced knowledge: “And I got lucky, there was 
another kid in the class that had been around construction and wired his grandparents’ 
whole house, and I mean, he had some good knowledge and we kind of palled around 
together.” When Randy earned his degree, he went back home to work in the family 
business, where much of one’s success is based upon reputation, not paper credentials. 
Randy recently took over the family business, and he stressed that the business lives off 
reputation: 
I do very little advertising because most the time the bang for the buck is just not 
there. So, I don’t do a lot of that and the people coming in, it’s just nice to see 
where they heard from you. And a lot of it’s just word of mouth reputation in 
town; I can’t take credit for all that cause between granddad and my dad and 
uncle it’s a strong name through town, so I’m living off of that. I think I've 
improved it. 
 
He notes regarding his degree, “I've only had one person ever ask for the certificate,” and 
“they just needed somebody’s creds to have on file.” 
Jeremiah’s dad, a contractor, influenced his interest in building such that Jeremiah 
chose the architecture and design concentration in his high school Vo-Tech program. 
After considering several schools, he enrolled in the same technical college as Derek. 
Jeremiah thought he would be permitted to place out of some of the entry-level courses, 
so he was frustrated to learn after arriving on campus that was not an option. He tried to 
make the best of it, but he lost interest after crossing the instructor:   
So, I just kind of went with it and I went to the class and I thought, “Well, maybe 
they’ll, maybe there will be something different that I’ll learn, and I’ll learn a 
better way of doing something.” But they were teaching on an older, outdated 
version of CAD and they were teaching an older, outdated way of doing things. 
And, so, like, we got a drawing packet at the beginning of the semester with, like, 
50 drawings in it, and we had to have them all done by the end of the semester. 
And by the end of the second week, I had all of my drawings done and I was 
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showing the other kids in the class the shortcuts and the key strokes to get through 
the program. The teacher was not happy with me telling everybody how to get 
around the involved process of doing things. I kind of, I just stopped going to 
class. So, since participation and being there was so much of the grade, like, I 
kind of... I did all right, I think I got Cs and maybe a couple Bs, but I was not in it 
to go to class. So, I stopped going to class and started partying and hanging out 
with my friends and, you know, doing other things, so yeah. 
 
Jeremiah stayed one more semester but dropped his major “because I knew all of that 
stuff and I didn’t want to do it again.” He took mostly general education requirements, 
and then left the school after a year with no degree.   
Finally, there is evidence among those men in the study who are employers that 
paper credentials matter less than personal trust and a demonstrated ability to do the job. 
As we saw with Randy, small businesses in the area rely on the strength of reputation. 
This dynamic also applies to employers when they seek prospective employees, at least 
when it comes to jobs that have some technical requirement.40 Brett, who runs a towing 
company, talked at some length about the challenges of staffing. For drivers, he said they 
have gone to having a trial period with prospective drivers: “… what we started doing 
with drivers, we bring them in for three days if possible. And we do a trial with them for 
three days. And I can tell you whether or not they’re going to be able to run a truck after 
those three days.”    
 
                                                 
40 While employers complain it is difficult to find good workers, there is evidence in the work histories of 
the men in the study that there are many poorly-paid, entry-level jobs in this area that require virtually no 
requirements. This is covered in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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Geographical Mobility  
Almost as common as upskilling as a strategy to improve employment prospects 
were what I call mobility measures to improve labor market opportunities. While recent 
attention has been given to reasons why less-educated men are not moving out-of-state 
for work (Semuels 2017; Williams 2017; Yglesias 2013), the narrow focus on out-of-
state moves misses other mobility tactics, such as enlisting in the military or taking jobs 
that require travel. And even with moves, I find that the most common approach was to 
move away for brief periods on what I call prospecting trips, where men move without a 
job in search of better opportunities. Overall, almost one-third of the men in the study had 
at one point moved out of state for work. In most cases, the men were single at the time 
of the move, and the move was accompanied by little plan. Men often moved to a place 
where they had family or friends but no concrete job prospects. Sometimes they managed 
to find a job, but other times, they did not and returned home. In virtually all cases, the 
episode was relatively short-lived, and the men eventually ended up back in northwestern 
Pennsylvania. Of course, given the nature of my cases, I cannot know if some men took 
similar measures but found work elsewhere and stayed. It is the case that with those in 
this sample who moved away but returned, the men both had trouble making it work 
elsewhere and expressed a longing for rural place. 
William served in the Navy after high school. After he was discharged, he moved 
into an already crowded house in Ohio with his Dad, his uncle and his wife, and 
grandmother. William worked a few jobs, none of which led to advancement, and then he 
also found himself the primary caregiver for his aging grandmother, which was too much: 
“… I, as a twenty-one or so year old kid, like I couldn’t handle like watching my 
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grandmother deteriorate, let alone be in charge of her care.” He returned home to 
northwestern Pennsylvania, but his luck finding meaningful work was not more fruitful, 
so he decided to try his luck in North Carolina, where he had been stationed in the 
service: 
And then I went down to North Carolina, um tried to get work down there. Ended 
up working, uh, painting houses. Did that for a little while. Worked in the food 
service industry on base for a while. And then wrecked my car, got a DUI. And 
then from there, uh, spent the ten days in jail and then hitchhiked back home. 
 
For Zach and Scott, their moves out of state were attempts to make clean breaks, 
at least for a season. For Zach, who had a bout with cancer not long after high school, his 
move was a chance to get away. He moved in with his sister in Kentucky and stocked 
shelves at a grocery store at night: “I just wanted to get away for a while, everything had 
been so crazy with chemo and everything, and I was just kind of over being in the area 
and was just ready to try something else.” He thought it would be a long-term move, but 
he wasn’t making enough to pay his bills, plus a nascent relationship with a woman back 
home started to get more serious over the miles. For Scott, his move was a chance to 
break bad habits: 
I moved to Florida. Um, I tried to set myself straight once. Um, I kind of got stuck 
in the alcohol world, um, and I had a, a relative that um, lived in Florida at the 
time, so I um, I moved down there, kind of got my life a little more sober, I guess. 
Um, I moved back, and I don’t know what could’ve been, because I wasn’t there 
long enough, so...  
 
He moved in with a cousin and his cousin’s grandparents, but he failed to find 
work, so he moved back after just a couple months. He missed his friends, and like Zach, 
he “was talking to somebody” before he left, which also made it hard to stay away. 
While some men were escaping things when they moved, others moved to pursue 
concrete opportunities elsewhere. Thomas learned masonry from his Dad and grandfather 
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and carpentry from a man he worked for in high school. He worked a few carpentry and 
contracting jobs during and after high school, but he was lured out west to work for a 
cousin. He lived with a couple buddies, worked hard, and played harder: “We flipped 
houses. The economy there was great… [W]e made bank, but I drank a lot, and a lot of 
that bank was going straight to the bar.” After awhile, he moved back to northwestern 
Pennsylvania and took a job with another friend. Thomas described life out west as “fast-
paced” and the people outside of northwestern Pennsylvania as “more genuine.” In the 
end, he said that he “couldn’t imagine living anywhere else [than northwestern 
Pennsylvania].” 
The move out of state worked out—for a time—for men like Sean and Doug. 
Sean, the EMT later turned law enforcement officer, also had a stint working in North 
Carolina: “Then I, and eventually I went to North Carolina ‘cause I was just frustrated 
with not being able to find something around here.” He had an aunt and uncle near 
Charlotte, and although they did not have a close relationship, he reached out and they 
invited him to stay there until he got on his feet. Sean initially lived with his family and 
took a job at the “steel manufacturing place” where his uncle worked while he put in 
other applications. He eventually got a job at a utility company and made relatively good 
money. He enjoyed the weather, but he also said he always looked forward to his annual 
hunting trip with his Dad back in Pennsylvania. After living in North Carolina for a time 
and without much explanation, he said he just moved back to northwestern Pennsylvania 
and has been back ever since: “it's nice to live here.” 
While most men who moved were single, two men were in relationships when 
they made their forays out of state. Doug and his girlfriend moved in with a cousin of his 
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in Las Vegas after he and his girlfriend burned some bridges with close friends in 
northwestern Pennsylvania. Doug, who did restaurant work in Pennsylvania, quickly got 
connected with the culinary union and was making good wages with benefits. However, 
his girlfriend failed to find work, and because they lived in “a really shitty part of town,” 
she felt unsafe going out on her own. Over time, she became increasingly unhappy, and 
eventually, they decided, “we need to get outta here.” They actually had plans to go to 
Florida to live with her mother, but a family emergency pulled them back to 
Pennsylvania, where they remain. Patrick and his wife decided to move to neighboring 
Ohio: “… our thought was we might be able to make it better somewhere else.” He wife 
received Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI), and he worked for a chain of family 
restaurants. He took a transfer to a different location and hoped to find better work, 
perhaps a factory job: he “thought it would be a better place to do, to be able to make a 
better life out yourself, out myself.” Yet he admitted he “never scouted the area,” and he 
found upon getting there that “there wasn’t anything.” After about six months, he moved 
back. 
A small group of the men in the sample—about ten percent—at one point took 
jobs that required extensive travel, including work as members of itinerant work crews 
and as long-haul truck drivers. For most who did itinerant work, the job was usually 
taken when the man was young and unmarried; it was a chance to make money and see a 
bit more of the state or country. Brad worked locally after high school, but…  
… then came an opportunity and that’s when I started traveling through the 
United States doing like rubber roofing. And that’s what really started me going 
elsewhere throughout like the United States. Just going places that normally 




Similarly, Jeff worked for a time as part of a traveling crew that repaired kilns. He 
stayed relatively close to home—Ohio, West Virginia, and other parts of Pennsylvania—
but he found it a nice diversion from home: 
We didn’t know what was going to be next, when the job was going to be. You 
know, I was just dating… at the time. It was kind of a nice getaway. It kind of got 
boring [at home] ‘cause, you know, I had a girlfriend that couldn’t go and do 
anything, you know. But, but it was, it was different. You got to see some 
different places. Um, uh, you know, just the thrill of working on the road and the 
hotel. At least you get that experience. It’s not; it’s not all it’s psyched up to be, 
you know. It’s pretty boring, but also made good money. 
 
In most cases, this work on traveling crews was short-lived and confined to early 
adulthood. However, Larry made it into a career. After high school, Larry worked in a 
local factory for a few years, served in the Army, and went back to the factory. However, 
he had an older brother who worked on oil and gas rigs as a driller, and Larry said his 
brother “had always been telling me how great of a job it is. And how much money you 
can make.” Larry put him off, unwilling to consider another dangerous job after having 
served in the military. But when he realized that an entry-level position on a rig paid 
considerably more than he was making at the factory, he told his brother to let him know 
if they needed someone. Larry has been working in the industry since 2007, and although 
there have been a few slow times when he’s been temporarily laid off, he’s always been 
brought back on when work picks up. The job can take him away for a month or more at 
a time, but he reasons it is better than the factory, which for him was seven days a week. 
He does his best to request time off to coincide with significant events of his kids, like 
recently when he asked for time off to chaperon a field trip for his son. While hard in 
some ways, he says his children and wife are used to it: 
So, it’s a little rough, but the kids have already been through me being gone, so it 
is a little tough on them but not as bad. My wife, it can be tough on her, because 
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there is nobody helping her out with different things, but she’s been doing it since 
2007. She is kind of use to it, you know. 
 
Another factor that makes his work more palatable is the fact he is among the 
highest earning men in this study, easily making into the six-figures annually once his 
hourly wages, per diem, and overtime pay are factored together. 
Several of the men tried long-haul trucking. While these jobs tended to pay better 
than jobs available back home, in many cases they came with a cost to relationships. In 
fact, all but one of the men doing this type of long-distance travel for work have now 
moved to other jobs or means of support. As we saw above, Dan took a voluntary layoff 
to get his CDL and start driving, but he only lasted about six months, learning that he 
missed home too much. The story was similar with Nick. With a newborn at home, he 
needed more employment certainty than his work at the local factory provided, which had 
started rolling layoffs: “I came across an ad in the paper to, uh, go driving and learn to 
become a CDL driver.” The company paid all the training costs if the driver stayed with 
them for six months, so Nick gave those six months plus one, then moved to what he saw 
as a better company. However, he still didn’t like being away, so he eventually took to 
alternating between long-haul and local driving:  
There wasn’t enough money in this area to make… to provide for the things that 
was going on here, but I always wanted to be back here because I wanted to see 
my child, you know? I missed out on a lot of things while I was out driving. So, I 
kind of bounced back and forth like trying to save up some money and do the on 
the road thing and come back here and get a job until I just couldn’t take it 
anymore ‘cause we weren’t making ends meet. 
 
When his marriage ended, Nick went back to long-haul driving, although he was 
frustrated with the larger trucking companies that had no regard for his scheduling 
requests, such as when he wanted to be home for weekends when he had his daughter. He 
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eventually moved exclusively to local driving, which he has been doing for almost ten 
years. 
Jared also feels like he paid a high price for his time over-the-road. He had 
already earned his CDL for a previous job—although it had lapsed—and he found 
himself in a period of job transition. Like Nick, an advertisement caught his attention: 
This thing came on TV and said, “Drive for us,” and I said, okay, you know. And 
I called them and, and they said, “how much experience you have?” I said I drive 
fire trucks and log trucks and stuff. They said, “oh, we can put you on a bus,” and 
I said “when”, they said, “tomorrow.” 
 
Jared took a three-and-a-half-day bus trip to Phoenix to take his road test, which he 
passed. But Jared minced no words about the long-term outcome of driving: “And I said, 
yeah, and I climbed in a truck, started driving, got married like seven months later, drive 
for seven more years over the road, got a divorce, job killed my marriage.” He learned his 
wife had been cheating, and the marriage ended soon after. But he acknowledged the 
complexity of the situation: 
But when I was, when I was married, what killed my marriage… was just not 
being home because I got greedy and stuff you know. There’s this load that needs 
to go to Chattanooga, okay, put her on let’s do it, you know. And, and I’d be like 
in Pittsburgh and she, I’d put a load on in Chattanooga, oh I’m going to have to 
pull out, dear, and I’d go to Chattanooga, you know, and stuff like that. And I 
wouldn’t see her for nine, ten weeks at a time and stuff you know. We’d talk on 
the phone several times a day. But I mean, it was partly my fault ruining the 
marriage, but it was partly her fault too, because she didn’t control herself while I 
was home you know. I didn’t screw around on her. I had chances, I never did it, 
you know and stuff. 
 
An overlooked means by which men attempt social mobility, especially among 
minority and working-class men, is joining the military (Butler and Moskos 1996; 
Kleykamp 2006; Silva 2013). In this study, nearly one-fifth of the men enlisted in the 
military, which also resulted—directly or indirectly—in geographic mobility: these men 
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were trained, stationed, or deployed out of state (and even out of the country).41 In many 
cases, the men enlisted with plans to make a career of the military, but none in this study 
did, often dissuaded once exposed to the rigors of military life or the trauma of combat. 
Yet the main line of argument here is not whether the military yielded a stable career—
military or civilian—or whether the men who served in some way benefitted from their 
service, but simply the fact that in all cases the decision to enlist meant leaving the 
confines of northwestern Pennsylvania for other destinations.42 Some men, like Justin 
above, enlisted essentially on a whim. Others, like Brandon, saw it as the only remaining 
option: “It was either the Army or be homeless, so I chose the Army, and spent eight 
years in the Army as a mechanic.” And yet others, like Todd, saw it as a ticket out of 
town: 
And so, when I graduated, the first thing I wanted to do is get out of town. But I 
didn’t know what I was gonna do with college. And it was so much pressure for 
me to go to college I just decided, I’m like, I can’t, I don’t know what to do. So, I, 
one day just went to all the military meetings that they had at the school, and the 
one guy that didn’t yell and scream at me was the Air Force guy. And he’s like, 
“Well, it’s like a job, go to work, sometimes you got to work weekends, if we go 
to war, then you probably have to go to war. But the good thing about the Air 
Force is, we send the expensive guys out to fight the battles and the cheap guys sit 
way back off the front lines on the Airbase”. He said, “So, your chance of survival 
is really good. And we very, very rarely will put a backpack on you.” So, I said, 
“Perfect, sign me up. If it gets me out of town, I’m good.” 
 
A few men enlisted with more intention, seeing the military as connected to 
broader career aspirations. Blake, influenced by a mentor, has had his sights set on being 
                                                 
41 For comparison, exactly one-fifth of respondents in (Silva 2013) study of working-class young adults 
had military experience, but only one-quarter of those had their service result in secure civilian careers. 
While the focus of this chapter is on choosing the military as a mobility measure, I explore pathways to 
good jobs more fully in Chapter 4. 
42 Although the focus here is geographic and not social mobility, it is still worth noting that military 
service, while it has some material benefits, often does not get men very far vocationally upon their return.  
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a firefighter since high school. His mentor, a fireman himself, counseled Blake that 
military service—specifically the Coast Guard—would be excellent preparation: 
And so, he was telling me, you know, “If you join the military, you get extra 
bonus points on your civil service exam.” And then, you know, instead of paying 
for college, you get free college when you’re done. And then you have job 
experience and all the stuff that comes with that. And then he was saying, in most 
places you can get that time that you spent in the military towards your cause 
firefighters can retire at 20 years or a lot of them. And so, he was saying you 
could still retire, you know, if you join when you’re 38 you get out of military and 
go into the fire department, you can still retire when you’re 38. So that sounded 
like a great idea to me. So, I signed up, and I signed up, and I went to the rescue 
swimming school. 
 
While men who enlisted could not know how their decision would play out, the very act 
of enlisting shows a willingness to be mobile in search of opportunity or adventure.  
 
“Stickiness” of Rural Place 
While I find that many men have attempted a mobility measure, these men who 
leave are drawn back to the area by a combination of attachment to family and love of 
rural place, evidence of a “stickiness of place” that supersedes any marginal increase in 
earning opportunities elsewhere. Men express this “stickiness” both affirmatively in their 
recitations of aspects of what has been called the rural idyll (Bell 2006), and negatively in 
their characterizations of urban space as expensive and potentially dangerous, which 
plays at least in part on racialized stereotypes. Among the cases, a few men express 
interest in leaving the area in the future, but most men are content in rural place, even if it 
means fewer employment opportunities. There is a clear sense among these men, whether 
or not their mobility efforts were “successful”, that they were all drawn back by a sense 
134 
 
of attachment—and preference for—rural place that was also home.43 It is perhaps 
expected that those who did not have employment success in other places—men like 
Scott and Zach—would return, perhaps then retrospectively praising their hometowns, 
having failed to “escape”. Yet there is also this attachment to rural place in Thomas and 
Sean, who both had employment success in other states. Thomas, who has family our 
west and made a good living in Utah and Arizona for a time, describes in great detail 
what he loves about the area: 
If you’re looking for quiet and solitude. Beauty. If you like seasons. Like, I lived 
out West, and it was fast. Everything’s fast-paced. It’s definitely not here. It’s a 
lot different. It’s hard to even get through seasons is tough, like winter’s so long, 
but you find things to do to get through it. I fish a lot, so we ice fish to get through 
winters. I remember skate boarding as a kid. You couldn’t wait ‘til winter would 
end, and then it finally did. It’s a great place to live. I wouldn’t want to live 
anywhere else cause I did, and it wasn’t.... I fish in it. It’s these things that you 
grow up with. When you see gun control, you think to yourself like, oh man, if 
they only understood. We’ve got a rack of twenty-twos and we shoot stuff all day 
long as kids. It’s just what you did. It’s something you did growing up. It’s not 
gun control that needs to be instilled. It’s a way of living for us. You might say 
we’re a little hillbilly. It’s a little hillbilly of an area, but it’s a great place to live. 
 
Sean, who had a job for a utility company in North Carolina making about $40,000 a year 
but returned, shared similar sentiments: “Well… the seasons are beautiful. You know, the 
leaves change, there’s, there’s a lot of neat things.” 
                                                 
43 In this study, 85 percent of the men were born and raised in northwestern Pennsylvania, and another 8 
percent moved to the area as children or youth; only four of 61 men moved to the area as adults. While 
migration patterns in rural America are not uniform (Smith, Winkler, and Johnson 2016), rural areas have 
generally experienced depopulation over the last century (Johnson and Lichter 2019). Nativity to the study 
area was not a screen for inclusion in the study, but given broader trends, it is not surprising that virtually 
all men in the study are from the area originally. This creates a selection problem when analyzing motives 
for staying: by definition, these men are those who have stayed, and missing are those from the area who 
have left. Despite this limitation, I argue there is value in examining the rhetoric of attachment to rural 
place as a key feature of why these men remain, whether or not one suspects this is a proactive rationale 
driving behavior or retrospective justification for failure to leave (Carr and Kefalas 2009). This will be 
further explored in Chapter 5. 
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While there are affirmative reasons why the men chose to stay, there are also 
negative impressions of other places—sometimes based in racialized stereotypes—that 
make home sound better. Nick tells of a friend in a mid-sized city whose two-mile 
commute could take thirty minutes. But a more racialized area of concern about cities is 
crime: the men see small towns as safe and other areas as not. In a race-neutral 
description, Sean expresses the safety of the area, perhaps overstating the dangers 
elsewhere:  
… there’s not very much violence here. If there, if there’s, um, there is a drug 
problem, of course there is, but I think you have that everywhere. Um, but, you 
know, you can, you can... at least up in this neighborhood and, and, and through, 
like, throughout the city, you can see people walkin’ their dogs, you know. It’s 
nice you don’t have to worry about violence and things like that, so, I mean, it’s 
just a nice, quiet area. 
 
For Nick, however, this fear of violence is racialized. As a former long-haul truck 
driver, he spoke of his experience in places like Compton and Detroit. He told of one 
time in Memphis where he heard gun shots when doing paperwork in his cab. At times, 
Nick spoke in more neutral terms, although his remarks uphold stereotypes of dangerous 
urban space: “You never had to worry about, you know, any of the issues that bigger 
cities do. You can safely walk down a street one, two, three o’clock in the morning and 
not feel like you’re going to get robbed or nothing.” But elsewhere, Nick equates 
“diversity” with “craziness” in the context of discussing city life: 
I said, it’s not even Pittsburgh. I said, it’s a whole new ballgame because those are 
the things that I never knew because I almost feel sheltered growing up in this 
town. There’s not enough diversity in this town that would show you remotely 
close to what’s out there in this world…. Craziness can be out there, and you have 
absolutely no idea. 
 
While most men in the study had a stated preference for living in northwestern 
Pennsylvania, a few men also mentioned they needed to remain close because of 
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arrangements with custodial and noncustodial children, either their own of those of their 
current partner or spouse. In many cases, this proves no barrier to mobility since the men 
prefer to stay close by anyway. Jeremy, who works a custodial job for a state-run facility, 
has two step-daughters from his wife’s previous marriage. He says that he and his wife 
are “not allowed to leave the area” because his wife’s divorce agreement with her ex-
husband stipulates “that both parties have to stay within the… school district.” Although 
he and his wife would like to have their lives back, they are content in the area. Brett, on 
the other hand, would happily leave the area if not for his custody arrangement with his 
ex-wife. Brett had a contentious divorce from his first wife, and they share custody of 
their three boys. Brett remarried and has a child with his current wife, plus she has a son 
from a previous marriage. While the arrangements Brett’s current wife has with her ex 
are informal, Brett’s wife has made sure everything has been through the courts. Formal 
or not, Brett and his wife feel committed to the area despite being the exceptions in the 
study in expressing a preference for urban living: “We don’t… the small-town living is 
not really our thing, we like big towns.” He and his wife go to Pittsburgh “quite a bit,” 
and he spoke fondly of an annual work convention in Baltimore he and his wife enjoy. 
He said they appreciate the amenities of the city, the walkability of the downtown, but 
especially the anonymity: 
They [in the city] honestly don’t care who you are, what your past is. You get into 
a small town everybody wants to be in your business. Everybody knows 
everything about you from the time you were in diapers up through. And it’s 
just… you get into the city and people think it’s rude. But, really, they’re minding 
their own business just like the rest of us should. 
 
Brett said, “it’s just small town is just not our thing. And probably once the kids 




Carr and Kefalas (2009) describe four types of people in their study of rural Iowa: 
Achievers, Stayers, Seekers, and Returners. The Returners have much in common with 
the men in this study who have attempted a mobility measure: they have gone away—
gaining education, military training44, or life experience—but they slink back almost 
unnoticed to their hometowns “when their new lives fail to take hold” (2009: 107). This 
depiction certainly seems true in some cases, as many men in this study who ventured 
out—often without a plan—ended up back home in short order with little to show for 
venturing away. However, this depiction undervalues the ways in which men in this study 
were drawn back to their towns—not just from failure to “make it” elsewhere—but 
because they express a sense of deep connection to both rural and home. This theme will 
be more fully explored in Chapter 5, as I argue that rurality plays an important role in this 
study as an independent variable on a number of key outcomes.  
 
Occupational Flexibility 
Consistent with existing evidence of the reluctance of men to enter female-
dominated occupations, just a few of the men in this study have worked in such jobs. 
Justin, profiled above, used his GI Bill to get a degree in elementary education, and he is 
currently the only male teacher or staff in his entire private elementary school: “I'm the 
only guy in the building really most days”. Paul, who worked in a manual job for over a 
decade, found himself in need of work and used a connection of his wife’s to get a job 
                                                 
44 Carr and Kefalas put men who joined the military as an escape in the Seekers category. 
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working the front desk at a drug and alcohol treatment facility. A couple men in the study 
left the formal labor force completely for a time, in consultation with their wives or 
partners, in order to stay at home and be the primary caregiver for their children. Yet 
overall, these examples were relatively rare. 
The most common female-dominated field considered by men in the study was 
healthcare. Phil is one man in the sample who works as a Registered Nurse (RN). He 
describes his interest in “science and health science” going back to childhood, when he 
would read books about the human body. His interest in the health field was spurred by 
two events of his childhood: his grandfather dying of lung cancer and his mother giving 
birth to conjoined twins. He describes the influence of being in the hospital and ICU a lot, 
seeing nurses and doctors. However, his first love is music, and he considered both music 
and nursing when thinking about college: 
I was actually accepted to [university] for music, which is what I—music’s kind 
of my favorite thing. That’s what I really wanted to do, but I didn’t think I would 
be able to have a significant income or support a family off of that. So, actually, I 
was accepted to [university] for music program first, then I started applying for 
nursing, too, and thought maybe I should do this instead. I got accepted to both 
and I chose the nursing over music mostly due to financial reasons, but both of 
them are of interest to me. 
 
Similar to the approach to education and training we saw earlier in this chapter, 
Phil was eager for the most direct path to a credential that would get him into the labor 
market. He chose a local branch campus because it was closest and cheapest, plus he 
saved room and board costs by living at home. He explains his thinking: 
I knew going into school that all I needed to start working to get like a nurse’s 
salary was an associate’s. So that was my plan was just get the associate’s and 
start working because I figured I probably couldn’t afford to pay for a bachelor’s 




Phil earned some grants and scholarships, worked all through school, and lived at 
home, yet he graduated after five semesters with about $20,000 in student loans. Despite 
the debt, his credential has been rewarded: a week after graduating, he started working at 
a local hospital. He began at $18 an hour and quickly moved to $19.50 when he passed 
his boards. Seven years later, Phil’s base pay is now about $24 an hour, and he usually 
makes around $27-28 an hour factoring in various pay incentives, such as working nights, 
being the charge nurse in the ER or ICU, and holding certain certifications. He works 36 
hours a week, has benefits and union protections, and has paid back about half of his 
student loans.45 
The other side of health care work is that of a direct care staff, which is Alex’s job 
title in his work at a local nursing home. Alex struggled with alcoholism for much of his 
adult life, making it difficult for him to hold a job. After losing his family and entering 
residential rehabilitation twice, he finally got sober. It was during his rehabilitation he got 
the idea for working in direct care:  
Well, when I... when I was in the ministry, I, uh, I visited a home a couple of 
times and I kind of wish that maybe that’s... maybe that’s something that I wanted 
to do, but then I wasn’t sure, you know, if you had to go to school for it or not. 
So, when I got back home, I seen that job in the paper and I said, you know what, 
I’m gonna... I need this job. So, I went down and she hired me right away. 
 
Alex finds the work fulfilling, but the pay and schedule have been challenges. For 
his first four years, Alex worked third shift, which was difficult when he also had to have 
his children during the day. For the last year, he has worked mostly second shift, 
occasionally first shift. Yet after five years, Alex makes $8.25 an hour, just a dollar over 
                                                 
45 Phil is an outlier in his willingness to undertake a female-dominated job, albeit a well-paying one. More 
detail about his self-understanding in this occupation is included later in the chapter.  
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the minimum wage. He thinks that other local facilities pay more, but he is emotionally 
attached to his residents and reluctant to leave them. He also expresses gratitude for the 
raises he has received and reluctance to challenge his boss: “Um, well, I think for what 
I’m doing they should pay... pay me a lot more than I am getting, but I’m not, you know, 
going to say anything because it’s what she pays me and I’ve got raises here once in a 
while.” Alex says that the next step up would be to what he calls the “med nurse”, but he 
is not interested if it means less contact with residents, which is what he enjoys about the 
job: “If I could do that [med nurse] but still do the floor, I’d like that. I just don’t want to 
be just the med nurse because it’s... it’s kind of, so slow for me, you know. I want to help 
everybody and walk around and do all that kind of stuff.” Despite the less attractive 
aspects of his job, he plans to stay in the field of healthcare. 
Despite how few men in the study work in healthcare, several others considered 
pursuing healthcare and even took initial steps toward a healthcare job or training. Gary, 
46, got the closest, enrolling in an eighteen-month course to become a Licensed Practical 
Nurse (LPN). After high school, Gary worked for a couple years at McDonald’s, ten 
years at a lumber mill, eight years as a custodian, and four years at a company that 
processed damaged vehicles for insurance companies. When the salvage company closed 
its local office, displacing several dozen workers, Gary received unemployment 
insurance. He said he was under the impression that if he started school, his 
unemployment would last until he finished. He began the LPN training and was only 
partially through the program when his unemployment insurance ran out. Without the 
support of UI, Gary needed income to support his family, so he left the program to work. 
He currently works in a related field as a Personal Care Aid for a man with disabilities 
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who needs around the clock supervision. Gary works third shift and makes $12.50 an 
hour, but he would like to go back to get his Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) 
credential, ideally at a facility that pays for the training as part of employment. Gary likes 
that this work brings together getting to work with people and with his hands. He adds, 
“I’m getting too broken to do a lot of construction anymore.” 
A few other men considered or started school in nursing. Justin, who decided 
upon elementary education with his GI Bill, said he considered nursing before thinking 
better of it after having an adverse reaction to vomit. William, who had field medical 
service support school training while in the Navy, tried to use his training to get a job as a 
medical assistant after discharge, but he said, “none of that counts, you still have to go 
back and get re-trained on whatever.” He opted for a job at a car dealership that was 
immediately available, and he ended up never pursuing healthcare. Jeff, who went on to 
become a master carpenter, initially enrolled in school locally to start a nursing degree, 
“but I had a lot of doubts about that, and uh, decided to um, withdraw.” Jerry, among the 
youngest in the study at age 21, enrolled in the local branch campus initially as a pre-
nursing major but switched to business: 
I went to pre-nursing… because I’ve heard a lot of good stuff about nursing 
industry or the healthcare industry just they’re being in demand. It’s a wide 
variety of possible jobs for nurses. And so like, “What the hell? Let’s get money.” 
So that’s why I did it, and then I did that for a year, I just now switched to 
business management… 
 
Scott, a military veteran who has mostly worked in fast food, took steps to work 
at a nursing home, but nothing came of it when the facility did not stay in touch:  
Um, actually, um when our store manager left, um, I was actually applying to the 
Manor [a local nursing home], um, so I was gonna do like, nursing, I guess. But 
uh, um, they were waiting on my background check, and for a company that said 
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they really liked work history, because men tend to leave jobs very often. Um, 
they really want me to, they just never really kept in touch with me, so... 
 
While nothing came of it, Scott said he thought starting at the nursing home 
would be the door to other opportunities: “I thought maybe if I started there, then I could 
become the next step in the nursing, the nursing neighborhood, and actually get into like, 
a hospital.” And while prospective plans must be taken with a grain of salt, Brad—who is 
a recovering opioid addict and currently receives SSDI—said he would like to go back to 
school for nursing: “I like helping people.” 
Casey is the one man in the sample who worked in healthcare but left the 
profession. He did not pursue the profession as much as he was put up to it by a family 
member, who put in an application on his behalf to attend a CNA class without his 
knowledge. He was working for $10 an hour doing landscaping and small repairs for an 
RV dealership when he got a call inviting him to participate. He describes his experience: 
I took that class and I passed the top of the class after being told by the head nurse 
that was in charge of it that she didn’t see me making it past the second week 
because I walked in as this big “redneck” kid who belonged in a garage 
somewhere, you know, and I’ve dealt with that stereotype all my life. 
 
Although it is not possible to confirm his account of the reception of the “head nurse”, it 
is clear throughout the interview that Casey embraced his “country” side but also sought 
to transcend it. But once he was introduced to the idea of working as a CNA, he 
embraced the work fully: 
Yep, my motivation for getting into it—after I realized that I was actually smart 
enough to do it—was that I’ve always really loved to help people in some form or 
another. I love people. I love helping them. I love just being there with them, you 
know, and for that reason, I was very motivated to stick with it for a while. And 
after I got into it, one of the things that kept me going was—as our society puts 
these people in these homes—the families leave and they don’t come back, and 
those people not only lost the life that they knew, but now they’re all alone. And 
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being a CAN, you have that opportunity to walk in to their room and to be that 
family that walked out on them and to stay and to love them. 
 
Despite his passion for the job, his time as a CNA was short. He said he lost fifteen 
residents in his first year, but the final straw was when he had to try and resuscitate his 
grandfather, with whom he lived. The personal trauma of experiencing his grandfather’s 
death, especially with his role trying to help him, led Casey to leave the field of 
healthcare completely. 
*** 
While relatively few men in the study have taken jobs as entry-level healthcare 
workers or pursued the education needed to qualify for higher-paying healthcare work, 
that misses the men who considered such paths or even took initial steps toward such 
careers. Further, there is evidence within these interviews that at least some gendered 
barriers to these jobs are weakening, at least in the rhetoric many men used about pink-
collar jobs. When the issue of being willing to work in a pink-collar job was raised in the 
interview, the only objections concerned the duties required of the position, not the nature 
of the job itself. For example, Zach—who dropped out of art school and works as a 
graphic designer and tattoo artist—said he “wouldn’t have anything against that” but he 
doesn’t see himself as “really good with hands on health care stuff.”46 And Jordan 
replied, “a couple of my best friends are guys that are nurses and it gets, gets to a point 
where, uh, acclimated in that, um, so yeah.” But for a man like Corey, he grounded his 
response in his own masculinity, which he said was secure enough to handle such work: 
                                                 
46 While this comment could be construed as a rejection of health care work, hen set in context with the 
first quote, I take Zach to be saying that while he is not opposed to health care work, he does not think it 
fits his interests or gifts. 
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“I wouldn’t think twice [about working in a female-dominated job]; I don’t care. I know 
I’m a man, you know.” 
Paul, who worked for years in manual labor and now mans the front desk for a 
drug and alcohol rehab facility, spoke at some length about his feelings toward those who 
see his work as gendered: 
In a way, really what I do now, I answer phones all day. I... I get, I answer the 
phones so much, and like I said, I don’t think this way, but for somebody else you 
know, you know, some of the older men that I work with, the drivers, they’re kind 
of rough around the edges. And one guy in particular, you know, “Where’s your 
skirt at?”, you know? “Listen, buddy, I’ll show you where my skirt’s at,” you 
know? You know, but let me tell you, what if I ever, you know, you’re… that 
thinking, they... I don’t pull any punches with anybody. That thinking, I’ll put it in 
place every time. And there’s no place for it anymore. There was never a place for 
it period. Um... and as I said, I’m not gonna let you get away with it and me, I 
don’t care, but it’s that type of thinking that takes women that could probably do 
your job better than you, feeling uncomfortable, demoralizes them and I ain’t 
gonna let you do it. You have daughters, you have mothers, you have aunt, 
grandmother, how’d you like it if you watched somebody do that to them? And I 
have four daughters, and my youngest one will put you in your place, too. So, I’m 
not gonna let it happen. 
 
These instances of men showing an openness to female-dominated jobs—even 
standing up for women in the workplace like Paul—could be seen as examples of social 
desirability bias, but even if we grant that as the case, it is notable that men were 
influenced enough by a prevailing sense of gender awareness to moderate their responses. 
But as we see in quotes from men like Casey and Paul, there is an effort here among at 
least of the men to redefine masculinity to incorporate these types of jobs traditionally 
done by women, giving evidence that men might be doing more than “doing masculinity 




This is where the experience of Phil, the registered nurse, is instructive. He spoke 
at some length of his experience as a male nurse in rural northwestern Pennsylvania. He 
describes a culture where there are only two options for men: “It’s kind of funny because 
northwestern PA is such a strange area in terms of human sexuality and gender views and 
everything like that. It’s like, you either wear camo or you’re gay. That’s essentially the 
mindset of the people around here.” Phil describes himself as not being attracted to the 
hunting culture, instead seeing himself as “an artsy, music, and poetry and literature type 
of person.” He did not listen to country music, preferring rock and roll and following pop 
culture. Influenced musically and in fashion by some of the guitarists he liked, he would 
wear pink shirts or skinny jeans and be questioned by peers and his family. (“That’s gay” 
or “You look like a girl”). Although not gay himself, he says he sometimes got covert 
requests to meet up from closeted men in the area. 
Because of his experience navigating gender growing up, Phil said nursing school 
did not bother him, but he still called it “an extreme experience.” Of the 36 people who 
started in his class, there were three men: two straight, one gay. Fourteen of the 36 
gradated: twelve women, two men. This gender disparity has carried forward into his 
work as a nurse: 
So, like my peers throughout college were so strange because here I am, a 
seventeen-, eighteen-year-old kid, sitting with these thirty-year-old women. It’s 
just bizarre. It’s a very strange mix. Then the same thing in the workplace for me 
today. I work with late-twenties to sixty-year-old women. There’s two other male 
nurses at the hospital. 
 
Phil says his coworkers “have never made a deal about me being a male nurse”, 
but gendered expectations crop up at work. Some concern patient expectations, such as 
how he is often mistaken for a doctor, even after he explains he’s a nurse. Conversely, he 
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sees patients, especially older ones, often surprised when the doctor is a woman. In the 
carrying out of his duties, sometimes female patients who require toileting prefer a 
female nurse. But he also describes how there are unwritten rules about who treats which 
case: “It’s kind of funny, like in the ER, like if there’s a male gender urinary problem that 
comes in, like it’s just kind of understood like that’s my patient. Female genital or urinary 
problem that comes in, that’s, you know, one of the other nurses’ patients.” In reflecting 
on how gender might play out at work, he also realized—in the act of speaking—that he 
is not sure the legality of one of the hospital’s rules:  
I was told when I got hired there—I don’t even know if this is legal, but I was told 
when I got hired there that I wasn’t allowed to work in OB because I was a male. 
They didn’t let males work in OB there. I don’t know. I was like nineteen at the 
time, I had no interest in working in OB anyway, so I was like, “Okay. That’s 
fine.” But come to think of it now, I don't know if that’s really even... if that’s 
legal, but. 
 
Finally, while several men who work in healthcare or considered it mentioned 
financial reasons, we see in these interview quotes that men also often mention that they 
enjoy the work and see it as fulfilling. There is evidence that a growing number of men 
are entering nursing (Munnich and Wozniak 2017), and if female-dominated sectors 
continue and produce middle-skill, middle-wage jobs (Cottingham 2013; Dill et al. 2016), 
there is some possibility for more men to consider these fields. Jerry, the 21-year old who 
first pursued nursing because he “heard a lot of good stuff about nursing industry or the 
healthcare industry just they’re being in demand”, has gotten the message of the potential 
financial rewards to such careers. And the lack of overtly sexist pushback against these 
jobs and careers, while a low bar, is some indication of slow cultural change. More 
optimistically, at least some men seem to be rethinking masculinity in ways that includes 
jobs not traditionally done by men.  
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But we also see in the examples of Phil, Alex, Gary, and Casey some reasons why 
continued movement of men into female-dominated healthcare occupations might still be 
slow. Phil has found support at work but faced gendered resistance at home and 
elsewhere—if not to his occupational choice per say—then at least to deviations from a 
particular understanding of rural masculinity. And while Phil makes almost $30 an 
hour—wages that place him among the top-fifth of men in this study—he does not make 
more than others in the study who still work traditional, blue-collar occupations. Further, 
in order to get his “good job,” Phil needed to successfully complete five semesters of 
higher education and take on $20,000 of student loan debt, things not possible or 
preferred by many men in the study. Short of earning at least an associate degree, the 
options in entry-level healthcare are perhaps less appealing, at least on wage grounds 
alone. While Alex’s pay and rate of promotion are perhaps unusually low, Gary seems to 
be near the top of the market for healthcare jobs that don’t require formal credentials, and 
he earns the equivalent of about $26,000 per year, barely enough to pull a family of four 
above the poverty line and comparable to many of the traditional blue-collar jobs in the 
area. Given the remaining cultural cost for some men to switch careers and the 
availability of at least some traditional work that pays well, it may take even more time 




This chapter explored the ways in which rural, working-class men do—and do 
not—seek to improve their labor market positions. The evidence presented in this chapter 
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shows that men are often doing more to improve their labor market position than existing 
accounts allow, but there are misunderstandings about why working-class men adopt the 
strategies they do. First, I find that a majority of men in this study have pursued some sort 
of postsecondary education or training; however, rather than seeing these decisions in 
purely market-based terms as means to improve their labor market positions, many men 
use education and training as a way to explore vocational interests at a time of life when 
many of their college-going peers are doing the same and in a world without a dominant 
local employer that obviates vocational exploration. Some men do not have the 
opportunity for such exploration, as life circumstances expedite their entries into the 
labor market or their own choices limit opportunities for vocational exploration. This 
“winding path” toward adulthood can cause some men get off track in ways that costs 
them in the long term, but most of them manage to land on their feet. Important for 
understanding these men’s approaches to post-secondary education and training is the 
way in which rurality and masculinity intersect in the identities of the men in this sample. 
Post-secondary education is a means to strengthen—not create distance from—working-
class vocation. Additionally, these men see education as a means to an end, not an end in 
itself: pursuit of education is most often to gain a practical skill or trade that can be 
transferred in an immediate and obvious way to the labor market, something especially 
true in rural places where formal educational credentials are sometimes less valuable than 
personal trust and practical knowledge. 
Second, I find that almost as common as upskilling were men who have taken one 
of a set of what I call mobility measures to improve their labor market opportunities. 
Despite evidence that Americans in general are moving less for work, I argue that 
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looking at out-of-state moves is too limiting when trying to understand the ways in which 
men use geographic mobility to improve their labor market prospects. This narrow view 
neglects those who enlist in the military and take jobs that require travel. The most 
common type of move among the men in this study is what I call a prospecting trip, 
where men move without a job in search of better opportunities. These moves often lack 
a plan or any meaningful employment connections in the new location, so these episodes 
are often short-lived. But short of moving, many men take other mobility measures to 
improve their labor market position like enlisting in the military or taking jobs that 
require travel, such as long-haul truck driving or working on an itinerant work crew. 
These jobs, while relatively well-paying, often have detrimental effects on partners and 
families, whom these men must leave for long stretches at a time (Viscelli 2016). Yet I 
also find that even men who leave are usually drawn back to the area, often by a 
combination of attachment to family and love of rural place, evidence of a “stickiness of 
place” that supersedes any marginal increase in earning opportunities elsewhere, a picture 
counter to that which depicts those who remain in rural areas are having failed to escape 
(Carr and Kefalas 2009). Men express this “stickiness” both affirmatively in recitation of 
aspects of what has been called the rural idyll (Bell 2006), and negatively in their 
characterizations of urban space as expensive and potentially dangerous, which plays at 
least in part on racialized stereotypes. Notably, some men stay in the area due to 
obligations to custodial and noncustodial children. Among the cases, a few men express 
interest in leaving the area in the future, but most men are content in rural place, even if it 
means fewer employment opportunities. 
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Third, I find that while few men have actually worked nontraditional jobs, quite a 
few have considered it, and almost none express hostility to the idea in theory. While the 
absolute penetration of men into some female-dominated occupations lags (England 
2010; Wootton 1997), evidence from this study indicates that men have considered such 
jobs and have even taken preliminary steps toward them, even if they end up not 
following through. These findings suggest that we may be closer to a tipping point with 
some occupations than occupational data suggest. This said, the few men in this study 
who are in female-dominated occupations testify to some resistance from family and 
peers, indicating that certain cultural barriers remain entrenched, perhaps particularly in 
rural America, where a type of “country boy” masculinity is more pronounced 
(Campbell, Bell, and Finney 2006). Additionally, given the remaining cultural cost for 
some men to switch careers and the availability of at least some traditional work that pays 
well, it may take even more time and decimation of less-skilled, male-dominated 
occupations to push more men into female-dominated jobs.
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CHAPTER 4: GOOD AND BAD(ISH) JOBS FOR WORKING-CLASS MEN IN 
RURAL AMERICA 
Thirty-three years old, Dennis is a working-class man doing well in rural 
America. Born and raised in northwestern Pennsylvania, Dennis enlisted in the Marines 
after high school. His older brother had enlisted before him, although Dennis says his 
decision was more in response to a challenge from his father about him being 
undisciplined than the example of his brother. Dennis initially thought the military might 
be a career, but he says that his deployment to the Middle East after the events of 9/11 
cured him of that aspiration. He fulfilled his four-year commitment and returned to 
northwestern Pennsylvania without a plan. Once home, he learned of a nearby technical 
school, so Dennis—with the benefit of living at home, plus his savings from the military 
and six months of unemployment insurance—used his GI Bill to pursue a welding and 
fabrication credential. After eighteen months, Dennis had earned a specialized associate 
degree, and with the help of the school, he secured a job immediately after graduation at a 
local manufacturer making $18.50 per hour. He worked there for a couple years, but the 
parent company closed the plant where Dennis worked, leaving Dennis again without a 
job or a plan. A longtime family friend, who worked for the electric utility, suggested that 
Dennis apply. Dennis began the process of attaining the necessary pre-qualifications, but 
when the workers went on strike, all hiring stopped, again putting a roadblock in Dennis’ 
path. However, the family friend learned that the rural cooperative utility47 was hiring, so 
                                                 
47 Rural electrical cooperatives, more common in the Western United States, were often started by farmers 
to provide utility service to hard-to-reach rural places that were underserved by for-profit utility companies. 




Dennis turned his attention there. He recalls being the first person interviewed, and he 
was asked why they should skip the stack of applications and just hire him. He doesn’t 
remember his exact response, but he must have made an impression, because they called 
the next day and offered him the job. 
At the cooperative, Dennis started as an apprentice at $17 per hour, and his pay 
increased as he gained more training and experience. He has received regular wage 
increases connected to his progress in the apprenticeship program, other incentives, and 
cost-of-living increases. Seven years later, Dennis now makes almost $40 per hour and 
earns an additional $20,000 to $30,000 a year in overtime pay, which puts his annual 
earnings in the low six-figure range, an impressive amount given his relatively young age 
and the low cost of living of the area. Dennis recently bought a small working farm, but 
his real passion is being outdoors, hunting and fishing. Dennis’ latest project is building 
an addition onto his house that will serve as a showroom for his many hunting trophies. 
Although situations can change, Dennis is a working-class man making a good living in 
rural America. 
* * * 
The conventional wisdom is that life in rural America is difficult and 
unforgiving—even undesirable (Adamy and Overberg 2017; Overberg and Calderon 
2017). Chronic poverty and underemployment have long been greater in rural America 
than urban America (Cromartie 2017; Findeis and Jensen 1998; Jensen et al. 1999), and 
rural workers are more likely than urban workers to slip from adequate employment into 
underemployment; less likely to move out of marginal jobs into adequate employment 
(Jensen et al. 1999); and less likely to move from part-time to fulltime work (Findeis and 
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Jensen 1998). In short, there are a lack of good jobs in rural America (Findeis and Jensen 
1998), and it can be challenging to make an adequate living in at least some parts of rural 
America. Yet focusing on the relative disadvantages of rural places suggests that very 
few have managed to do well. In this chapter, I examine the work experiences of rural 
men by dividing men into two groups: those who have “good jobs” that pay at least $15 
an hour, and those who don’t. Contrary to conventional wisdom that good jobs in rural 
America are rare, almost one-third of the men in the study have good jobs, including a 
dozen men who earn an effective hourly rate of at least $25. For the men in good jobs, I 
identify three themes among their jobs: they are mostly in traditional, blue-collar 
occupations and industries; they tend to be unionized; and many of the jobs are 
professional or managerial. In many cases, it is a combination of these factors that makes 
a real difference in earnings. Dennis’ story illustrates a couple of the characteristics that 
were typical of those who were successful: he worked in blue-collar occupation and was 
a union member.48 Overall, the stories of the men in this study with good jobs offers a 
window into a rural America of gainful employment, living wages, and working-class 
careers. 
But while many men in the study had good jobs, a majority of the men did not. 
Some of the men once had good jobs but no longer do, while others have never managed 
to navigate their way into higher-paying work. While some of the men’s wages have been 
perennially low, more common among the men are those whose wages seem to stall 
between $10 and $15 an hour in what I call bad(ish) jobs. These jobs are not the most 
                                                 
48 Dennis also had military service and earned an associate degree, and while those characteristics are 
arguably useful in the labor market, they were not clearly correlated with labor market success among men 
in this study. 
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poorly paid, but they generally lack opportunities for predictable advancement or 
assurance of measurable wage gains over time. I identify four dynamics of this lower-
wage labor market: 1) the job carousel, in which men move laterally among jobs that pay 
comparably but struggle to find opportunities to advance; 2) chutes and ladders, which 
describes the fact that there is often not a clear-line path of wage improvement, as almost 
half of men at one point made more than they currently do; 3) the steel ceiling, the 
working-class version of the glass ceiling, in which men find their wages stagnating, even 
after years of service to the same employer; and 4) not management material, the fact that 
some men desire advancement but are deemed not to be suitable managers by their 
employers, often compelling men to make lateral moves to other occupations or 
industries. A final group of men make up what I call the downwardly mobile, which are 
those with greater earning power who have chosen not to use it or those whose hourly 
wages are not reflective of their true labor market position. While Chapter 3 described 
how men have tried to improve their labor market prospects, this chapter utilizes these 
men’s labor force narratives to offer insight into the ways men have—and have not—
managed to find and keep good jobs.     
 
Literature Review 
Employment for Working-Class Men in Rural America 
Much of rural America faces stiff economic headwinds. Employment 
opportunities in rural America have generally been worse than those in urban America 
(Slack 2007), and in rural places, work has provided less protection from poverty (Slack 
2010). Rural workers have long contended with working poverty (Lichter, Johnston, and 
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McLaughlin 1994), as well as various forms of underemployment (Jensen et al. 1999; 
Slack and Jensen 2002) and nonstandard employment (McLaughlin and Coleman‐Jensen 
2008). Older research shows that jobs in rural areas pay less for comparable work and 
offer less return for human-capital endowments (McLaughlin and Perman 1991), and 
rural wage growth continues to be slower than urban growth (Cromartie 2017). While 
gains in manufacturing in rural America helped offset employment losses due to 
agricultural consolidation in the waning decades of the twentieth century (Albrecht and 
Albrecht 2000; Lobao and Meyer 2001), early twenty-first century labor markets in rural 
America nonetheless came to be dominated by service-sectors jobs (Gibbs and Kusmin 
2005) that were disproportionately low-quality. (For a summary of rural economic 
restructuring, see Chapter 9 in Tickamyer, Warlick, and Sherman 2017). There is 
evidence that rural America benefitted less in terms of absolute poverty reduction from 
the surging economy of the late 1990s (Gundersen 2006), and more recently, rural 
America has been slower than urban America to recover jobs lost during the Great 
Recession (Cromartie 2017). There is also evidence for the so-called “brain drain” from 
rural America, in which higher-skilled workers have left for more plentiful and lucrative 
opportunities elsewhere (Carr and Kefalas 2009; Domina 2006), leaving behind a rural 
population with lower average levels of education (Beaulieu and Mulkey 1995). 
In their assessment of the employment situation of rural men in particular, Jensen 
and Jensen (2011) find that rural men lag behind their urban counterparts in several 
employment indicators, including labor force participation and employment, and rural 
men have greater rates of underemployment and working poverty than urban men. Yet 
despite this pessimistic picture of rural male employment, there is emerging evidence that 
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employment in rural America is not as dire as certain depictions suggest. Manufacturing, 
which tends to pay better than the service sector (Mishel 2018), makes up a greater 
percentage of jobs in rural America (Cromartie 2017) and has been slower to recede in 
rural places when compared with urban America (Low 2017), which helps explain why 
rural men are less likely than urban men to have been displaced from their jobs (Jensen 
and Jensen 2011). Further, low-skill jobs make up a shrinking portion of rural jobs 
overall (Gibbs, Kusmin, and Cromartie 2004; Young 2013). And although working 
poverty has long been a mark of rural life (Brown and Hirschl 1995; Jensen, McLaughlin, 
and Slack 2003; Lichter et al. 1994; Lichter and McLaughlin 1995), rates of those in 
working poverty have been converging in urban and rural places (Slack 2010). 
 
Upwardly Mobile Pathways in Today’s Labor Market 
Even with the declines in traditionally male-dominated occupations and industries 
like manufacturing and construction, these jobs continue to provide low- and middle-skill 
men with higher wages and better job quality as compared to most other alternative 
industries and occupations (Andersson et al. 2005; Mishel et al. 2012). For example, 
Holzer and Lerman (2009) identify a number of prominent middle-skill construction and 
manufacturing positions which provide decent median annual earnings ($30,000-$70,000 
per year) that continue to employ thousands of men in today’s labor market, including 
inspectors, electricians, plumbers, machinists, welders, cutters, and solderers. There may 
also be advantages for men in some service sector occupations industries in today’s 
economy. Many of the occupations and industries where we see growth are industries that 
are traditionally dominated by women, not men. These include the health care sector and 
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education industries (for example, see Nelson and Wolf-Powers (2009) and Parrillo and 
de Socio (2014) on the growth of “eds and meds”), which expanded during the recent 
recession while all other industries contracted (Goodman and Mance 2011). Past research 
has shown that low- and middle-skill men are reluctant to enter these female-dominated 
industries because of lower pay and prestige (Gatta and Roos 2005; Simpson 2005), but 
such trends may be changing as these sectors continue and produce middle-skill, middle-
wage jobs (Cottingham 2013; Dill et al. 2016). 
There is also some evidence that the public sector has remained a source of higher 
wages, benefits, and job security for low- and middle-skill workers (Autor et al. 2008b; 
Lee 2004). This is especially true for racial minorities, who have benefited from 
affirmative action programs in the public sector that have promoted the hiring and 
retention of racial minorities, although much of the research on minorities in the public 
sector does not reflect today’s labor market (Blank 1985; Collins 1983; Holzer and 
Neumark 2000). There is also evidence that public sector workers were substantially less 
likely to lose their jobs during the recession, and protection of the public sector was 
greater for low-skill workers compared to workers with a college degree (Kopelman and 
Rosen 2016). And research has shown that union jobs are a source of higher wages and 
benefits for men without a college degree: Mishel (2012) reports that the union premium 
earned by those who belong to a union is 17.8 percent for men without a college degree. 
Finally, Katherine Newman’s (2006) qualitative work among low-skilled workers in New 
York City in the 1990s and early 2000s identified paths of upward mobility for the 




Findings and Analysis 
To provide perspective on the men in this study with good jobs, I first set them in 
context of all the working men in the study. Figure 1 shows the effective hourly wage49 
for all men who worked for pay at the time of the interview.50 Of those 44 men, seven 
(16%) earned less than $10 an hour; 19 of 44 (43%) earned between $10.00 and $14.99 
an hour; four of 44 (9%) earned between $15.00 and $19.99; and 14 of 44 (32%) earned 
at least $20.00 an hour. Although not much should be extrapolated from this distribution 
given the small sample size and nonrandom nature of the cases, a few observations are 
possible. First, there is not an even distribution of wages. A relatively paucity of men 
earns below $10.00 an hour or between $15.00 and $20.00 an hour, but almost half of the 
working men make between $10.00 and $15.00 and almost one-third make over $20.00 
an hour. Regarding the lower earners, there are relatively few men making below $10 an 
hour, and only one man in the study literally makes the minimum wage. Conversely, over 
one-quarter of the men make at least $25 an hour, which equates to an annual salary of 
over $50,000, twice the poverty line for a family of four and within reach of the U.S. 
median household income.51 It should be kept in mind that Figure 1 excludes 17 men in 
the study: six men live primarily on SSI or SSDI, and another ten men had no work-
related income at the time of the interview because they were either unemployed or not in 
                                                 
49 In some cases, the men were paid by the hour and had an actual hourly rate. In cases where they worked 
for salary, by the job, or were paid in some other way, I calculated an estimated hourly rate based on 40 
hours a week for 52 weeks per year. 
50 This excludes those men who were unemployed or whose primary income came in the form of disability 
benefits, even if they worked on the side. 
51 The Real Median Household Income in the United States was $61,372 in September 2018. 
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the labor force. I lack income information for one man because he did not reveal it during 
the interview despite several attempts to determine that information. 
 
Figure 4.1: Effective Hourly Wage of Working Men (N=44) 
 
 
Men with Good Jobs 
A number of definitions and dimensions are used to conceptualize job quality, 
including pay and benefits, skill, autonomy, and overall job satisfaction (Green 2006; 
Handel 2005; Kalleberg 2011; McGovern, Smeaton, and Hill 2004; Schmitt and Jones 
2012). What is a “good job” for low- and middle-skill workers in today’s economy? For 
simplicity, in this chapter I focus exclusively on wages.52 Kalleberg (2011) argues that 
while there is some individual variation in whether a job is “good” or “bad,” most people 
                                                 
52 Men’s subjective experiences of their jobs, including whether they think their jobs are “good”, are 
explored in Chapter 5. 
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agree that compensation and benefits are central components of job quality and a sense of 
dignity at work (Bolton 2007; Hodson 2001; Sayer 2007). I measure job quality using a 
baseline threshold of $15 per hour as a “good wage” for low- and middle-skill worker. 
This threshold is meaningful due to the “Fight for $15” living wage movement over the 
past four years (Greenhouse 2016) and its success in establishing $15 as a threshold for a 
dignified hourly wage (Meyerson 2014).53 
As seen in Figure 1, eighteen men in the study who worked for pay at the time of 
the interview made at least $15 per hour, which represents 41 percent of the working men 
in this study and 30 percent of the men in the study overall for whom I have income 
information. If I include among those with good jobs one man who was unemployed at 
the time of the interview but who had accepted a job that will pay him in the high 
$40,000s and another man who declined to reveal his income but owns a successful local 
business, the number of men earning at least $15 per hour rises to 20, which is 45 percent 
of the working men and almost exactly one-third of the men overall in the study overall. 
As seen in Figure 1, of the men with good jobs, four earned between $15 and $19.99, two 
earned between $20 and $24.99, and twelve had actual or estimated hourly rates of at 
least $25 per hour. Among those high earners, four men earned an average of more than 
$30 per hour. 
                                                 
53 The $15-an-hour minimum wage movement began with strikes by fast food workers in 2012 and 2013 
(Luce 2015; Tung, Lathrop, and Sonn 2015). In the short time since those strikes, many localities have 
passed a $15 minimum wage, and it is likely to be a key part of the 2020 Democratic presidential primary 
(Romeo 2019). The decision to choose $15 as the specific target of these strikes was based on intuition 
more than empirical research (Luce 2015), and some scholars have raised concerns about the impact of a 
$15 an hour wage on the poorest workers (Holzer 2015a). However, Desmond (2019) recently argued that 
not only does a $15-an-hour minimum wage improve lives, it saves them through many positive 




Given the popular perception of rural America as experiencing rapid decline 
(Adamy and Overberg 2017), some may be surprised at the number of men in this sample 
with good jobs. To set these findings in context, I borrow analysis from an unpublished 
paper coauthored with Janette Dill54. As seen in Table 1, we use the 2004 and 2008 
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to look descriptively at 
differences between low- and middle-skill men living in rural areas as compared to 
working class men living in metropolitan areas.55 The mean wage for working class men 
in rural areas and in metropolitan areas is the same, at about $18.75 per hour. However, a 
smaller percentage of rural men make at least $20 or $25 per hour (27% and 14%, 
respectively) as compared to metropolitan men (34% and 21%, respectively). In terms of 
occupation, rural men are more concentrated in production (20% of rural men as 
compared to 13% of men living in metropolitan areas). They are less likely to be in 
white-collar professional, office, or management jobs, or to work in service occupations. 
Rural men are concentrated in the manufacturing industry (which employs 30% of rural 
men as compared to 19% men in metropolitan areas). The other major industries where 
rural men work are construction and retail (17% and 12%, respectively). Rural men 
compared to metropolitan men have longer tenures in their current job (89 months as 
compared to 83 months), are less likely to be in a salaried job (27% as compared to 33%), 
are slightly less likely to be in a unionized job (14% as compared to 16%), and are more 
likely to have had some military service (17% as compared to 15%). Low- and middle-
skill rural men have lower levels of education as compared to the metropolitan 
                                                 
54 Dr. Dill is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Akron. 
55 This analysis concerns men in the SIPP with less than a four-year college degree. 
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counterparts, with lower rates of some college or an associate degree, and they are more 
likely to be married and have children. Overall, while there are some differences, 
between rural and urban men, rural men have the same average hourly wage, and nearly 








 Rural Men Metro Men 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Hourly wage 6,357 $18.75 24,216 $18.76 
Wage of at least $20 6,357 27.2% 24,216 34.4%* 
Wage of at least $25 6,357 14.2% 24,216 20.6%* 
Occupation     
Service 6,741 14.0% 25,334 16.7%* 
Management 6,741 5.2% 25,334 7.1%* 
Professional 6,741 6.5% 25,334 8.2%* 
Sales 6,741 6.9% 25,334 8.7%* 
Office 6,741 5.3% 25,334 7.8%* 
Construction 6,741 15.2% 25,334 15.5% 
Installation 6,741 10.4% 25,334 8.8%* 
Production 6,741 20.4% 25,334 13.0%* 
Transportation 6,741 16.1% 25,334 14.2%* 
Industry     
Retail 6,741 12.1% 25,334 13.6%* 
Construction 6,741 16.9% 25,334 17.2% 
Manufacturing 6,741 29.7% 25,334 18.8%* 
Wholesale 6,741 4.5% 25,334 5.1%* 
Transportation 6,741 6.9% 25,334 8.1%* 
Information 6,741 1.6% 25,334 2.5%* 
Professional and business 6,741 1.9% 25,334 2.9%* 
Management and administration 6,741 4.4% 25,334 6.8%* 
Education 6,741 2.5% 25,334 2.4% 
Health care 6,741 3.2% 25,334 4.1%* 
Food service 6,741 5.5% 25,334 8.4%* 
Other services 6,741 4.0% 25,334 4.6% 
Public administration 6,741 6.8% 25,334 5.4%* 
Work characteristics     
Tenure in months 6,674 88.8 25,005 83.3* 
Salaried job 6,717 26.8% 25,273 32.5%* 
Union member 6,717 14.4% 25,273 16.2%* 
Military 6,741 16.7% 25,334 15.1%* 
Education     
High school degree or less 6,741 59.5% 25,334 53.2%* 
Some college 6,741 31.0% 25,334 35.8%* 
Associate degree 6,741 9.5% 25,334 11.1%* 
Personal characteristics     
18-24 6,741 16.3% 25,334 16.2% 
25-44 6,741 48.3% 25,334 50.1%* 
45-65 6,741 35.4% 25,334 33.7%* 
Married 6,741 58.5% 25,334 53.2%* 
Children under 18 6,741 42.3% 25,334 40.6%* 
 * Indicates significant differences by rural/metro (p<.05) 
Source: SIPP 
Notes: Mean values for the full sample of men include the first observation for each respondent in the 2004 and 
2008 cohorts of the SIPP 
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The men in this study who make at least $15 an hour are displayed in Table 2, 
along with their age, current occupation or industry, and effective hourly wage. The men 
are arranged by hourly wage from lowest to highest. Several themes emerge from among 
the men with good jobs. First, most of these men work in traditional blue-collar industries 
or occupations. Second, many of them belong to public or private sector unions. And 
third, a number of the men have worked their way into management positions. In the 
sections that follow, I will explore these three themes, including interrogation of these 








The most common jobs among the higher-earning men were in traditional blue-
collar fields like manufacturing, natural resource extraction, construction, and law 
enforcement. Several men with good jobs in this study work in some facet of 
manufacturing. Despite evidence that rural economies have shifted toward services 
 
    
Name Age at Time of 
Interview 
Current Occupation or 
Industry 
Effective Hourly Wage 
    
    
Jeremiah 38 Manufacturing $15.00 
Derek 40 Commercial driver $16.75 
Cameron 33 Self-employed contractor $17.31 
Wes 34 Operations $19.95 
    
Seth* 40 Manufacturing $21.65 
Phil* 26 Nurse $24.00 
    
Thomas 32 Self-employed contractor $25.00 
Sean 39 Law enforcement $26.00 
Jacob* 38 Law enforcement $27.11 
Don 43 Oil & gas $29.00 
Jeff* 25 Master carpenter $29.61 
    
Sam 37 Manufacturing management $30.29 
Dustin* 46 Hospital administration $31.00 
    
Vince 39 Higher education $36.06 
Dennis* 33 Utilities $37.50 
    
Austin* 46 Federal government $44.62 
Todd 46 Self-employed $72.11 
Larry 35 Oil & gas $96.00 
    
* Indicates union member 
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(Slack 2014), American manufacturing arguably remains strong (Kliesen and Tatom 
2018; Kotkin and Shires 2018), including in some rural areas (Low 2017). All of the men 
in good-paying manufacturing jobs had worked their way to higher-paying positions over 
time, something covered later in the chapter when I discuss work trajectories. Sam works 
in quality control for a local manufacturer; Seth does testing and calibration for a 
manufacturer that makes products in support of the oil and gas industries; and Jeremiah 
works in research and development for a manufacturer specializing in injection molding.  
Don and Larry both make over $25 per hour in the oil and gas industry, long an 
important industry in northwestern Pennsylvania, the birthplace of the modern oil 
industry (Dickey 1959). Don’s work keeps him local, as he maintains a few hundred gas 
wells that he visits weekly. Don has been in the same job for 22 years, which he knows 
has involved a bit of luck. When gas from the Marcellus shale flooded the market and 
drove down the price, his company laid off 30 percent of the workers. And just nine 
months before the interview, Don’s company was acquired by another firm, and the new 
owner cut another 20 to 30 percent of the workforce. As Don says, “we’ve been cut deep. 
I’m fortunate to still be there.”  
While Don has been in the same work in the oil and gas industry for decades, 
Larry came to his work as a horizontal driller after stints in other fields. After four years 
in the Army, Larry got a job at the same local manufacturer where he worked in high 
school. He started at $8.00 an hour and over three years worked up to $12.50, which he 
says made him one of the top paid people in the company. Larry had an older brother 
who worked on oil rigs, and his brother often told him about the pay: 
… he tells me what they started out paying. I’m like—which I was making $12.50 
at the time—the rig that he was working on started out $14.50, and then $100 [per 
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diem]. I’m like, that’s pretty awesome, just to show up for work you are getting 
extra money every day, I’m like, that is great. And, so I started thinking about it. 
 
When he learned about an open position through his brother, Larry made the jump 
to oil and gas. He started at the bottom and worked his way up, although as he described, 
his work—like Don’s—is subject to broader economic forces: “I worked myself up; it 
goes floors, motors, dash, drilling, and then rig manager. I got up to drilling, and I was 
fixing to go to rig manager in then the slow down happen. So, I went from drilling all the 
way back down to floors within a few months.” Larry was ultimately laid off, and he 
went back to working at a local factory for $11.00 an hour. With overtime at the factory, 
Larry could make about as much as he did as a floor hand on the rig, although it took him 
seven days a week: “… it’s two weeks on, two weeks off [on the rig]; at the shop, I’m 
working at is seven days a week. It’s not really the same amount of money, but it is, you 
know?” Still, Larry was unsure about jumping back to oil and gas, so he worked at the 
shop for a year and waited for drilling to pick back up. He also did not want to start at the 
bottom again, so his brother helped him come back in as a driller, which pays very well: 
“So, MWD [measurement while drilling] end up making about $100,000 a year. 
Directional drillers make about $200,000 a year.” Larry got his first directional drilling 
job about nine months before the interview. Based on his reported income from the last 
six months of the previous tax year, he is in line to make close to what he was told to 
expect. 
Several of the high-earners work in the construction trades. Thomas and Cameron 
both are self-employed contractors, whose stories will be told in greater detail below 
when I discuss self-employment. After working for years for other contractors, often for 
middling wages, each decided to strike out on his own. Each is responsible for bidding on 
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jobs and securing contracts, and both have had success in keeping enough work for 
themselves. As employers, they are responsible for assembling the crew necessary for 
each job. Even after expenses, each still makes a healthy hourly wage, although there is 
variability with being self-employed. Jeff is also in the trades as a journeyman carpenter. 
As a member of his union, he gets jobs from the local union hall and is guaranteed a 
certain hourly wage. He has been fortunate to have relatively steady work through the 
union, although he can draw unemployment insurance when he is between jobs. Jacob 
and Sean both work in law enforcement, jobs where they literally wear blue collars and 
each make more than $25 an hour. Two men with good jobs work in transportation: 
Derek is a commercial driver for an industrial laundry company, and Brett owns a local 
towing company. Wes and Todd make good livings in one of the newer hands-on 
industries, microbrewing. Todd has made his name on the brewing side, while Wes 
applies his experience with welding and engine repair to brewery operations. Finally, 
Dennis works as a lineman for the local public electric utility. Overall, a majority of the 
men with good jobs have blue-collar employment. 
Blue-collar employment by itself is not universally high-paying among men in the 
study, although all men in the study except one who work in blue-collar occupations 
make at least $10 an hour. For example, Charles has worked for just a few weeks at a 
food manufacturing facility where he started at $9.00 an hour, even though he is a line 
leader. Mark makes $10.95 as an assistant shift supervisor at a facility making industrial 
products. Casey is a laborer in a steel mill and makes $12.10 an hour. As will be 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter, tenure is not always enough to move men in 
blue-collar jobs into “good jobs” territory. Dan, like Casey, works as a general laborer at 
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a steel plant, where he makes $13.75 an hour after ten years of service. After six years, 
George makes $12.50 an hour as a machinist at a manufacturing facility. After seven 
years, Curtis makes $13.50 an hour at a manufacturing facility. Jerry makes $10 an hour 
as the low man at a custom cabinetry shop. 
 
Union Membership 
Several of the men in good jobs are members of public or private sector unions, 
which overlaps substantially with the men in high-paying blue-collar work. Seth works in 
a union manufacturing plant; Jeff is part of his local carpenters’ union; Dennis, a utility 
lineman, is part of a cooperative that has union-like characteristics concerning his wages, 
benefits, promotions, and security; and Jacob is part of a public sector union as a law 
enforcement officer. But not all union men are in blue-collar work. Phil, who works as a 
nurse, is part of a union, as is Austin, who served in the Navy and now works as a civilian 
for the federal government. The only union member in this study who does not make 
more than $15 an hour is Jeremy, who makes $13.31 an hour working for the state of 
Pennsylvania as a custodian. Although his wages do not qualify him as having a good 
job, his position has many other features of a desirable position, including good benefits, 
a pension, and long-term job security. His hourly rate, while still relatively modest, is 
almost twice the minimum wage, but the benefits make the job worthwhile in his eyes: 
Benefits are real good. That is one of the main reasons why I’m still there. My 
benefits cover the full family, including my two step-children, my two step-
daughters. My union benefits, well my union dues and things like that, my 





Not only do the men in unionized jobs benefit from higher current wages, they 
also started at much higher wages than their non-union peers and have more robust and 
regular raises. Dennis, a lineman for the public utility, took a cut in pay from his previous 
work in manufacturing when he started, but the advancement has been robust: 
I would say, I think when I started, I actually took about a dollar an hour cut. In 
2009, when I started as a ground man, I want to say I made like $17-something an 
hour. And then, as a first-year apprentice, it probably went up $2, $2 or $3, and 
then, it progressed $2 or $3 every – every year, which raises the floor of the 
current and future earnings. 
 
He continues, “When I hit journeyman four years ago, we made $33.50 an hour, and then 
in the last four years, it still goes up a couple of dollars a year.” He now makes $37.50 
with ample opportunity for overtime.  
Seth, who works in manufacturing, has increased his pay by a combination of 
seeking shift incentives and bidding for internal promotions: “And then, if you worked 
second shift, it was a dollar shift premium. If you worked third shift, it was $1.25. So, I 
worked, I’ll take that $1.25, so I always worked third shift. And then, every year there 
was an incremental pay raise. You know, it went from like 15.65 to 15.90.” But Seth also 
benefitted from already having a “good job” when he started in the stockroom, making 
more on his first day that many of the men in this study have ever made, even after years 
with the same employer. Once he had his foot in the door, Seth was easily able to bid for 
other jobs: 
The job I’m in now is pay grade 8. And that was a huge thing about switching 
jobs, was like 3.60 more an hour. So, I went from the stockroom to what we call 
the test area, and it was three dollars more an hour just like that. And then, once I 
trained and went on the off shift, it was another raise. And then we just had a new, 
we just did a five-year contract. 
 
He explains his improvement in pay after just five years with the company: 
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So, from the time I started there in 2012 with 15.65, to where I am now, with my 
new raise, it’s 21.65 and they pay me $1.10 to work second shift. Actually, pay 
me just a smidgen more. So, I can’t complain with what’s happened to me there in 
five years. 
 
And he also has great benefits. His employer matches his 401(k) up to 7%, plus he has 
had full benefits from the first day on the job: “With full benefits from the day I started. 
Not, there was no probation, nothing like that. The day I started I got full benefits, a week 
and a half vacation, two sick days, and that was my very first day.” 
Similar to Dennis and Seth, Phil began with a “good job” and has had ways to 
enhance his wage through a combination of wage and has ways to enhance his already 
generous wage. Phil, who works as a registered nurse, describes how his base pay has 
increased over time:  
Um, and you can get other certifications that bump your pay, but right now 
without anything—without including anything that bumps my pay, I think I’m 
around twenty-four dollars an hour. Um, after seven years. So, nineteen to twenty-
four. I’m up about five dollars an hour in seven years. 
 
Phil also takes advantage of a number of the ways he can enhance his pay. As in 
manufacturing, Phil gets extra pay for working second or third shift. He also earns extra 
when he is the “charge nurse” in the ER or ICU, which means added responsibilities for 
patient assessment and triage. Phil also maintains several medical certifications that also 
raise his pay. While his base pay is around $24 an hour, he is usually making more: 
“Sometimes it’s around twenty-seven, twenty-eight, depending on what’s going on, if I’m 
in charge and it’s a night shift, which I pretty much always work the night shift.” 
Regarding his shifts, Phil has an arrangement with the hospital where he works thirty-six 
hours but still is considered fulltime for the purposes of benefits. Phil generally works 
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twelve-hour shifts and usually gets them spaced as he would like. He defends the 
difficulty of his work: 
And it’s a little different, too because—I always tell my wife, like I feel like it 
would be different like if I were working in like a factory or like McDonald’s or 
something, I don’t think it would be quite as hard, but there’s just such a high risk 
and liability with nursing because you have—I can’t be tired when I go to work, 
you know? I have to like pay attention to the patients’ vital signs and what’s—
especially ER and ICU. You’re working with more critical patients. So, those 
long six twelves in a row was just like super stressful. Um, because I know a lot 
of people welders and stuff like that will put in eighty hours a week and they’re 
like, “Aw, you’re a wimp.” It’s like, “Well, I’m sure your job is hard, too, but you 
probably can’t get sued for—if you mess up a welding job.” 
 
Jeff, a journeyman carpenter with the Greater Pennsylvania Regional Council of 
Carpenters, has worked his way through the union apprenticeship program. He explains 
the process: 
Um, basically start out at a certain rate, and if you complete full, uh all of your 
classes, have all of your dues paid, and fill out a report card, um then you are 
eligible, and have thirteen hundred working hours in per year, you get, uh, 
bumped second year level, third year level, so on. 
 
He recalls that his first job paid about $18 an hour, which included extra pay 
given the nature of the work: “I was twenty years old and it was great. Like I would get a 
check for this and then an extra check because it was deemed heavy highway.” He works 
with his union hall to land jobs but can also solicit his own work, although he needs to 
manage the politics of the union: “All that to say, I had asked my business agent if I 
could go do that because I’m allowed to solicit my own work, but if I piss off my 
business agent, there’s a chance that he’ll play games and, ‘No, I don’t have anything for 
you.’” Jeff says his wage for a given job is pegged to the county; right now, he makes 
$29.61 an hour doing a remodel of a high school, work that is not glamorous: “Um, I’m 
working for a general contractor, so doing a lot of concrete and gross stuff, stuff that 
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makes you wish you would have went to school.” Jeff admitted he wasn’t totally clear on 
union operations and talked at length about some of the union politics, but he still 
ultimately saw value in what they do for him: 
Um what, with um, the idea of being in a union from what I understand, is 
basically you have somebody backing you and you have a kind of like a rule book 
you can go by that keeps the contractors accountable or that keeps you 
accountable. Um, basically just work as hard as you can, as hard as you want to, 
and hope you stay on for a long amount of time. 
 
Jacob, a law enforcement officer in a public sector union who earns almost $30 an 
hour, sums up the benefits of the union succinctly: “Benefits, shift differential, uh, 
overtime if you can pick it up, longevity.” For Jacob, the only downside is that because 
the job is so attractive, especially for the area, few men ever leave unless they retire or 
die, which makes opportunities for advancement few and far between. As I will explore 
in more detail below, the promotion structure of union work is virtually absent among the 
non-union men in this study. In Chapter 5, I will discuss the ways in which these union 
men, despite benefitting from the union, still sometimes have suspicions and questions 
about the role of unions overall. 
 
Management 
Finally, several of the high-earning men were self-employed or worked in 
managerial or professional roles. Thomas and Cameron are both self-employed 
contractors. While moving into business for themselves introduced more risk and 
responsibility, it also allowed both men to increase their earnings. Thomas learned 
masonry from his Dad and grandfather and carpentry from a man he worked for in high 
school. Thomas liked working with his hands and did not see himself going to college. 
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He started at the bottom, working as a laborer while still in high school for around $7.00 
an hour. After high school, he got a job in the carpentry division for a hospitality 
company making $12.50 an hour, but he did not like the work. In subsequent construction 
jobs, he made better money and worked his way up, but as he describes, there is a cap to 
what he could make if he was working for someone else: 
I started with him at like fourteen. Right away, it was bumped up. Just kept 
bumping out ‘til I hit like a twenty-dollar cap. Around here, twenty bucks 
working for somebody, is like… twenty to twenty-five max. That’s your max cap 
unless you’re doing your own work, so that’s what I hit. I’m turning down work. I 
don’t want to be at that point of turning it down when I know I can do it myself. 
So finally, it was just a number of things that drove me to that, but it’s like yeah, 
man. I’ll try it and see what happens. That was three years ago. 
 
Thomas usually runs a three-man crew; he prefers to stay small to avoid what he 
sees as some of the headaches or running bigger crews. He makes more on average than 
he did when he was working for others, but he also has responsibility for finding work 
and negotiating on behalf of him and his crew:  
My wages, they vary. Depends on who I work for. If I work for a buddy or if I see 
somebody that’s not doing well, I’ll work with them, you know what I mean? I’m 
not saying, “Oh, that guy makes bank, I’m going to charge extra.” It’s not the 
case, but if I know of somebody that’s financially struggling, I’ll do what I can to 
help. A lot of times, I’ll set it up on an hourly wage, and I don’t make money on 
my guys usually. Here’s their wages. Here’s my wages. We’ll do an hourly wage 
if you want to do it that way. If you want me to bid it, you’re probably going to 
pay more, and I can do that, too. It’s usually anywhere from thirty to twenty. I 
don’t need to get rich. I just want to pay my bills, and I’ll be happy with that. 
 
The story is similar with Cameron, who also worked in construction for others for 
many years before going out on his own. He started at the bottom: “Just doing labor, you 
know, I'll pay you $7 an hour or whatever it was.” Over the years, he has worked for a 
variety of places making in the $11-12 an hour range. Eventually, Cameron caught on 
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with a contractor and worked his way up to $17 an hour before feeling like he needed 
more: 
Um, and so, you know, like I said, it’s five, five or six years in. I started feeling 
like, um, like there was more like I was kind of like maxed out of my current 
position, like I didn’t want to be hands on for another 30 years, kind of… kind of 
a thing. Um, getting older, you know, body doesn’t recuperate quite as fast. It 
requires a little bit more, uh, sleep, different things, time to recuperate. So, um, 
you know, I just started thinking about these days, thinking about, you know, now 
I’m at a point where we’ve got a serious girlfriend, you know, settling down in 
life, um, you know, uh, just needing, um needing to explore like, beyond… 
 
Cameron approached his boss and was granted a raise up to $23 an hour, which 
kept him on board for another year and a half. At that point, Cameron’s issue was less 
about the money than with not having responsibility of seeing the big picture. He 
approached his boss again, and this time, his boss offered Cameron the chance to buy him 
out. Cameron saw it as a generous offer, but he also figured he had enough contacts to go 
on his own without taking on the debt of buying an existing company. Cameron, like 
Thomas, talked at great length about what has gone into being a self-employed 
contractor, including challenges with finding crew, advertising, and competition.56 
Cameron had one year where he made $78,000 after expenses, but last year, it was just 
$36,000. The increased potential for earning also comes with risk:  
Um, because I can have a banner month and then I can have, you know, where I 
don’t make hardly anything at all. And uh, and honestly if—you know, that you 
have those negative months where if I don’t have a job for the guy, my employee 
for a week, I’m a paying job, then I create something for him to do because if I 
lay him off, my unemployment rate goes up, and if I don’t give him work then he 
gets unhappy and leaves. 
 
                                                 
56 Both Thomas and Cameron mentioned the challenge of competing with the Amish, who also do general 
contracting. According to Thomas and Cameron, the Amish do not have to pay workers compensation or 




Thomas said you do your best to prepare for those times: “Summers pick up, of course. 
You’ll pick up college help or high school help in the summers. It tends to be... like I 
said, you make hay while the sun shines. Tuck it away and save it for a rainy day. That’s 
pretty much the name of the game.” 
Brett is an example of someone in another industry who made the decision to 
move from employee to employer. Always entrepreneurial, Brett was moonlighting as a 
heavy equipment operator even in high school, having bought his own mini-backhoe for 
hire. After high school, he worked a series of jobs for different companies in different 
industries, but he always operated heavy equipment, from backhoes to log skidders to 
forklifts to frontend loaders. Yet most of the jobs paid less than $10 an hour. His longest 
job, where he worked for an excavation company, only paid him $11.50 after four years 
of service. Brett knew that one of the local towing companies was not doing well, and he 
saw a business opportunity. He started with one wrecker, and eight years later, the 
company employs eight people and did nearly a million dollars in gross sales last year. 
Brett insists he doesn’t know his salary—he says that stuff is handled by their business 
manager—but presumably he makes more than the $11.50 per hour he made operating 
equipment at his previous employer. 
Other high-earners work in professional or managerial positions. Dustin, for 
example, worked his way up from a technician into hospital management. He began as a 
mobile X-ray technician, and after five years, he took an opportunity to become a mobile 
MRI technician. As part of a mobile unit, Dustin built a network of relationships with 
hospitals and facilities around the region. When one of the hospitals purchased an MRI 
machine, they hired Dustin to run it at a starting wage of $22.00 an hour. He did that for 
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twelve years, and when his boss retired, Dustin was offered the position in charge of all 
imaging technology. He admits that the learning curve was steep, and there is a lot on his 
plate: “And this being a small hospital, you really do seems like five people’s jobs, but 
that’s the way it has to be. We’re not big enough to have, you know, a large number of 
people, so you kind of get morphed…” Overall, Dustin likes the work, and he earns a 
salary in the low $60,000 range, which he sees as fair for the area. 
However, a few high-earning men have turned down opportunities for 
advancement. They were already making good wages, and they did not want the added 
stress or responsibility. Don, who maintains wells in the oil and gas industry, has had 
opportunities to become a foreman that he has passed up. Not only did he not want to 
extra stress, he figured he would be safer to stay where he was:  
So, I’ve always believed the closer you are to the well the safer you are in the 
company.  And that’s proved to be true because we’ve got 1 foreman, 12 well 
tenders left, so…. Plus, at the time, it didn’t pay that much but there was a lot 
more headache, and I’m like, “I don’t want the stress. I’m good.” 
 
Jeff, the journeyman carpenter, has chosen not to pursue some of the pathways of 
additional credentials available through the union: 
Um, they did offer, you can go to an estimation class and you can go to 
superintendent’s class. I think now that I’ve graduated, I would have to pay a 
certain fee, but they would pay that back if I maintained a B or above. My desire 
though is not really to be an estimator or a superintendent. I feel like that’s a lot of 
responsibility. And you see people who do it and it’s not, it’s not really their 
responsibility. It’s not really worth the stress in my mind, um ‘cause your crew, 
your guys can be what makes or breaks you. 
 
Just 25 years old, Jeff will have opportunity to consider such paths in the future; he 
knows that he can’t do his present work forever:  
Do you want to make, basically—these jobs that I just mentioned, superintendent 
or whoever uh or the estimator, is to make it easier on you later in life. Do you 
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want to be swinging a hammer when you’re fifty-five, you know? I have till sixty-
seven before I can retire without a penalty. It’s ridiculous. I mean, you want, can 
you see a sixty-year old guy carrying sheets of drywall around? 
 
 
Men with Bad(ish) Jobs 
Up to this point in the chapter, I have examined the men in the study with good 
jobs. While about one-third of the men in the study currently have a job that pays at least 
$15 an hour, that means that two-thirds of the men currently make less. This section of 
the chapter focuses on the employment dynamics of the lower-wage labor market 
occupied by a majority of the men in this study. As seen in Figure 1, most men in the 
study who work in the formal labor market make less than $15 an hour, and of that group, 
most make between $10-15 an hour. Should these be considered bad jobs? In their study 
of extreme poverty, Edin and Shaefer (2015) find that many of their respondents aspire to 
jobs that pay about $12 an hour with regular schedules, which is the current situation of 
many working men in this study. But what are the experiences of the many men in this 
study with such jobs? In some cases, jobs in this wage range are stepping stones to good 
jobs. However, most of the men have what I call bad(ish) jobs because they have little 
reason to think they will eventually ascend to the ranks of good jobs. In particular, I 
identify four dynamics of these bad(ish) jobs: the job carousel, chutes and ladders, the 
steel ceiling, and not management material. These dynamics are not mutually exclusive, 
but they describe distinct aspects of men’s labor market experiences. Before exploring 
these four dynamics in detail, I first examine men who are not in good jobs for reasons of 
disability, unemployment, or not being in the labor force. 
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A portion of the lower-earning men in this study receive disability benefits, which 
are generally less than $1,000 per month. Of those on disability, William, 39, brings in 
the most at around $1,800 per month, but that includes other benefits he earned from 
previous employment. As he describes, “… I get a retirement from the VA ‘cause I’m 
considered non-employable. So, I get a retirement check from them. I get a retirement 
from Social Security. And I get a retirement check from Federal Technician.” As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the receipt of disability benefits is not synonymous with 
nonwork, as a majority of the men with such benefits currently work on the side or have 
worked in the past while on disability. However, in no case is that side work enough to 
raise men close to the “good jobs” threshold. For most men, the side work is more about 
stability and community, not the meager income it generates. Yet several men who now 
receive disability used to have good jobs. William parlayed part-time work for the 
National Guard into fulltime federal work paid on the GS scale; at his peak, he was 
making $27.90 an hour as a GS-9. However, his unit was deployed, and the resulting tour 
in Iraq exposed him to the trauma that ultimately led him to qualify for disability. Brad 
made good money on a traveling crew installing rubber roofs on commercial buildings, 
but it was that same job that precipitated the back problems that eventually led him onto 
the disability rolls and into an opioid addiction. Jared was a long-haul truck driver who 
says he made sixty or seventy thousand a year before a series of health problems took 
him off the road and eventually onto disability. 
Another group of men who make less than $15 an hour currently reports zero 
income, although as with those on disability, several have previously had jobs that paid at 
least $15 an hour. Some of the men with no current income are unemployed but looking 
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for work. In Victor’s case, he was unemployed at the time of the interview but had had 
several good-paying jobs in the past and had accepted a sales job that he said would pay 
him in the $40,000s with opportunities for performance bonuses. Christian, who once 
earned double the good jobs threshold but has had trouble finding secure work in recent 
years, is unemployed and waiting to hear on an electrician job. Steve has made as much 
as $19 an hour working in the oil and gas industry, but at the time of the interview, he 
had been unemployed for a few months after being fired from a low-wage job at a lumber 
company. He believes he was unjustly let go, and he worries that has hurt his search for 
work: “Yep, on the application it says can we contact your most recent employer. If you 
mark no, it makes you look bad. So, you got to mark yes.” Several of the men with no 
current income are marginal men, a group discussed in Chapter 2. While a couple of the 
marginal men are looking for work or working under-the-table, most of the marginal men 
with no income are not actively seeking work. From here, I now turn to the four 
dynamics of the lower-wage labor market that emerge across the cases of working men. 
 
The Job Carousel 
Like stepping on and off a carousel, the job carousel describes the experience of 
many men moving among jobs that are relatively fungible with few ladders of 
advancement and relatively little long-term job security. Common among men making 
lower wages, there is an identifiable pattern of men making lateral moves among 
comparable jobs, often at different companies, but always for low wages. Ryan has never 
made more than $9 an hour across a series of jobs in different industries. In his first job, 
he made minimum wage at a manufacturing facility but left after just three months: 
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There was a lot, they’d hire somebody, everybody’s on drugs, bringing alcohol to 
work in Pepsi bottles and such. I didn’t like the way we were treated. You know, 
you got, you gotta deal with stuff every job you have. There’s always something 
you’re not gonna like about it. But it’s just a matter of how everybody was treated 
there, how everybody treated you. The management. 
 
Ryan moved on to a manual labor job where he worked for three years but never 
made more than $8 an hour. He also had issues with the treatment there: 
I didn’t like that place. Because they didn’t—I liked it for what I was doing, but 
they didn’t give us time and a half. It got to the point where they would make us 
go on, they wouldn’t let us leave. Like if there was an ice cream place up the road, 
we weren’t allowed to just take off on our lunch break. Well, then he, I don’t 
know what happen, he started getting mad. We’re sitting there eating lunch one 
day, he’s like, “[No], what are you doing? Why can’t you work?” Work and eat? 
We got to the point where we, if we wanted to eat, we were working while we 
were eating, you know? I mean, just dumb stuff, you know? So, we all kinda got 
fed up and went our own way… Making up stupid rules? Yeah, you gotta swing a 
shovel while you’re eating a-a sub? I don’t think so. Break time, lunch break is to 
relax and eat. You know, stuff like that. 
 
Ryan tried telemarketing for $9 an hour, but he was fired after six months for swearing 
on a call. He acknowledges that he isn’t suited for such work and would rather be outside 
or doing manual labor. He has also worked in maintenance at a motel for minimum wage 
and for $9 an hour treating utility poles. For the last year, he has worked part-time as a 
stock clerk for a grocery store chain. While he likes the physical nature of the work, he is 
frustrated at not being able to work more hours or qualify for benefits: 
No, no cuz then they’d have to give us benefits, and they don’t wanna give us full 
time and benefits. So… I’m getting a little more hours cuz a lot of people are 
quitting, but now they’re hiring on a lot more people. Three twenty a paycheck, so 
yeah, I’m making six-forty, six-fifty a month. 
 
Due in part to the fact he has only been able to find low-wage jobs, Ryan has had two 
stints of about a year each outside the formal labor force. As he said explicitly, he can 
make more under-the-table, which erodes the incentive to stay in the formal labor force: 
“I can make just as much working with my brother [a contractor]. Like two days a week, 
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‘Okay, here’s two hundred bucks, man.’ The end of the month, I’m still making more 
[under the table].”  
This was also the case with Jeremy, whose case was profiled in detail in Chapter 
2. Although he made $14 an hour shortly after high school (before leaving over his 
contention that his boss ignored safety concerns) and currently makes over $13 an hour, 
he had a period in his twenties where he worked a series of entry-level manual jobs that 
all paid about $8 an hour. It was during that time, when he was single and living at home, 
where he took two extended periods off from formal work, instead choosing to work off-
the-books: “‘Cause I was doing all these part-time jobs and odd jobs and things like that, 
and that was bringing in almost the same amount of money and only working maybe fifty 
percent of the time.” There are labor force participation implications of the job carousel, 
as men stuck on the carousel feel that they can move in and out of the labor market 
without the perception of much wage or career penalty. There will always be a low-wage 
job waiting when they want it, and these men can often make as much money off-the-
books as they can from these low-wage positions in the formal labor market.  
Charles and Evan are two other men who have worked numerous jobs but never 
for more than about $10 an hour. Charles, who holds a bachelor’s degree, has had long 
stretches of unemployment where he has worked under-the-table construction. His 
highest-paying formal job was in telemarketing, which he worked for four and half years 
but still made just $10.28 an hour. While Charles said of the job that “you do what you 
gotta do,” he “hated the job” for several reasons, including the fifty-mile commute each 
way. He also did not like the work itself: “Stuck in a cubicle. Um... very low freedom at 
the job. Felt like a dog gnawing at... gnawing at a cage that also had a... was also on a 
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rope, too.” In his current job, he makes $9 an hour at a manufacturing facility. Evan, like 
Ryan and Charles, has worked in various industries. He worked in manufacturing, sales, 
natural resources, and the service sector. He has never made more than $9.10 an hour. He 
currently works as a cashier and stock clerk at a convenience store for minimum wage; he 
has been there for two years. 
Finally, Scott, who has worked in fast food most of his life, also has found 
himself stepping on and off the job carousel. Although just 30 years old, Scott has 
worked for McDonald’s, Tim Horton’s, Arby’s, and Taco Bell, in addition to stints 
working for a factory and a gas station. Scott, who joined the U.S. Army Reserves, also 
did a tour in Iraq. Several of Scott’s fast food jobs have last for two years or more, but his 
employment has always ended involuntarily. After three and a half years at McDonald’s, 
Scott says he was fired for a scheduling misunderstanding, and he was let go from Tim 
Horton’s for accidentally leaving the back door open, a violation of security protocol. He 
wanted to stay at Arby’s but was not getting enough hours. Having never made more than 
$11 an hour, Scott currently makes $10.50 as a shift leader at Taco Bell. Because Scott 
does not want a shop job, he thinks he is “stuck” working in fast food: “Um, it’s mostly... 
it’s just another one of those starter jobs for kids, pretty much, or for people like me, that 
kind of get stuck in the, I don’t want to work in a shop job. So, I'm kind of stuck working 
somewhere fast food-ish.” 
 
Chutes and Ladders 
Ivoking the title of Newman's (2006) book about the low-wage labor market, 
chutes and ladders describes the fact that many men make at least modest advancements 
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in wages, only to find themselves pushed back down the wage ladder. Similar to 
Newman’s “‘up but not out’ club”, these men have not yet managed to grab the rung of a 
ladder of predictable advancement. This is not an isolated phenomenon. It goes without 
saying that the men in the study who are currently unemployed, not in the labor force, or 
on disability are earning less than they once did. However, even among the men currently 
working, nearly 40 percent have at one time in the past earned more than they make 
today, indicating that experiencing a step backward in pay at some point during one’s 
employment history is almost the rule, not the exception. While there might be strategic 
reasons for taking a temporary step back in pay, such as when making a career change, 
most examples of step backs in pay among the men in this study are involuntary. This 
picture stands in contrast with that of predictable and secure advancement described 
earlier in the chapter when discussing those with good jobs, especially men who are 
union members. 
As already mentioned, a number of men who are currently unemployed or on 
disability once had good jobs. But there are also several men in the study who once had 
good jobs that paid over $15 an hour but no longer do. Kyle started at $8 an hour in the 
shipping and receiving department at a manufacturer. After a year and a half, he bid out 
to work in customer service, where he worked for another three years. He had worked up 
to $15.50 an hour and says he was essentially the head of his small department. However, 
a change in management changed his situation. Kyle lost the boss he liked, and the new 
boss brought in someone from outside to be Kyle’s immediate supervisor, essentially 
taking over the responsibilities Kyle once had. When they asked Kyle to train his new 
boss, he quit: “And then they asked me to train him, which at the time I declined, put my 
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two weeks in. So, that was sort of me leaving there.” Before he quit, Kyle worked out an 
arrangement to work at a locally-owned grocery store. While he now makes $10 an hour, 
he can walk to work, which is especially nice in the snowy winters. It is unclear if or 
when Kyle will work back up to $15.50.  
Like Kyle, Paul had worked his way up to a good wage, in his case making 
$16.40 an hour for one of the local municipalities. In this case, it was Paul’s oversight 
that led to the loss of his good job: he failed to renew his driver’s license, which he 
needed for his job. Paul explained he had a lot on his mind: 
Um... I, at the end of that, towards the end of the twelve years, um, in there, my 
dad had passed away. Um, lot of things going through my head. I wasn’t taking 
care of a few things that I needed to take care of. One of those was my driver’s 
license renewal. Completely forgot about it. That lead to um...a termination… 
 
Paul knew he had let his family down, so he immediately did all he could to make 
amends:  
So, I started applying for jobs everywhere: McDonald’s, Burger King, Walmart, 
you name it, gas stations, I was applying. Um, I knew it was gonna be a hurt in 
family. I was even talkin’ to people about workin’ in the oil fields. Um, and I 
knew how much time I would be away from my family if I did it. 
 
The first job he managed was at a juvenile detention center an hour’s drive away, 
but the burden of the drive plus the cost in gas was too much. Through a contact of his 
wife’s, Paul managed to get hired at a drug and alcohol treatment facility, where he has 
been for six years. He makes $13.40 an hour and likes the work, but his oversight years 
ago has proven costly. 
For Mark and Doug, changes of geography also mean reductions in pay. Mark 
was born and raised in northwestern Pennsylvania, but a job took him to New York, and 
then a relationship brought him to central Pennsylvania, where he got a job in a factory. 
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He started at $15 an hour and worked up to $23, but both his marriage and the job ended. 
Without work or his marriage, he moved back to northwestern Pennsylvania and drew 
unemployment while he planned his next move. He decided to move back to New York, 
but before he could go, he met a local woman and stayed. He got work at a local factory, 
where he has worked for three years: “I started out at ten, ten dollars an hour and went to 
ten-fifty, and now I’m at ten-ninety-five.” He plans to stay and likes the job well enough: 
“Just you stay busy and time goes fast.” Doug also worked a couple different jobs in 
northwestern Pennsylvania, but he and his girlfriend decided to try their luck out West in 
Las Vegas. Doug, who had worked in a restaurant locally, got a job at a café and started 
interviewing for better work: “When we first moved there, I went around and did all these 
job interviews and I have to cook for people. It was really nerve wracking.” He 
eventually got a job at a restaurant in the culinary union: “Like their benefits are like 
unbelievable. And uh, they have like a retirement plan, like they got like all that stuff. 
Um, they’ll even like put a down payment on a house for you.” Doug made about $20 an 
hour and took full advantage of the benefits: “I hadn’t been to a doctor in like 10 years. 
So, I’m like going to the dentist, going to the doctor, getting contacts, like it was 
awesome.” Doug and his girlfriend eventually returned to northwestern Pennsylvania, but 
although Doug had big-city experience, it did not translate into a similar wage. The chef 
at a local restaurant, Doug makes a salary of around $29,000.  
Finally, Derek is one example of a man who has a good job today but still makes 
less now than he once did. Derek started out on the job carousel, working a series of 
machining jobs for years at a time that all paid $9 or $10 an hour, even though he thinks 
his labor was worth more, especially considering the value he was creating for the 
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company. As he explained, “You know, a lot of them bearings were about this big, as big 
as this hot plate thing right here, and that would be sixty thousand dollars, and they’re 
paying us like nine bucks an hour to, you know, make this stuff.” When he was laid off, 
he took the first available work in the logging industry. He liked the work, but when he 
got married and started a family, he decided he needed a job with health insurance: 
Yeah, after I did it [logging], after I went and tried it for a couple of weeks, I said, 
“Yeah, I’ll do this, this thing sounds fun.” So, me and [his boss] did that for a 
while, and then, there’s no health insurance, nobody has health insurance, nothing 
like that working in the woods. I mean, it’s just unheard of. Because everyone’s 
like a subcontractor is the way you get hired. And, uh, we got married during that 
time. Decided to have a kid and I thought we better get some health insurance if 
we’re going to do this. So that’s when I went to work in the oil and gas. 
 
Like with his other jobs, Derek liked the work. While he did have health insurance 
working in the oil and gas industry, he did not have retirement: “that’s part of it too, in 
that industry, you know.” He worked his way up to a good wage, but then the economy 
around oil and gas collapsed: 
It was, I was making eighteen bucks an hour. So, it was decent money for this 
area, you know. Um... and then when the prices everything crashed down, he said, 
“Hey, I can’t, I can’t do your health insurance no more.” Then vacation time went 
away. It was just taking and taking and taking. And finally, I said, I gotta do 
something different. 
 
Derek left on good terms but had to find other work. The first thing he found was driving 
for an industrial facility making $16.75 an hour. It is still a good job and hopefully 
secure, but it is less than his last position. 
 
Steel Ceiling 
While northwestern Pennsylvania is known as the birthplace of the oil industry, 
western Pennsylvania is also built upon steel. Borrowing the reference to steel from the 
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area’s past, I identify what I call the steel ceiling, which refers to the fact that many men 
in this study seem to max out their hourly earnings in the $10-15 an hour range. While 
naming $15 an hour as the threshold of a “good job” is arbitrary, Figure 1 shows that $15 
an hour represents a wage ceiling for many of the working men. While almost half of the 
men currently make between $10 and $15 an hour, only four make between $15 and $20 
an hour. This could be a function of the sample itself, but as the labor force narratives of 
these men reveal, many have been working in positions for years, only to see their wages 
stagnate at a level between $10 and $15 an hour. 
After seven years working in a warehouse, Dan still made just $8.50, so as 
described in Chapter 3, he took a voluntary layoff, earned his Commercial Driver’s 
License (CDL), and starting long-haul truck driving. This work paid better, but Dan did 
not like the long stretches away from home, so he left driving for to work as a mechanic 
while he looked for other work. Dan was hired as a general laborer in a steel plant, where 
he has encountered the steel wage ceiling: after ten and a half years, he makes $13.75 an 
hour. Dan gets full benefits and has gotten raises over the years, but the chances to move 
up are rare: “Well, it’s [the wage] moved up a lot. We got a quarter raise, but I mean, to 
get a different, uh, a position, higher position as you work your way up the ladder. 
Somebody’s either gotta quit or retire. You’re pretty much stuck where you’re at.”  
Nick has been operating heavy equipment for the same company for eight and a 
half years; he started at $12 an hour and now earns $14.65 an hour. He gets benefits, 
including paid vacation, but not paid holidays. He earns time-and-a-half for anything over 
forty hours, which boosts his earnings, but he also spoke at length of ways his boss 
breaks rules when it comes to the schedule: “So, if you at all drive anytime during that 
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week, you’re limited to twelve hours a day, sixty hour week. But my boss doesn’t work 
in those terms. He thinks we’re somehow above the law…” Nick describes exceeding 
those hourly limits, including once working a twenty-three-hour day. He also talked at 
some length about cases where he thinks his boss shorted him on pay. Nick says of his 
boss, “Anything he can get away with, he’ll surely do it.” Even if he has concerns about 
his current situation, Nick knows he won’t make more at other local outfits. He even 
suspects collusion on wage among local employers:  
So, see the thing is, this area keeps it that way. You know, I can’t go... like I said, 
it’s not competitive to even go to [a competitor] because they’re around the same 
area [in pay]. It’s almost like they congregate and say, “Don’t pay them more 
because you know we’ve got ‘em.” 
 
Zach, who works in the creative industries, also has seen his wages plateau just 
short of good jobs territory. He works for a small business that is dependent on project-
based work. As a young man, the first challenge was finding anything where he could use 
his artistic talents: “… there really wasn’t anything to do around here. I mean, I really 
didn’t know about any artistic jobs in the area.” When he learned of a local screen-
printing shop, he applied but didn’t hear anything for over a year. When the shop had a 
surge of business, they called offered Zach a job. He thinks he started at around minimum 
wage, and eleven years later, he makes around $14 an hour. He says his pay increases 
have been informal: “I mean, we really never sat down and negotiated anything, and 
she’s just periodically bumped me up and pay and I’ve never had to ask for anything.” 
Zach seems content with his pay, although he’s recently taken on part-time work on the 
side to buffer against times when business at the shop is slow. As a small business, there 
are limited opportunities for Zach to move up, and he is not interested in management: 
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I’m pretty much at, I mean, I’m the art department so it’s pretty much, unless I 
take over the business someday, that would be the next step, but I don’t really 
have an interest in taking on that headache, because I’ve seen with the owner has 
to deal with on a daily basis, and she was the art department, and now she doesn’t 
hardly do any of that now, so. 
 
Alex, who was profiled in Chapter 3, has worked as a direct care aid at a nursing 
home for six years but has only seen his wage move from $7.25 to $8.25 an hour. He 
believes that workers in his same job make more at other local facilities, but he is 
attached to his residents and is hesitant to leave. And he is reluctant to move into a higher 
role because he likes his daily contact with the residents. George found his current job as 
a machinist through a temp agency. He thought the temporary period was only supposed 
to last for 90 days, but he was kept on as a temp for six months, he thinks to avoid the 
additional costs of hiring him fulltime. However, he was eventually hired. George made 
$7.50 as a temp, which was raised to $9 an hour when he was hired. In the five years he 
has worked there, his wage has moved to $12.50 an hour, although he thought it was 
supposed to go to $13 last year. Curtis, who was out of the labor force for his early adult 
life due to drug abuse, has now been stably employed for a manufacturer for seven years. 
Also originally hired through a temp agency, Curtis has moved up from minimum wage 
to $13.50 an hour. He has been happy with the company, and he has even been successful 
when asking for raises: 
I got a few raises because I actually went in and asked them, which was kinda 
cool. They [are] a really good company. Really, really good to me when there are 
a couple of times, and I was like listening to them, trained on like, everything. 
Can I have a raise? And they’re like, “Yeah.” 
 
Content for now, time will tell if Curtis will continue to advance or if he is nearing a 




Not Management Material 
A final characteristic of the job experiences of men in bad(ish) jobs is the fact that 
some of the men have been passed over for promotion, thus closing off one of the paths 
to good jobs profiled earlier in the chapter and perhaps partially explaining the steel wage 
ceiling.57 When Kyle took offense and quit over having new management bring in 
someone above him, he lost a job that paid over $15 an hour in the process. George, 
mentioned earlier, makes $12.50 after five years as a machinist. But before his current 
job, he spent many years trying to make a career in the service sector. His first and best 
chance came with a grocery store chain, where he worked for six years. He never made 
more than $8 an hour,58 and eventually he realized that he had probably maximized his 
earning potential: 
But anyways, I think what I was trying to say was, I mean, it hit a point where I 
think I realized I’d gone as far as I was going to go within [the company]. I was 
not somebody they viewed as management material, and I think I’d hit the glass 
ceiling as far as somebody who was going to go without getting into management. 
And I think that’s when I hit a point—I decided to leave [the company].   
 
In the several years that followed, George rode the job carousel among several similarly 
paid, entry-level service jobs, never making much more than minimum wage. 
Gary, 46, has been passed not once but twice for promotion in different industries. 
After working for McDonald’s for a few years right out of high school, he took a job 
piling lumber, one of the most common entry-level positions among the men in this 
                                                 
57 While I have the perspective of a few employers from an early phase of this project, I cannot speak from 
the employers’ perspectives about whether it was justifiable for them to pass over these men for promotion 
in these cases. The point here is descriptive: because some men are deemed “not management material” by 
their employers, they lose one of the few possible pathways to higher wages. 
58 George left this position in 2003 when minimum wage in Pennsylvania was $5.15 an hour. 
192 
 
study. While most men do not last long in that role, Gary says he did that “for many 
years.” But he wanted to move up, and eventually he performed other roles within the 
company, including operating the stacker and driving high lift. The real promotion 
opportunity to lumber grader—“looking at the knots, you know, how far they are apart, 
and different degrees, and how much you can get out of this piece and that piece”—but 
Gary claims the teacher started dating one of the students, “so he forgot about everybody 
else.” The woman the teacher was dating was promoted. Over the course of ten years 
with the company, Gary’s pay only went from $8 to $12 an hour. When they moved him 
to third shift, he decided to look elsewhere. His next job was working second shift for the 
school district in custodial maintenance. A union job with good benefits, his work at the 
school offered insurance for his family and a 401k match. The pay was not markedly 
different, but he did work up to $13 an hour. However, as with the lumber company, 
Gary was frustrated at being passed over for promotion. He tried multiple times to bid on 
first shift jobs (“I wanted to see my kids”), but he was never successful. As he said, “I 
was tired of getting passed over for day jobs.” Despite the benefits and pay, he eventually 
moved on. In the three jobs Gary has had since leaving the school, he has made between 
$11 and $13.50 an hour, similar wages but with less generous benefits. In fact, he is now 
trying to get back into the school district, but he has had no luck thus far. Gary would like 





The Downwardly Mobile 
A few of the working men in this study comprise their own distinct group, namely 
those who have chosen to make less than they otherwise might in favor of other priorities. 
These men—by virtue of their lower hourly wages—are technically among those in the 
study with bad(ish) jobs, but by virtue of their education or family background, they are 
shielded from some of the dynamics of the lower-wage labor market. These men are also 
distinct from the marginal men, another group that includes some who have chosen to 
deprioritize work. While some marginal men have left formal work because they have 
other priorities, the downwardly mobile have strong labor force attachment and have 
more labor market capital than the marginal men. Justin, for example, used his GI Bill to 
earn his degree in elementary education. He graduated in the Spring and spent the 
summer applying for jobs without success. When the new school year began, he 
substitute taught and later took what he thought was a job at a charter school that he said 
turned out to be more like a “glorified daycare.” He worked that job for the rest of the 
school year, but a year after earning his degree, he had yet to get even an interview for a 
teaching position. He got a tip about a private Christian school in the area that was hiring, 
so he applied and was hired just a few weeks before the beginning of the next school 
year. Justin has now taught at the school for five years, where he makes much less than 
he would at a public school: “I make about half as much as a public school teacher 
would, so I’m making in the low 20 thousands.” Although he could be making more, he 
justifies his choice in two ways: “… I don’t have to deal with the bureaucratic stuff, 
which is really important to me also. And um, I’m obsessively religious, so that works 
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also, so.”59 Justin’s wife works fulltime at about $9 an hour, and between the two of 
them, they do well enough to get by. However, if push ever came to shove, he has a 
credential—his teaching certification—worth more in the labor market if needed. But as 
he explains in detail using his dry wit, his situation is stable: 
Justin: … I’d say we’re comfortably in the lower-middle class so. Um... we live a 
little bit below our means to cushion things. We have a 17-year-old car that’s still 
running and a 7-year-old car, so yeah. Ah, but both were bought new, that’s just 
part of my wife’s personality, so you know? But we live a little below our means, 
so we do have a savings account, but neither of us really have a retirement plan. I 
think my wife’s retirement plan is me dying at work. 
 
Interviewer: [Laughs] I don’t laugh because I want something bad to happen to 
you. 
 
Justin: This is true, yeah. This is true, you know so.... um, money really isn’t a big 
concern, though. I don’t care much about it because it’s not really worth anything 
anyway. I’ve had money before in short periods before I was married, you know, 
I didn’t really had any bills and I could buy anything I wanted and you know, my 
wife was in a very similar boat and we’re pretty on... we’re not really materialistic 
people so um, being broke works out really well for not materialistic. Um, when 
we do have extra money, like we ever have, but if we do have extra money, we 
usually just end up giving it away anyway or giving to something, not giving it 
away but we give to things through the church usually. 
 
Like Justin, Jordan has a bachelor’s degree but is currently choosing not to 
maximize his earning potential in order to prioritize other pursuits. Jordan, who comes 
from a working-class household, is one of only two men in the study to pursue and 
complete a bachelor’s degree immediately after high school. He attended a local college, 
living on campus his first two years and commuting from home his final two years. In 
contrast to the vocational and technical orientation of most men in the study (see Chapter 
                                                 
59 In the context of the interview, “obsessively religious” is not synonymous with fundamentalist. Justin, 
who identifies as a pacifist, is an elder in his Mennonite church and has pursued some post-secondary 
theological education online. 
195 
 
3), Jordan chose to study English literature, which he says he found interesting. However, 
Jordan’s vocational drive is toward pastoral ministry. He is a volunteer with his local 
church and is pursuing additional education and training online. He has chosen to stay 
close-to-home for the time being because he is invested in the work of his local church. 
While Jordan’s vocational focus is church, he supports himself by working for his father, 
who is a self-employed logger. Jordan explains: 
So, I’m going into Pastoral Ministry. Uh, that's my, my long term, and actually, 
my short-term plan. I’m doing it now. Just to, just can’t fund myself doing it right 
now, um, so I’m funding myself in the woods. Um, but I went, um, I want, 
wanted, that’s my life and making other people’s lives a little better. Um, and, so 
that’s the plan. 
 
Jordan is a subcontractor and makes only about $1,000 a month, which puts him far 
below the “good jobs” threshold, but he has minimal expenses and only works as much as 
he needs to live so he can put most of his time into church work. Time will tell what 
Jordan does in the future, but it is clear he has chosen to be downwardly mobile for the 
time being. 
Finally, Randy is another example of someone whose current hourly wage is not 
reflective of his labor market position. Randy’s grandfather opened a small electrician’s 
business in the 1950s that has passed from Randy’s father and now to him. Randy never 
really considered other work: 
I mean, that was always like a thing. I was never pressured into it or anything. 
But, you know, when I was little and tagging around with dad in the summers and 
whatnot, it was just neat. And I was just good at it. And I have a good mechanical 
skill set. So, you know, it just fit. And I don't know, I like the—I like the ability to 
be out and about, you know, and the days that are super nice, you can be outside 
instead of, you know, at an office looking out. I don’t like computers, so it just fit. 
 
After high school, his parents wanted him to get some training before starting 
work, so Randy earned an associate degree and did a couple other short-term trainings. 
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Once he had his education, he came back and started working for the business. Randy 
started at minimum wage but eventually grew discontent with his pay, thinking he 
couldn’t get established on such a low wage. Around this time, another business tried to 
recruit him, so with a competing offer in hand, Randy issued an ultimatum: he gets a raise 
to $10 an hour or he’d take the other offer. Randy got the raise and stayed with the family 
business. Just over a year ago, control of the business transferred to Randy (“You know, 
it was like a buyer-for-a-buck sort of thing”), but he remains an hourly employee. Despite 
owning the company, Randy makes an hourly rate of just $11.25. He thinks the fringe 
benefits make his actual rate higher, but he also knows there’s a ceiling to what he can 
make in the area: 
But, yes, but it’s like I’m driving a 2014 truck that the company pays for, my cell 
phone’s paid for by the company. You know, I mean, I have—there’s other things 
that make up for that. So yeah, if you tally everything together, like fringe 
benefits, it’s like I’m over 20, which is pretty decent. But I mean, I’m in a small 
town and I can’t charge $100 an hour and I like what I do. So that makes it all the 
better too. 
 
While making a high hourly wage is important to many of these men, Justin, Jordan, and 
Randy demonstrate that not everything can be judged by the hourly rate alone, a topic I 
tackle more fully in Chapter 5. 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, despite a pessimism among many about male 
employment in rural places, many men in this study make at least $15 an hour—and 
some make much more. These men work in a range of jobs and occupations and attained 
their positions in a variety of ways, although common threads among those with good 
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jobs include working in blue-collar occupations, belonging to a union, and having a 
managerial position. Yet while many men are doing well, the majority of men in this 
study do not make $15 an hour—and some make much less. Some men are currently 
unemployed, not in the labor force, or living on meager disability benefits. For these men, 
the challenge is one of frugality and subsistence. As Jared, who receives disability 
benefits, says, “I don’t have no extras or nothing and stuff like that.” But most of the 
working men in this study are not stuck at $8 an hour, but $11 or $12 or $13. These 
wages are much higher than the minimum, but they only approximate what the minimum 
wage would be if it had kept up with inflation (Desilver 2017; Tarr 2015). The men with 
these jobs also face labor market challenges, including what feels to them like an inability 
to advance.  
Given the way that many of these men are stuck at wages below $15 an hour, one 
might suspect that many of these men would support the push for a higher minimum 
wage. Charles, who has never made more than $10.28 an hour, supported Bernie Sanders 
in 2016 and spoke at length about why he thinks there should be a $15-an-hour minimum 
wage:  
I supported Bernie Sanders in the, ah, in the elec... ah, presidential campaign. I 
believe one change that would definitely help people in this area would be a 
fifteen dollar an hour minimum wage. I think it’s, ah, ridiculous that, ah, the 
minimum wage has stayed stagnant for so long at 7.5. You know, I believe that 
minimum wage workers that... minimum wage if we are, you know, we have 
decided as a society that we are going to have a minimum wage, we should at 
least it with the cost of inflation. You should at least be able to, you know, have 
the same buying power every year, you know? Minimum wage workers have, 
basically, every year it doesn't go up, it’s a pay cut for them, you know, in real 
dollars, you know. You know, everything else is going up, cost of housing, cost of 
food, you know, that’s, you know, that definitely one thing I would... I would 
change. Um... You know, I... I also think, you know, fifteen dollars an hour 
minimum wage could be good for the economy of [this] County or in... in this 
area. You know, with so many jobs many jobs paying far below that it would 
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actually bring more money... more money in. Ah, lot of, ah, I... You know, a lot 
of employers who are here, are here because they can pay sub-par... sub-par 
wages, let’s be frank about it, and I think that’s part of the reason why the wages 
and the opportunity is just so low, because the employers have every incentive to 
keep it... keep the status quo. 
 
Others, however, are not so sure. Nick, who has his CDL and makes $14.65 after 
eight and a half year with the same employer, is less sure what would happen to the local 
economy if the minimum wage was raised that high. He also wonders what it means for 
him, as someone with a credential and skills, if fast food workers suddenly make more 
than he does after years on the job:  
Then you look at any of the national news where somebody’s waving signs that 
they want minimum wage to be fifteen bucks an hour. That just tells me that I 
don’t no longer have to have a skill of driving a truck or doing anything that I do 
now because if they want that and they get it, that’s all I’d have to do to get a 
raise. I would be then making more than I make now for kind of a trade or a 
special skill. 
 
Asking explicitly about the minimum wage was not part of the interview protocol, 
but men were given the opportunity to speak about their work, the local economy, and at 
times, national politics. In response to those questions, men raised any number of 
personal, political and policy issues, but wages were rarely one of them. While many men 
made offhand comments during the interviews about wanting to make more money and 
some men had taken concrete steps to improve their wages, most men in the study 
displayed relatively high degree of contentment with their jobs and lives. It is this topic to 
which I turn in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5: BACKROADS BOYS: MASCULINITY, IDENTITY, AND 
VOCATIONAL SELFHOOD AMONG RURAL, WORKING-CLASS MEN 
Wearing a baseball cap and a worn, lime green golfing shirt, Nick and I sat in the 
corner of a restaurant in northwestern Pennsylvania on a mid-July evening talking about 
his life. Nick, 38, told me that he once had an interest in law enforcement, but because he 
knew his parents couldn’t afford school, he “never asked, and I never insinuated that that 
was something that I wanted to do.” After high school, he worked at a local photography 
studio, but the business failed to adjust to the advent of digital cameras and went under. 
Nick transitioned to work as a machinist for a local manufacturer, working there for four 
years making around $8.00 an hour. But when the company was acquired and business 
slowed—“It was, kind of, you know, an economy thing”—they started asking workers to 
work every other week and draw unemployment insurance on the off times: “I’d get a 
regular paycheck from working. I’d collect an unemployment check. It’s every other 
week like that for awhile.” With a newborn at home, Nick decided to get his commercial 
driver’s license and start long-haul truck driving. While he liked the open road and it paid 
well, he felt that big employers had no regard for him personally, such as when he wanted 
to be home on weekends when he had custody of his daughter. He also found he got “a 
little homesick”, so he eventually transitioned to driving locally. After eight and a half 
years with the same employer, Nick now makes $14.65 an hour, more than double the 
state minimum but still a wage that amounts to little more than $30,000 a year. He gets 
benefits and two weeks of paid vacation—three once he gets to ten years with the 
company—but does not get paid holidays. He describes his boss operating as though he is 
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“above the law”, which sometimes puts workers in harm’s way, but Nick knows the other 
local employers and says there’s no place where he’d make more. Nick is largely happy: 
You’re really flirting with a disaster a lot with this occupation. Um, I guess all in 
all, I’m still happy at work. I get to see my daughter. Making ends meet. I don’t 
have a lot of extra... I get to golf today. You know, that’s my free time. Had a 
week’s vacation that I took about a month ago now, and that’s all I did. Two or 
three days I golfed. That was my vacation. Good enough. I don’t need a thousand 
dollars to go to a casino or trip to stay in a cabin somewhere. 
 
*** 
What is the state of the working class in rural America today? As Edin et al. 
(2019) argue, the bargain many working-class men stuck in the twentieth century has 
broken down in the twenty-first.60 For many men profiled in earlier treatments of the 
working class (Halle 1984; Kohn 1969; Komarovsky 1964; Lamont 2000), they accepted 
work that was often tedious and even dangerous in exchange for a wage that allowed a 
middle-class level of consumption and enabled a form of family life—the male 
breadwinner model—that preserved their status as head of the household. Almost two 
decades into the new century, that bargain has broken down for many men, who now 
have work that is neither remunerative nor fulfilling. As I discussed in other chapters, 
some men have managed to do well in the new economy (Chapter 4), but most men 
experience some churning in and out of the labor force (Chapter 2), many men are stuck 
in jobs where ladders of advancement are blocked or nonexistent (Chapter 4), and a few 
men have even detached from the labor force completely (Chapter 2).  
                                                 
60 It is important to note that this largely applies to white men. There is ample evidence that working-class 
men of color were often excluded from the best-paying working class jobs through mechanisms both 




In the face of this rupture of the social contract with working-class men, what has 
happened to working-class male identity? In this chapter, I examine how men understand 
their identities in this new world of working-class work. First, I explore how the nature of 
these men’s jobs shapes their ability to think about and plan for the future. For the 
minority of men in secure positions, particularly those with jobs that offer a clear 
retirement timeline, they think of the future in those terms. Moreover, some men even 
forego opportunities for promotion at work in favor of maintaining job security, a 
demonstration that job security, which is elusive, is more prized than prestige or even 
income. But for those who do not have secure work, which is a majority of the men, they 
have difficulty thinking and planning for the future, which reflects the insecure nature of 
their work. In this sense, thinking about the future is a luxury these men are not afforded. 
How then does this job insecurity affect the relationship of work and identity? 
First, I find that men ask both more and less of work than working-class men profiled in 
other sociological literature. They ask more in the sense that men care about the nature of 
their work and are less willing to countenance work that is not personally fulfilling or at 
least tolerable, especially when it does not pay well enough to justify the conditions. But 
men also ask less of work in the sense that many men have deemphasized the role of 
work in their identities. Men still value work, but they also find meaning in other spheres 
like family, church, friendship, and hobbies. Rather than identity being centered around 
“the disciplined self” (Lamont 2000), I find that men have what I call vocational selves, 
in which they find meaning and fulfillment in non-work pursuits.61 Calling this a 
                                                 
61 As will be discussed later in this chapter, I also find that men speak of their emotional and relational 
selves, which fits with recent profiles of the working class (Cherlin 2014; Silva 2013). 
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vocational self seems counterintuitive, but I am resurrecting a historical meaning of 
vocation in which one’s calling is multivalent and not necessarily tied to one’s 
livelihood.62 In the face of often meaningless and poorly paid work, men have elevated 
other aspects of their lives as sources of meaning and satisfaction. Some men express 
their vocational selves in hobbies that seem diversionary, while others invest in vocations 
that are generative (Edin et al. 2019), although the line between these is often blurred.63 
Asking both more and less of work are two sides of the same coin: they both imply less 
commitment and attachment to one’s job. 
There is a second way in which men in this study diverge from previous 
treatments of the working class. In contrast to working-class men who are rootless 
(Cherlin 2014) and even angry (Silva 2013), the men in this study display a high degree 
of contentment with their situations, which I attribute to a set of subcultural beliefs and 
practices grounded in rural masculinity. This identity is deeply connected to rural place 
and rooted in working with one’s hands, being outdoors for work and leisure, and having 
autonomy. Rather than “stuck” in rural America (Florida 2019), the men in this study 
strongly identify with what they see as the virtues of rural life, challenges and all, which 
provides refuge from the vicissitudes of labor market precarity. Yet while these beliefs 
provide a sense of contentment, but they also constrain how men approach work. For 
                                                 
62 I am influenced by the Lutheran understanding of vocation, in which vocation “refers not only to one’s 
occupation but to all one’s relationships, situations, contexts, and involvements (including, of course, one’s 
occupation, if one is employed)” (Kolden 2001). A vocation, in the sense I am using the term here, refers to 
an activity that gives meaning and satisfaction, and contributes to one’s sense of self. 
63 There will be more examples later in the chapter, but one example of how a vocation can simultaneously 
be diversionary and generative is Steve’s love of dirt-track racing. He builds and races cars on dirt tracks 
throughout northwestern Pennsylvania, which at first glance seems frivolous, even if it is meaningful to 
him. However, Steve learned this from his now-deceased father, and he has passed it on to his son. As such, 
it has been a source of familial bonding, and in that sense, it is generative. 
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example, the aversion to working for a boss in supervised, indoor settings limits 
opportunities; seeing urban spaces as unsafe makes them non-starters for relocation; and 
masculinity as expressed in practical, hands-on skill, as discussed in Chapter 3, can evoke 
a distrust of higher education or even an anti-intellectual ethos. Construed positively, this 
sense of rural masculinity provides a meaningful connection to place.64 Further, one 
unspoken aspect of this rural rootedness is its whiteness, which offers an unspoken and 
often unexamined sense of social solidarity.  
Finally, the negotiation of identity for these men unfolds in the context of 
families, which have largely been absent in this dissertation to this point. Many men 
delay children and marriage, but rather than use this time to solidify their labor market 
position, they often exist in a state of marginal attachment to the labor force as seen in 
Chapter 2. The fact that family is often a motivator for men to get serious about work 
echoes the process found among urban families (Edin and Kefalas 2007). Yet because 
secure work is elusive for most men, forming families is not a “cure” for labor market 
precarity. For those in marriages and partnerships, there is most often a household-level 
livelihood strategy, marking a return to a previous mode of family life that predates the 
male breadwinner model (Cherlin 2014). While this does not represent a total breakdown 
of traditional gender roles around tasks like caregiving, there is a sense that the rigidity of 
certain roles has eroded. And while family complexity is common (Cherlin 2010), many 
men in this study have traditional family forms of being married with children. 
                                                 
64 A possible counter-factual that is largely invisible to this study is the fact that those men from this area 
with contrary values—what might be seen as “ambition”—have left the area (see the discussion of "High 





A large body of sociological literature has explored the lives of working-class 
men. Early treatments focused on blue-collar occupations and told of life on the shop 
floor and the repetitive and demanding work it entailed (Burawoy 1982; Halle 1984; 
Komarovsky 1964; Rubin 1976). While these jobs gave men a sense of identity (Lamont 
2000; Willis 1981), they also afforded a level of consumption that provided its own 
reward in jobs that could still be repetitive and even dangerous (Edin et al. 2019). But 
these jobs were not to last forever. Another wave of literature—mostly in the 1980s and 
1990s but continuing to the present—tells of the disappearance of those good-paying, 
secure factory jobs (Alexander 2017; Chen 2015; Dudley 1994; Goldstein 2018; Linkon 
and Russo 2002; Milkman 1997). These works profile plant closures and the subsequent 
impacts on company towns and the workers themselves, mourning the days—still within 
the lived experience of many workers—when men without a college degree could make a 
middle-class living. Sociological treatments of work in the twenty-first century have been 
dominated by themes of precarity and insecurity (Cooper 2014; Kalleberg 2011; Pugh 
2015; Silva 2013).  
One stream of this working-class literature has focused on the white working 
class, a group recently raised to prominence by the election of Donald Trump on a wave 
of white, working-class support (Cohn 2017). This renewed interest in white, working-
class people, especially those in rural places, has elevated several existing works and 
invited a flood of others. Hillbilly Elegy, the memoir of “hillbilly”-turned-graduate of 
Yale Law School J.D. Vance (2016), suggests that while rural America has been hard hit 
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by broader economic forces, the diagnosis—as the book’s subtitle stresses—is of “a 
family and culture in crisis.” Hochschild's (2016) empathetic Strangers in their Own 
Land humanizes her Tea Party subjects, casting them as understandably grieved at losing 
their “place in line” in favor of women and minorities. While attempts to demystify rural 
and working-class whites is welcome since these people and places have long been 
overlooked (Burton et al. 2013), there remains a need—especially in this political 
moment—to further reexamine the state of white, working-class men. 
We know that the economic fortunes of working-class men have dimmed. 
Greenstone and Looney (2011) summarize several concerning trends: 1) real male 
earnings today are lower than in the 1970s; 2) among full-time, full-year male workers, 
all but college-educated men have experienced double-digit decreases in inflation-
adjusted mean earnings since 1969; and 3) the percentage of men working full-time 
decreased from 83 percent in 1960 to 66 percent in 2009. The forces of 
deindustrialization (Weis 1990) and de-unionization (Rosenfeld 2014)—compounded by 
neoliberal policy responses—have left men without college degrees in a state of precarity 
(Kenway, Kraack, and Hickey-Moody 2006; Standing 2011). Jobs that were previously 
good working-class jobs, like long-haul trucking (Viscelli 2016), have been degraded. In 
short, the economy is offering fewer good-paying jobs to men with less than a college 
degree, and the jobs that exist for these men have not allowed them to keep up.65 How 
have men responded to this new world of work? 
                                                 
65 It should be noted that while white, working-class men can claim some sense of past success and 




Some literature depicts working-class men as victims of a betrayal (Faludi 1999), 
displaced and “put on the scrap heap” (Kenway and Kraack 2004: 99). This betrayal, at 
least in the eyes of the men themselves, has left them emasculated, humiliated, and angry 
(Gest 2016; Kimmel 2017; Sexton 2017). However, other work suggests that working-
class men have been more strategic and active in their resistance to these economic 
changes. Willis' (1981) classic work on lives of working-class boys in England depicts 
white working-class youth as political actors, consciously resisting authority, even though 
it meant socially reproducing their working-class station in life. As Aronowitz notes in 
the Forward to an edited volume reflecting on Willis’ original study (Dolby, Dimitriadis, 
and Willis 2004), Willis’ boys are not failures or victims: they consciously reject “the 
cultural and political implications of buying into the curriculum and accepting school 
authority” (ix). Similarly, Halle (1984) observes how unionized blue-collar workers 
expend considerable energy making their jobs more tolerable, what might be a form of 
micro-resistance. Yet while resistance theory recasts working-class subjects as agents, 
more recent work (Calarco 2018) questions whether observations of the working-class 
that predate the college-for-all push are outdated. More to the point, how does a strategy 
of resistance work in a world of bad jobs (Kalleberg 2011)? 
McDowell (2003) followed 24 British men coming of age in the early 2000s, a 
time when the manufacturing work available to Willis’ lads was virtually gone. She still 
finds among these boys a striving to create meaning, which lends modest support to 
resistance theory and confounds the notion that young, working-class men are passive 
victims or idlers. But she also documents ways in which her working-class subjects, by 
doubling down on “the hegemonic version of masculinity that is misogynistic as well as 
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deeply ambivalent about race” (2003: 20), marginalize themselves from labor market 
opportunities in expanding sectors and disqualify themselves as potential mates for 
women whose own notions of gender roles are changing.  
In Australia, a similar exploration (Kenway et al. 2006) finds a sense of 
destabilization among working-class men. Yet they also find that responses varied 
between the study’s two sites, one a “country city” and the other a coastal town. Men in 
both localities experienced a rupture of working-class culture, but the men of the country 
city were more likely to resist efforts to reconceive working-class masculinity in new 
terms or retool for twenty-first century jobs. This fits with other research that suggests 
rural masculinity is quintessential (Lobao 2006); rural men hold more traditional attitudes 
toward gender and masculinity than rural women or nonrural men (Courtenay 2006); and 
the sense among rural, white, working-class men that they are often viewed by urbanites 
as backwards, unsophisticated, and “redneck” (Cramer 2016; Sherman 2009). 
More recent work among the working class finds not only anger but disconnection 
and despondency. Silva (2013), who interviewed a multi-racial group of one hundred 
American men and women with working-class parents, found that as the traditional 
markers of adulthood moved out of the reach of her respondents, they withdrew from any 
hope of changing the system and took charge of the one thing they could control, namely 
their own emotional and psychological selves. Similarly, Cherlin (2014) finds a sense of 
rootlessness and disengagement among working-class men that is also bathed in the 
language of therapy and self-help. Sherman (2009), in her mid-2000s ethnography of a 
small mill town in northern California, found that when jobs, income, and other sources 
of identity were removed, morality became the basis of social differentiation. Morality 
208 
 
“actively structures social life and the social hierarchy of the community” (Sherman 
2009:5). Moral discourses around hard work are the most powerful; the most normative; 
and the most concrete in the consequences for failure to adhere. Sherman’s identification 
of the power of morality extends Lamont's (2000) work on “the disciplined self” of the 
working class from a generation earlier, where she found that American workers are 
preoccupied with “keeping the world in order—in moral order, that is—at the top of their 
agenda” (19). Other work finds that fatherhood is another important source of meaning 
for men, especially less-educated men whose employment prospects are dim (Edin and 
Nelson 2013; Waller 2002). 
 
Findings and Analysis 
In this chapter, I explore how the nature of working-class work has affected 
working-class identity for these men and how men in this study differ from those in other 
recent work about the working class. One well-documented aspect of working-class work 
in the twenty-first century is that most jobs no longer offer a defined time horizon for 
retirement (Kalleberg 2011, 2018), which introduces uncertainty about the future. What 
does this mean for how men see themselves and their futures? I find that those in this 
study with less employment security are more likely to have a present-orientation in 
which they resist efforts to plan for or even think much about the future. In short, 
thinking about the future is a luxury most men cannot afford. Men have learned, often 
through personal experience, that employment circumstances can change quickly, so 
there is little use in planning ahead. But for those men whose jobs offer security, 
especially when it is connected to a clear timeline for retiring with a pension, the men 
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speak about the future in those terms. This future-orientation appears even among men 
whose work does not pay particularly well but who have promise of a pension, 
suggesting that security is more meaningful than wages.  
Another way in which men have adjusted to a world of precarious work is that 
they ask both more and less of work. They ask more in the sense that they are often will 
not persist in jobs that are unsatisfying and poorly paid. They ask less in the sense that 
men find meaning and identity in pursuits outside of the realm of work, which sets them 
in contrast with earlier depictions of working-class masculinity built upon the disciplined 
self (Lamont 2000). These men exhibit what I term their vocational selves, which 
connotes both the way men seek meaning in life and the way they more fluently talk 
about their relational and emotional selves. Asking more and less of work are two sides 
of the same coin: both suggest that men have less attachment to their work. 
Men in this study share much in common with men in recent treatments of the 
working class: many in this study have dim employment prospects and have faced 
numerous personal and employment challenges, including health problems, broken and 
complex families, and drug and alcohol abuse. Yet the men in this study diverge from 
these other recent profiles one important sense: they seem remarkably content with their 
lives. Evidence for this emerges as men talk about their situations, but also because few 
of the men would change anything about their pasts even if they could. Why do these 
men have such a different view of their situations? I argue that the rural aspect of their 
identities provides a sense of grounding that shelters them from the vicissitudes of the 
uncertainty around them. Not only do these men live in a rural place, most of them have 
210 
 
proactively chosen rural place, as discussed in Chapter 3. Those in the study who are less 
connected to rural place also show less contentment. 
 
“You Don’t Make Big Plans”: The Future as Luxury 
For those in this study with secure jobs, a question about the future had a 
predictable answer: same company, higher pay (either from promotion or wage increases 
bargained collectively—or both), and closer to retirement with a pension.66 Jacob works 
in law enforcement and is part of a union, and his thinking about the future is guided by 
his retirement timeline at work: “Yeah, about 14 more. That’s when I’ll... I will be 
eligible for a full pension at that time.” Dustin, who works in health care management, 
does not have union protection but has a certain measure of employment security by 
virtue of being in management. He hopes his current job will be his last: “Yeah, I’d be 
fine if I could retire from here, it would be great. Hopefully I don’t have to look 
anywhere else.” Brett who started his own company, sees the business itself as his 
retirement plan: “They can buy it, but I’m not giving it to anybody; this is my retirement 
fund, you know, basically I’m going to only be able to do it for so long. And when I’m 
ready to retire, it’s going to be, ‘let’s sell everything off.’” Austin, who works for the 
federal government, spoke in detail about obscure federal legislation that might threaten 
the work of his particular department, showing that he was invested in his work enough 
to track such developments (or that his union or coworkers kept him informed). For 
Jeremiah, who was recently promoted into a research and development role at the food-
                                                 
66 Also see Chapter 4, Union Membership. 
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related manufacturer where he works, has a newfound interest in going back to school 
born of his promotion:  
Uh, I want to... so, I never really had direction other than the bike school thing for 
what I wanted to do, but now I have another goal for some more education that I 
want. Penn State offers a food science, uh, certification, and I’d like to go for that. 
It’s a four-day class that they offer at main campus in June, and I’d like to go take 
it to get the certificate. I want to understand the science behind why different 
things work the way that they work.”  
 
And for Blake, who just finished his commitment to the Coast Guard, wants a career with 
the fire department in because he will have a clear retirement timeline: “And then 
hopefully, one day, you know, that would give me—I would probably be in the fire 
department for 20 years.” Overall, secure jobs gave men the luxury to think about and 
plan for the future.  
But what about men with less secure employment? When asked about the future, 
the overriding sense among these men is that they do not think about the future, or at least 
have little idea what the future holds. Because men do not expect work to last, questions 
about the future no longer have easy answers built-in as features of employment itself. 
Seth, who now works in a union shop, used to work in lumber and expressed the sense of 
utter precarity in that line of work:  
Yeah, I mean it was always a struggle. It was, this job one day, I knew I could 
lose those jobs. Especially the lumber business, I knew any minute it could be 
over. It could be… tomorrow could be the day. The price could fall through the 
roof and then boom, back on unemployed sitting at home. 
 
Steve, who has worked manual jobs in several precarious industries and is 
currently unemployed, captures this present-orientation: “I try to live my life one day at a 
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time. You don’t make big plans.” Paul, a rare man to lose a union job,67 sounded a similar 
note: “Um... I don’t like to think ahead. I don’t... I don’t wanna have or be thrown off by 
my expectations of what I think I should be.” And Zach, who has worked for the same 
local company for eleven years, nonetheless links his present-orientation to uncertainty at 
work:  
Um, funny, ‘cause I really don’t think that far ahead most days. Um, it’s kind 
of… as far as work, it’s kind of up in the air because I’m not sure how long my 
boss plans on running the business she has because she’s nearing retirement age, 
and so I’m not sure what’s going to happen there. 
 
For those in precarious work with plans, they were often general and not tied to a 
particular career trajectory. George, who worked in the service sector for years before 
moving to manufacturing, had hopes for his family but did not know if his current work 
would be part of the future: “Settled down into some place that, you know, there’s a good 
chance that’s where we are going to spend the rest of our lives. Um, whether I’m still 
where I’m working now or not, I don’t know, you know. I’m open to anything.” Alex, a 
recovering alcoholic who works as a direct care assistant, is another example of this 
nebulous thinking: “In five years, I’d like to have my own place, my own, I mean, my 
own house, maybe. I’ll have my car... my truck by then. Uh, maybe, uh, even, uh, maybe 
even downtown in... in a better job situation, cause it’s really, there’s no life at this 
place.” Corey, currently unemployed, also just offered a general vision of his future: 
“Um, realistically, the crew is out of the question with that, so ideally a decent position, 
                                                 
67 Paul lost his job when he forgot to renew his driver’s license, which was needed for his work, during a 
time of personal turmoil. 
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you know, like an operating position or maintenance, just something to keep us going, 
you know?” 
To this point, we see that the relative security or precarity of work influences how 
men view and plan for the future. But there is evidence that job security is even more 
valuable to men than additional pay or opportunities for promotion. Seth has been offered 
the chance to move into management, and his main reasons for turning it down was that 
he would lose union protection: 
Well, I really like what I do there. So, I don’t know if I’m gonna continue to float 
at this position at the shop or not. I have had some chances to move into 
management position. But it always gets me skeptical because the last time that 
the market dipped, they walked 200 management people out like that, you know. 
It’s crazy, we had 127 union guys, 460 on the salary side. You know, engineers, 
field services, parts people, all the way down through the line just at our little 
shop. And it was always crazy for us that there’s, we build all this stuff and 
there’s all these other people. So the first time the field services job come open, I, 
uh, they were talking about my, uh, no, I, I don’t wanna do it. 
 
Similarly, Don, who has worked in the same job tending gas wells for 22 years, has seen 
two large layoffs and has turned down management offers in favor of what he sees as a 
safer role: “So, I’ve always believed the closer you are to the well, the safer you are in the 
company. And that’s proved to be true because we’ve got one foreman, 12 well tenders 
left, so…”.  
Men seem to prefer security over higher wages. Jeremy, who held many jobs and 
even had two extended spells outside the labor force in his twenties, got a job with the 
state of Pennsylvania in his mid-thirties with the help of his wife. Although he makes 
$13.31 an hour, which is less than $30,000 annually, Jeremy’s future plans now revolve 
around the security of his work: “Wherever I go, I plan on staying within the state 
system. I plan on retiring from the state.” He knew exactly what he needed to retire: 
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“Twenty-five, as of right now twenty years is retirement. If you do twenty-five or more, 
you retain all your benefits after retirement without having to pay for them.” He is also 
already thinking about contingencies in case he and his wife opt for him to retire early: 
“So, I’d have to see what the penalties would be, see how my body’s doing at that time, 
see how the job’s going at that time, see how we are financially.” And Gary, who left a 
unionized job with the school district when he was continually passed over for 
advancement, now regrets that decision and is trying to get his old job back: 
I want to get back to the school, I’ve been trying to get back to the school for a 
couple of years. But the boss is not giving me the time of day. So, when I turn in 
the application this time, I’m going to talk to the superintendent, and I’m gonna 
say, “Hey, you promised me a job when I quit, that I’d get my job back when I 
wanted it, and this guy isn’t giving me an interview, I’d at least want an interview, 
to give me a chance to get back in there.”   
 
A final bit of indirect evidence of the effects of work on men’s future orientation 
is the way some men talked about paths not taken. A common regret for men was either 
not enlisting in the military or not staying in if they had served. However, this regret was 
not born from nostalgia about the service, but the longing for a clear retirement timeline. 
Justin, who left the Army about a decade ago, still referred to his retirement timeline had 
he stayed in: “… I knew I needed to get out of the Army, which I honestly didn’t know if 
I was gonna make a career out of it or not, which I would be retiring in.... three and a 
half, four years. I’d be retiring in four years if I would have stayed in.” Now an 
elementary school teacher at a Christian school, Justin likes his work but does not get any 
retirement benefits. When asked about his future plans, Justin was unsure, but his 
comments revolved around retirement: “I'll probably try to find a job in public school so 
that I can retire someday.” Brandon, who served eight years in the Army, also spoke 
about that twenty-year threshold: “When I first started, I wanted to make the twenty years 
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then get out. After that, I seen what the twenty-year people were like. Each one had some 
kind of quirk to them or something. I was like, ‘it’s probably not a good idea.’” 
Finally, the lack of a future plan was also present among those men with low 
labor force attachment. Brad, who draws disability for back problems, talked about 
possibly going back to school for nursing, but when asked where he saw himself in five 
years, he replied: “Hmm... I can honestly say, I don’t think I've ever thought of it.” As he 
explained, “I take every day at a time. So, I don’t want to think where I’m going to be in 
five years and then five years I’m not there, it gives me something to be disappointed 
about.” Carl is an extreme case of not thinking about the future. Never able to stick with 
formal employment, Carl has chosen to forego traditional adulthood in favor of living life 
in the moment. Not only does Carl not have career plans, he often does not know where 
the day will lead: “That’s the thing is, I don’t—I don’t know what I’m doing tomorrow, 
you know? I don’t know what I’m doing later today.” While seemingly rootless, Carl has 
actively chosen to resist the strictures of contemporary work. It is part and parcel to his 
worldview: “But really, I don’t have any plan on what I want to do. It’s a way for me.” 
 
More and Less  
How do men construct identity in a world where work often is not meaningful or 
well-paid and in which imagining five years ahead may as well be fifty? I find that men 
in this study ask both more and less of work. They ask more in the sense that men care 
about the nature of their work and are less willing to countenance work that is not 
personally fulfilling or at least tolerable, especially when it does not pay well enough to 
justify the conditions. But men also ask less of work in the sense that at least some men 
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have deemphasized the role of work in their identities. Men still value work, but they also 
find meaning in other spheres like family, church, friendship, and hobbies. Rather than 
identity being centered around “the disciplined self” (Lamont 2000), I find that men have 
vocational selves, where they are most animated by largely non-work pursuits. 
 
More 
For those with secure jobs, especially jobs with union protections and a defined 
time horizon for retiring with a full pension, there is tremendous incentive to stay with 
their work as long as possible, even if aspects of it are less desirable. But for men in less 
secure work, there is less reason to stay in jobs where the pay is poor or the conditions 
are unfavorable. Ryan, for example, has churned among a series of low-wage jobs, which 
could be interpreted as a lack of interest in work or lack of commitment to a single 
employer. But for Ryan, his movement among employers reflects his concerns about the 
working conditions or the fit of jobs with his skills or life circumstance. He left work at a 
manufacturing facility after just three months because he said most of the workers were 
drunk or high. He then worked three years in a physically-demanding, poorly-paid job 
that he finally left because he felt management did not respect their lunches and breaks. 
He left another manual job because it required travel that took him away from his 
newborn daughter. He even tried telemarketing but found it a poor fit for his skills. Most 
recently, he has worked for a year stocking shelves at a grocery store, but he is frustrated 
at the store’s refusal to give him more than part-time hours and the lack of opportunity to 
move up. Ryan has never made more than $9 an hour, so his churning is adaptive: it does 
not make sense for him to stay in jobs that are undesirable, especially when there are 
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other, similarly-paid jobs available that might turn out better. Further, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, Ryan can make as much money under-the-table as he does with these near-
minimum-wage jobs, which explains why Ryan took two different breaks from formal 
work during which he did occasional day labor and helped out more at home.  
Jeremy’s case, mentioned earlier in this chapter and also in Chapter 2, provides 
both a comparison to and counter-factual for Ryan. Jeremy worked for a painting 
company in high school, and after graduating, Jeremy eventually moved up to running his 
own crew making $11.50 an hour. However, after repeated clashes with his boss, Jeremy 
finally quit in a demonstration that work conditions mattered to him: 
The job itself wasn’t that bad, but every time something would go wrong or 
something of that nature, it was always everybody else’s fault but the boss. Um, 
one instance I’ll use. For example, I told him that the one van was not safe to use, 
water pump was going out of it. From Punxsutawney to Sigel, coming up Route 
36, we had to put over fifteen gallons of water into the radiator because the leak 
was so bad. That’s not so far of a trip.  And ended up blowing up the motor, and it 
was my fault because we didn’t keep enough water in it. At two o’clock in the 
morning, where are you supposed to get water in the middle of nowhere? That 
was pretty much the straw that broke the camel’s back on that one. 
 
From there until his mid-thirties, Jeremy’s labor force experiences looked much 
like Ryan. Jeremy churned through a series of low-wage jobs, including two longer stints 
outside the labor force. Jeremy’s prospects changed when he met his wife and she helped 
him navigate the state of Pennsylvania’s application process. He was offered a job, and as 
described earlier, Jeremy’s outlook changed from contingency to commitment. After 
working at no less than eight places in his twenties and early thirties—and never for more 
than the $11.50 he made just after high school—Jeremy has plans to stay in his current 
work for the twenty-five years required to realize his pension, even though his current 
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wage of $13.31 an hour is only marginally better than what he made painting after high 
school. 
For some men, even healthy wages are not enough to make up for undesirable 
conditions in the absence of long-term job security. As discussed in Chapter 3, several 
men who were long-haul truck drivers left that work—not because it did not pay well—
but because the men missed time with family or simply did not like being away. Others 
have found that they deeply dislike factory work, even when it pays well. After serving in 
the Marines and then earning his associate degree in welding, Dennis worked in a factory 
for almost $20 an hour. He was laid off and now works as a lineman for the public utility. 
“Looking back on it now,” he says, “I realize how much I hate factory work.” If he lost 
his current job, he would not go back to a factory: “And, like, I really—like, if I lost my 
job and had to go back to the factory, I think I would do something different, self-
employed something, you know?” Scott, who works in fast food, has also been cured of 
factory work:  
… I worked at molded fiberglass for... like, eight months at one, at one point in 
my life, and that was just an awful job, working with fiberglass in general. It was 
terrible. Um, but after that, I just kind of, I was like, if I can stay away from the 
shop job, or life, I will, but I’ve seen the effects that shops can do to people. Loud 
machinery, causing people to go harder to hear, or completely deaf, and so if I can 
avoid stuff like that, I will. Trying to make my life a little bit easier. 
 
While the work that some of the men do is demanding and dangerous, there is 
also evidence that men value their physical well-being and are not willing to take certain 
risks, even for additional money. Nick, who operates heavy equipment for $14.65 an 
hour, says he could make $20 an hour at another local company, but it would be driving a 




There’s a lot of risk involved in winch truck operator. That’s why you go up to 
[another local company], which is three or four more miles away, and drive a 
winch truck for twenty dollars an hour. I don’t want that kind of responsibility. 
That’s why I wouldn’t go there, plus it’s a little further to drive. 
 
The flipside is that men expect to be paid for the risks they take, or they at least 
have an awareness when they feel they are not paid for the risks of their work. Casey, 
who is a new employee at a steel mill, explains: “I think being at a place where you could 
die at any moment, you should be worth more than $12.10, but it is what it is. Around 
here, it’s probably the best job that you’re going to find when it comes to pay.” In the 
longer term, Casey, who is a recovering drug and alcohol addict, hopes to go to school 
for psychology and become a drug and alcohol counselor. Men also demonstrated that 
they would take less money for better or different working conditions. Dan, who also is a 
general laborer at a steel mill, is planning to apply for a job in maintenance with a local 
municipality because he wants a first shift job. He’d make the switch, even if the new job 
pays less:  
I, I do enjoy the [steel mill] job, and I like the people I work with, but that swing 
shift is just so hard, and there is coming up an opening downtown at the… 
borough office. So, if it was even just a couple bucks less than what I make, it 
would be worth it, just to you know, have a straight day shift job. 
 
While the extrinsic rewards or work matter, intrinsic rewards matter as well, 
which for many men in this study has to do with working outside or doing manual labor, 
which factors into how they assess the desirability of their work. As Steve says simply, 
“Oh yeah, as long as I’m outside, I’m happy.” Don has been fortunate to work outside for 
both of his jobs. After dropping out of college, he worked two years at a farm: “I loved it 
there before. You know, I like working with the animals outside.” For the last 22 years, 
he has tended gas wells. Asked what he likes about his work, he mentions being outside 
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and having autonomy: “Outside. Outside. Nobody is breathing down your neck. You just 
do what you’ve got to do.” He adds, “I like the physical labor part of it.” Dennis, who has 
sworn off factory work and is an avid hunter in his leisure time, likes that his current 
work is outdoors: “Using the trucks, and yeah, it was fun, I enjoyed it, I really liked it, 
it’s outside. I’m an outside kind of guy.” Seth connects the nature of his work to his 
propensity to engage in risky behavior like drinking: “So, I had some growing pains with 
that, but I liked being outside and I always liked to work outside with my hands. When I 
had an office job, I hated it. I was miserable. I drank three times as much more when I 
worked in an office than I ever did when I worked in like manufacturing or outside.” 
While work that was outside and manual were generally most preferred, not all 
men hated office work, and what counted as manual labor was in the eye of the beholder. 
Kyle, who worked for a few years in customer service, would not be opposed to going 
back: “Um, I, I’d probably just, I’d be happy just to go back to a cube farm, that doesn’t 
bother me at all.” But even Kyle, who currently works in the deli of a grocery store, likes 
the tangible nature of his current work: “Um, the meat cutting part of it I actually 
enjoyed… just because it is an actual skill that I can then use later, you know what I 
mean, and actually use in a regular everyday life kind of setting.” And what counts as 
manual labor is in the eye of the beholder. Gary, who works as a personal care aide and 
would like to eventually earn his CNA credential, sees his work as manual labor: “If I can 
work with my hands, I’m happy.” Keith has only worked in food service, but he sees it as 
manual labor since he is on his feet: “I got to do the manual labor. I’m not about to sit 
down and do a bunch of busy work.” Ryan, on the other hand, would not work in fast 
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food—not because he is embarrassed or thinks the work is undignified—but because he 
sees it as an unacceptable combination of inside and not physically demanding: 
It’s not like embarrassment, it just, you know, sitting there watching what they’re 
doing, it don’t look hard. It just—uh, then again, I meant stuck inside. I’m not 
really doing anything, heavy lifting. I like to, you know, kinda stay active. I’m not 
the skinniest or the most muscular guy, but I like doing something where I feel 
like, at the end of the day, it’s nice to take my boots off and have a beer and feel 
like I earned it, you know. And I’m not saying people that work at McDonald’s 
don’t, it’s all, it’s, everybody has their, entitled to their own opinion. 
 
Ryan, who makes just $0.25 more than minimum wage, likes the physical nature 
of his current work stocking shelves, and he even goes as far as to create challenges for 
himself on the job: 
… I unloaded the whole truck, I put everything on a shelf, I get home and I am 
ready to hit the couch. And a lot of people don’t know that about a grocery clerk, 
but there is a lot of hard work involved, there really is. Some of the things I lift, 
you know, or I’ll even challenge myself, and instead of lifting the dog food, 
putting it up, I’ll lift two or three and slam ‘em up there, you know, fifty pounds 
apiece. Okay, here’s a hundred and fifty pounds. To where I get home and I’m 
like, yeah, I deserve this beer. I’m gonna have a beer and kick my feet back, you 
know? 
 
The idea that men ask more of their work is not to say that some men do not 
brook difficult conditions. Steve, who once worked a job in the oil industry that required 
nine days on before getting three days off, did not like that arrangement (nor did his 
wife), but he rationalized it was part of the job. When asked if he liked that scheduling 
arrangement, he replied, “Uh, not really, but if your job calls for it, it’s what you’ve got 
to do.” Charles, who described his time as a telemarketer in the starkest terms (“Felt like 
a dog gnawing at... gnawing at a cage”), still concluded that it was better than nothing: “It 
was... not the... how you say... not the ideal setting, but, you know, money’s money.” The 
job required an hour’s drive each way, which made for long days, and he often worked 
Saturdays, which did not give him a true weekend. Earning just $10.28 an hour, he still 
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stayed at the job for four-and-a-half years, only leaving when he was let go in a mass 
layoff. 
In sum, while decisions about employment are always calculations about the 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards of work, evidence from this study shows that calculations 
are more complex in a world where employment is insecure. Wages matter, but so do 
working conditions and the desirability of the job. For men in this study, work that is 
outside or manual trumps work that is inside or sedentary, wages being equal. 
Relationships with bosses and coworkers also matter. As Jerry, who works at a 
convenience store, says: “I don’t know, it’s just the atmosphere at work that matters to 
me rather than what I’m actually doing, which makes it harder to decide what I want to 
do.” Because few jobs offer a level of pay or the long-term security that make them 
indispensable, men are free to continually seek to improve their employment situation. 




While the uncertain nature of working-class work allows men to ask more of 
work, it also results in men asking less of work in the sense that many men spoke of 
nonwork pursuits as important parts of their identities. With work largely unpredictable 
in the long-term and not meaningful or well-paid in the present, men have found meaning 
in other pursuits, thus deemphasizing the role of work in their self-conceptions. Men like 
or value their work to greater or lesser degrees, but to take them at their word, they find 
meaning in hobbies, civic involvements, and other non-work pursuits. Even among men 
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with secure work, there is evidence of this deemphasis of work as part of identity in favor 
of extracurricular pursuits. In fact, some men want secure employment precisely because 
it will allow them to do other things on the side. These findings are in keeping with work 
that shows an increasing preference among men of all labor-market positions for 
meaningful life outside of work (Cherlin 2014) and the idea that working-class men have 
generative pursuits (Edin et al. 2019). Finally, in some extreme cases, men have given up 
on work as a source of identity altogether. 
For many men, their hobbies conform to traditional expectations of working-class, 
masculine pursuits. Dan, who works at a steel mill in a job he is looking to leave, finds 
enjoyment in tinkering with vehicles; he says he’s been “playing around forever with old 
junk cars.” The evidence is plain to see, as Dan’s yard is strewn with vehicles and parts: 
“… we do a lot of projects around here, as you can see, like that jeep.” In fact, during the 
interview at his home, his brother-in-law, who was working while the interview took 
place, interrupted several times to talk to Dan about engines and parts. Other men like to 
tinker with vehicles, including Dennis, Mark, Evan, and Wes. Steve once competed in 
dirt-track stock car racing, and he still builds cars from the ground up: “Racing is my 
favorite pastime.” He was eager to show pictures of his handiwork, and it would be his 
ideal job “if there was actually money in it.” It is a hobby he got from his father (“I have 
worked on race cars since I was pretty much old enough to hold a wrench.”), and he has 
passed it on to his son. Richard likes to ride his four-wheeler; Wes rides dirt bikes; and 
many of the men are avid hunters and fishermen. Several men have been involved at one 
time or another in local volunteer fire departments, including Jeremy, who is currently an 
assistant chief for a small municipality. 
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Numerous men in the study expressed a love of playing music, with several men 
playing publicly in bands and a couple even having CDs. Justin, the Army veteran turned 
elementary school teacher, has a self-produced CD and plays paying gigs with a cover 
band: “I love to play music, that would be you know... if you had a pipe dream, that 
would be the one. It would be able to play guitar and sing and, but that’s not really a 
career, you know? Even for people that do it all the time, it’s really a pursuit, you know?” 
I accompanied Justin to his performance at a local talent show, which he won. Doug, who 
has mostly worked in restaurants, has also been part of niche bands that have had success 
in the US and even abroad through online dissemination of their work. He, like Justin, 
wishes he could make a living on music alone: “And like, I don’t know, somehow, I just 
thought everything would work out and I never thought I was going to have to like have a 
normal job. I thought I would be a musician.” Ryan, who stocks shelves, plays drums in a 
couple bands, one of which is starting to get paid work: “But uh, I’m trying to get, well, 
now the band, I’m gonna start coming into a little more money ‘cuz we’re starting to get 
paid gigs, you know. Local honky-tonks, if you will.” Ryan also loves music and has 
aspirations bigger than his small town:  
Overall, I [wish] truthfully, music is the, the thing I know the best. If I could, you 
know, if I didn’t live in such small town, ‘cuz I’ve wrote originals, too. I mean, 
I’ve, one of my bands that was playing every week, we actually cut a demo. And 
was, I’ve been offered tours at least three times in my life, and just didn’t have the 
right set-up. Like the one time, uh, the band that was recording and had a demo, 
we had six songs on our demo—EP, whatever you wanna call it—we got offered 
a tour. We were even playing just shows where just straight our music, not, uh, 
covers. 
 
… But I can’t break into something like music around here. It’s too tough. 




Vince plays in a classic rock cover band that has six or seven gigs a year; he 
would be a musician tomorrow if he could do anything. Many other men are involved in 
music: Brad, Carl, Casey, Frank, Gabe, Jeff, Jeremiah, Phil, and Thomas all play or sing, 
several currently with bands. Thomas not only plays but makes instruments; his ideal life 
would be as “… a family man traveling playing bluegrass music through the country.” A 
few men have other artistic pursuits. Several men in the study work full- or part-time in 
tattooing or piercing, which itself is a mix of occupation and vocation. Zach, who works 
as a graphic designer and tattoo artist, also does fine art painting on the side. Austin is an 
amateur photographer.  
Some men have more generative pursuits that express their desire to do good in 
the world or pay forward lessons learned from their own struggles. Several men volunteer 
in capacities related to their struggles with addiction. Casey, a recovering addict, 
volunteers at his church and is active in recovery groups: 
Being a recovering addict, alcoholic myself, that’s where my heart is every day. I 
sponsor people like the youth kids. One of my favorite things is when I see that 
there is a troubled kid coming in because I get to see me in them and I get to 
speak life over their life because of what I’ve experienced. So that’s really what I 
do. I’m a steel worker, I’m a youth leader, I’m a sponsor in NA. 
 
Similarly, Don draws on his struggle with addiction in his work as a sponsor for 
AA: “I sponsor a bunch of guys, they sponsor guys. You know what I mean? I’m on the 
phone all day off and on with other recovering alcoholics.” Curtis ran a support group for 
awhile, although the group has since disbanded: “It was good while it lasted.” He is open 




Working with youth is another common pursuit. Derek has coached youth 
wrestling for fourteen years, and William and Keith have coached different children and 
youth sports. Although Austin makes a good living for the federal government, his 
volunteering with the Boy Scouts is where he draws most value: “You know, I could 
easily go to six figures if I was willing to work overtime, but being involved in Scouting, 
I get more energized out of that than sitting for eight hours a day [doing my job].” His 
work puts him in touch with many families who are struggling. He says people are 
resourceful, but many are hurting. For example, he does not like to ask them to sell 
things: “How many more piles of popcorn can you ask these people to hit their 
grandmother or their aunt up for?” Jordan and Cameron are both involved with the youth 
group at their churches. 
A few men have hobbies not yet mentioned. Several men invest great time and 
energy in personal fitness, with a couple men even thinking of it as a future career. 
Jeremiah is an avid mountain biker, which involves not only riding, but volunteering to 
maintain and even create local trails. George loves comic books and collectables to the 
point where his ideal job would be to run a comic book shop. A few men have hobbies 
that connect with their desires to live more self-sustaining lives. Keith eventually wants 
to live “off the grid,” but for now, he is content to garden with his father, with whom he 
still lives. Paul, who works the front desk at a rehab facility, talked at length about his 
efforts to grow food: 
Um, getting a jump on you know, growing vegetables even in such a, I have a 
little area to grow vegetables here, I’ve learned how to you know do the best I 
can, I grow out of you know, grow tomatoes and stuff out of buckets. Ah, a few 
years ago, this whole porch was filled with different planters and stuff like I 
managed to grow melons um, cantaloupes out here, a couple different pumpkins, 
peas the neighbors come up with peas.  Getting’ better at growin’ carrots, those 
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are simple. Didn’t do real good with tomatoes last year. Uh, got a late start. Not 
gonna happen this year, I’m all...I’m getting ready for it, getting’ it all planned 
out. 
 
He hopes to eventually work up to having his own animals and bees, growing his 
own herbal medicines, and even generating his own electricity using wind and solar 
power. Blake has more hobbies than he has time: “I can run sewing machines, I can run 
table saws, and I can make, you know, lots of stuff and, you know, I make my own 
bullets. And, you know, and I train dogs and whatnot.” 
Despite stereotypes of less-educated men as obsessive video gamers (Hurst 2016), 
few of the men mentioned gaming as a primary hobby, although several play. Brandon, a 
veteran on disability with anxiety and a dislike of crowds, spends a lot of time gaming, 
mostly World of Warcraft. Evan, who works at a convenience store, estimates he plays 
Call of Duty about two hours a day. Gabe, who has struggled to maintain labor force 
attachment (see Chapter 2), showed deep familiarity with video games, but he sold his 
old gaming system over a year ago for $75 to fund a date. Given his limited means, he 
has not yet had the money to even buy an older system to replace it. He’s a gamer, but 
with the caveat that he needs a system: “But, um, so yeah, it’s, when I have the system 
handy, yeah, I would consider myself a gamer.” Similar to Gabe, Troy has limited labor 
force attachment and limited financial means. For Troy, he has a cell phone but no cell 
service, so he relies on free Wi-Fi to access online games and communities. When he is 
online, he participates in chat rooms and video chats with people from around the world: 
“There’s people that I've talked to that are from China all over Europe.”  
A few men had more constructive relationships with gaming. Kyle, who used to 
work in customer service and now works in a deli, is a gamer, but his interest overlaps 
228 
 
with his interest in computers, one of which he recently built: “I’m really into computers, 
actually just built my own computer a little while ago, probably about a month ago.” Not 
only does it serve as his gaming computer, he figures the time invested was worth what 
he saved by doing it himself:  
Yeah, just from scratch, I just buy a case of all the parts, and me and my friend 
assemble it. So, it took us about four hours or so to get it fully assembled, but um, 
we ended up computer costing like eight or nine hundred bucks instead of buying 
one for eighteen hundred, so the time was worth it for me. 
 
Christian, who has training in IT, also likes to work with computers as a hobby; 
his ideal job would be dealing with “the latest and greatest technology.” And for Adrian, 
playing Xbox is what brought him to Pennsylvania:  
And I met a friend through Xbox gaming online who lived here in [northwestern 
Pennsylvania]. And yeah, we’d play Xbox for probably three, four, maybe five 
years and he was wanting to move out of his grandparents’ house and get an 
apartment but needed a roommate, and like I said, I was in anywhere-but-here 
mode. So, I said our interests are aligned, I’ll try to make arrangements and that’s 
why here. 
 
Unfortunately for Adrian, the living arrangement did not work out and he has struggled to 
maintain work in Pennsylvania, but the original connection would not have been possible 
without gaming. Trevor has also found community online, in his case in the form of a 
closed group he started ten years ago as a place of refuge for him of others during 
turbulent times in life: “… we help each other out, you know…” He tells of one time 
when he talked a friend in the group through a “suicidal phase”. The group became so 
meaningful that—as Trevor tells it—his wife grew so jealous of the group that she issued 
an ultimatum that it was either the group of her; he chose the group: “… the [group] was 
a hell of a lot nicer to me than she was.” 
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Finally, while not the same as a hobby, several men found meaning outside of 
work in the form of religion.68 Several of the men in recovery attribute their recovery to 
faith, and a few of them volunteer with their churches in recovery groups and beyond. 
Cameron, Justin, Jordan, Sam, and Thomas are in lay leadership at their churches; Scott 
volunteers at a Christian camp; and Patrick would someday like to be a pastor. Most who 
spoke of church attend nondenominational or theologically evangelical congregations, 
and these men have the tendency to interpret their life experiences through the lens and 
language of Christian faith. However, not all who spoke about religion were uniformly 
conservative. Paul, for example, invoked God when discussing his acceptance of gay 
persons (“Um, God created us all, and I even as a young kid, I knew that people were 
going to be gay, I knew.”). Greg, a tattoo artist, attends a mainline church and says he 
faithfully tithes ten percent of his income. Several men mentioned being raised in 
observant Christian homes but leaving religion as adults. One man, himself a recovering 
addict, identifies as Pagan and called religion an addiction, casting aspersions on those 
who use faith as a crutch in recovery: “I didn't go to like AA or NA meetings and give 
credit to God or anything else because that's what they do. They get clean and then it's 
God that did it instead of them realizing how strong they themselves can be.” And 
another man in the study was a convert to Islam and spoke at some length about his 
experience as a religious minority: 
And, but—but being here, I enjoy being a Muslim here, because the conservatives 
who don’t even get to have a sample of what a Muslim is, they—they turn on the 
television and they see Fox News, or—or any news, I don’t agree with any—any 
                                                 
68 Because not all men were explicitly asked about their religious lives, many did not speak of religion one 
way or another. 
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news that’s on the television, but—but they see the news and most around here 
are conservatives who watch probably Fox News and stuff. 
 
… when they meet me, they’re just like, “Oh,” so, like, they start asking questions 
about Islam and they actually start to learn, like—like, what it is, why people 
are—are doing crazy things, and then, you know, why, you know—and—it’s 
cool, because around here, it’s such a small town… most of the people already 
know me. 
 
Whether hunting, fishing, racing, firefighting, music, art, counseling, 
volunteering, fitness, or gaming, the men in this study evince a wide range of hobbies that 
are—at the least—diversionary, and are at most, generative and community-building. In a 
world where working-class work is often tedious, lacks meaning, and is poorly paid, men 
in this study have looked elsewhere for a sense of purpose. Doug, a self-taught chef and 
musician, captures this pursuit of meaning in an extended monologue that is as much 
sermon as statement: 
And it’s like you should fucking find something that you like to do so you don’t 
feel like you’re never accomplishing anything. It doesn’t have to be something 
that’s like you can sell or something that, is that like a commodity or anything. 
Just be like, you know what, if you want to like start gardening or making soap or 
doing anything to like— 
 
Because you can find ways and all those hobbies to like elevate yourself to learn 
more. I just think anything where you’re engaging in the world around you and 
like and like making sense of something and kind of like putting something into 
practice, doing some of your hands or mind is it’s just good for you as a human 
being. It helps you to like, at least for me, it makes me feel like there’s more 
meaning in life. 
 
‘Cuz you kind of make your own meaning, you know. It’s like, well, what are we 
here for? I don’t know how to create things to like just keep making more 
complex things and making ourselves more and more complex. That’s just what 




Contentment in Uncertain Times 
This study is not unique in finding that working-class young adults face what 
Silva describes as a “standard life course [that] has grown increasingly uncertain, 
unpredictable, and risky” (2013: 95). However, what is different among the men in the 
study is how they have responded. While recent treatments of the working class find 
them angry and hardened, the men in this study—despite facing similar circumstances—
are noticeably content. To form the basis for this contrast, I first offer summaries of two 
recent treatments of the working-class, Coming Up Short (Silva 2013) and Labor’s Love 
Lost (Cherlin 2014). Silva’s book is based upon interviews with 100 working-class men 
and women in Lowell, Massachusetts and Richmond, Virginia, small cities of about 
100,000 and 200,000, respectively. She defines working class as having a father without 
a college degree, which allows for her respondents themselves to have post-secondary 
education and still qualify as working class. One-quarter of her respondents have a 
bachelor’s degree or more, including four with a master’s degree, and a majority have at 
least some college. The average age of her respondents is 27, and all respondents are 
between twenty-four and thirty-four. Her respondents are split equally between men and 
women, with 60 percent being white and 40 percent being African American. Her 
interviews took place from late 2008 through early 2010 during and in the immediate 
aftermath of The Great Recession. Compared with the men in this study, her respondents 
are on average younger, better educated, and more urban, not to mention the obvious fact 
that her sample includes women and non-white respondents. The interviews took place at 
a particularly difficult time economically, although arguably many of the broader forces 
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she highlights—the decline of manufacturing, capital flight, and the rise of service jobs—
remain true.69 
In Chapter 4, subtitled “The Remaking of the American Working Class,” Silva 
addresses “the consequences of the neoliberal turn at the level of the self” (2013: 83). In 
particular, she asks, “What does it mean to become working class in the post-industrial 
economy?” (2013: 83). She paints a stark picture: her respondents experience constant 
betrayal in various realms of life, which teaches them “that they are completely alone, 
responsible for their own fates and dependent on outside help only at their peril” (2013: 
83). According to Silva, her respondents treat others with suspicion and distrust, 
hardening themselves against social and political institutions, including the military.70 For 
Silva, the evidence of “self-reliance and rugged individualism” (2013: 98) among her 
respondents, in which they resist dependence and “make a virtue out of not asking for 
help” (2013: 97), is a coping mechanism to the constant uncertainty and betrayal. These 
traits, while ostensibly positive, have “a darker side”, leading them to cut ties, turn 
inward, and numb themselves emotionally (2013: 97). In Silva’s view, her respondents 
are “acquiescing neoliberal subjects” (2013: 109) who reject social safety nets and 
solidarities in favor of the “cultural scripts of self-reliance, individualism, and personal 
responsibility” (2013: 109). 
                                                 
69 Silva notes in the Appendix that the men in her sample who were more likely to take a traditional path to 
adulthood were from Lowell, which she attributes to the fact that Lowell has larger public and private 
sector unions with a more robust manufacturing base, whereas Richmond has seen more capital flight and 
is in a state with less friendly labor policies. 
70 Despite the severe picture Silva paints of the lives of her respondents, the anecdotes she presents often 
describe her respondents as hard-working, pleasant, grateful, and generous.  
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In Labor’s Love Lost (2014), Cherlin also paints a portrait of the current state of 
working-class young adults. For Cherlin, the working class of interest are the less-
educated, defined as those without bachelor’s degrees, a slightly more restrictive 
definition than Silva’s. In Chapter 6, conducted in collaboration with Timothy Nelson, 
Cherlin draws upon both qualitative and quantitative sources in describing current state of 
the less-educated working class.71 As with Silva’s work, Cherlin finds that a “traditional, 
working-class life” (2014: 152) has moved out-of-reach for most of the interviewees: just 
one of thirty-three men had a continuous work history and all of his children within 
marriage. The men’s lives represent a tangle of “unfortunate choices” while facing a 
“difficult labor market” (2014: 153) that is characterized by mutual distrust and 
disengagement between employers and employees (2014: 154). Much working-class 
employment is now subject to casualization (see Sassen 2000, 2018), in which work is of 
limited term, contractual but not absolute, and lightly regulated. As for how working-
class men have adjusted to these changes, Cherlin describes the transition from the 
“utilitarian self” to the “expressive self” (2014: 159), in which emphasis has moved from 
self-control and conformity to personal fulfillment and communicating one’s feelings and 
emotions. Invoking Silva, Cherlin finds commonalities between their sets of interviews: 
the lives of young adults are centered on overcoming trauma and self-development, and 
men have tenuous attachments to work, religion and family (also see Edin et al. 2019). In 
                                                 
71 The qualitative sample includes interviews by Nelson and a collaborator with thirty-three men from 
Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five with at least one child 
conducted in 2012 and 2013. In comparison with Silva’s sample, Cherlin’s is smaller, all male, and 
restricted to fathers. Cherlin’s interviews were conducted a couple years after Silva’s, although certainly 
still in the long shadow of The Great Recession. In Cherlin’s words, the men are “probably more down-
and-out than the typical high school-educated dad” (2014:153). Both Silva and Cherlin have exclusively 
urban samples with nearly identical age ranges. 
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sum, Cherlin choses three descriptors to capture the current lives of working-class men: 
“[c]asualization, disengagement, rootlessness” (2014: 174). 
There are many points of agreement between the lives of the men in this study 
and those interviewed by Silva and Nelson.72 Men are united in facing a changed and 
changing labor market, and relatively few men have continuous labor force histories, as 
seen in Chapter 2, or secure work, as seen in Chapters 2 and 4. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, men have responded to these changes, in part, by seeking meaning outside of 
the world of work. Regarding family life, while the men in this study are not as 
nontraditional as Cherlin’s, there is still a relatively high degree of complexity in family 
arrangements. The marital status of the 61 men at the time of the interview is presented in 
Table 1. About half of the men were married at the time of the interview, and of those 
men, six had been married at least once before. Six of the men were divorced, and 
another three men were separated. Altogether, about two-thirds of the men were either 
currently married or have been married. Twenty-three of the men had never been 
married, although some of these men still had children, and a few were cohabiting. Many 
of those who have never married are younger, so it is likely that at least some of them 
will eventually marry.  
 
                                                 
72 Based upon the labor force histories, educational attainment, and family composition, the men in this 
study are likely—on average—slightly more advantaged than those interviewed by Nelson for Cherlin’s 
work and slightly less advantaged than Silva’s.  
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Table 5.1: Current Marital Status 
 
 
Next, Table 2 shows the current household composition of the men in the study, 
giving particular attention to resident children. About 40 percent of the men currently 
have no children living with them, which includes men who have never had children and 
those who currently live apart from their biological kids due to divorce or separation. 
Almost half the men live with only their biological children. In many cases, these are 
traditional arrangements with a wife and one or more biological children from the current 
partner. In a few cases, men have biological children from previous relationships who 
spend at least part of their time in the household. These children are still biological and 
not step, but the arrangement involves more than family. Finally, only eight men live in 







(N = 61) 
 
Percent* 
   
Married 29 48 
Divorced 6 10 
Separated 3 5 
Never married 23 38 
   
* Does not total to 100 due to rounding 
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Table 5.2: Resident Children at Time of Interview 
 
 
Table 3 attempts to give a truer picture of the degree of family complexity among 
the men in this study that is obscured to some degree by the previous tallies of marital 
status and resident children. About one-quarter of the men in this study are single, have 
never been married, and have no children. Another 30 percent of men are married, have 
not previously been married, and either have no children or only have children with their 
current partner. In these cases, the men’s partners have also not been previously married. 
For the remaining 27 men, which is almost half of the full sample, there is some elements 
of family complexity: a previous marriage by either the man or his partner; children 
outside of marriage; or the presence of children from other relationships, either the man’s 





(N = 61) 
 
Percent 
   
No resident children 25 41 
Biological children only 28 46 
Blended (biological and step-children together, or step-children  
  only)  
8  13 




Table 5.3: Lifetime Family Situation 
 
 
Despite some commonalities between the men in this study and those in other 
recent studies, the greatest divergence, especially when compared to Silva’s respondents, 
is how the men have responded. As she writes, “… the sheer force of these emotions—of 
vehement anger, defensiveness, and profound betrayal—throughout my interviews 
demands a more complicated explanation, one that starts from within the processual, 
contingent, and ongoing meaning-making of informants” (2013: 83). Where Silva finds 
anger, I find contentment. Where Silva and Cherlin find men turning inward, I hear of 
men turning outward. A quote from Justin captures the sentiment from many of the 
interviews: 
... that’s the thing, I think one of the biggest life lessons I’ve learned is when you 
find yourself in a position, you can either be opposed to it and be angry all the 
time or you can dive into and just embrace and really become a part of it. And it 
actually makes up for all the animosity you have towards it, so as much as I 
always hated this town um... complaining about it isn’t helping anything, so if I 
get more involved with community and stuff like that, that helps so yeah. 
 
Just as the strong negativity in Silva’s interviews demands an explanation, so does 
the relative contentment among my respondents, especially given the fact they face the 





(N = 61) 
 
Percent 
   
Never married, no children 16 26 
Currently married, never previously married, no children 3 5 
Currently married with children only from current spouse 15  25 
Other 27 44 




men’s contentment with their lives and situations, followed by explanations for this 
divergence of outlooks in response to uncertain times. 
Toward the end of most interviews, I asked men what advice they would give to 
their sixteen-year old selves. While many men acknowledged hardships in their lives, 
they also often spoke of a sense of contentment with what had happened. Dan captures 
this common sentiment: “No, I don’t think I’d do anything really different. It’s been 
really good. I mean, even the tough experiences that I’ve had in life going through it I 
mean, were good life lessons, you know?” Dan has never had a “good job”, although he 
has had more stability than many men. He piled lumber briefly after high school, then 
worked for seven years in a warehouse job where he never made more than $8.50 an 
hour. He took a voluntary layoff and earned his CDL, but long-haul driving was not to his 
liking. He worked briefly as a mechanic, and for the last ten-and-a-half years, he has 
worked as a general laborer at a steel mill, currently for $13.75 an hour. He likes 
tinkering with cars in his spare time, giving him a hobby. Single and working for most of 
his adult life, he recently married and has a young daughter.  
But this same sentiment also comes across for men who might have more reason 
to seek a change. William grew up poor and saw his parents divorce when he was young. 
He endured a painful first marriage in which his wife openly cheated; she later died. 
William served in Iraq, ultimately qualifying for benefits stemming from his PTSD. Yet 
he likes who he is and would not change anything:  
Like everything that happens for... I just believe that everything happens for a 
reason.  You’re put in... you’re put in places for a reason. And if I were to go back 
and change a little bit of it, I wouldn’t be the person who I am today. And I’m 




For some men, the sense of contentment and gratitude is a function of their own 
sense of mortality. Justin, who was quoted earlier about his decision to get involved 
rather than get angry, also said that his outlook stems from the fact that he never expected 
to live past thirty. At age 34, he already feels like he is living in “bonus time”: 
No, no, so then I had to figure out what to do next, so I’m still trying to figure out 
what to do next. But having almost died so many times, it’s almost like being on 
bonus time.  This is extra innings already so I can’t be in a bad mood, I decided a 
long time ago I don’t have bad days anymore and I haven’t. I get upset and I have 
bad hours, but I don’t have bad days anymore because you know, I really 
shouldn’t still be here. Um, but yeah. I kinda got over the idea that I was going to 
die once it just kept not happening. 
 
Likewise, Curtis, who long battled addiction, can only live in the present: “I 
don’t, I don’t think about it [the future] a whole lot to be honest, man. I never saw myself 
being where I’m at right now. Like I’d never planned on living past 30 when I was 
younger, and uh, I don’t know, kinda recognize that there is no way for me to predict that 
[the future].” 
 
Rooted in Rural Place 
The primary explanation for the lack of anger in my interviews is the connection 
most of these men have to rural place, which offers a sense of rootedness and identity 
perhaps absent among other groups of working-class men. Cherlin’s interviews were 
conducted in large cities or their immediate suburbs, and Silva’s respondents are from 
midsized cities but decidedly urban areas. Not only is this current study in rural place, the 
men interviewed have mostly proactively chosen to live there, as seen in Chapter 3. 
Cherlin characterizes less-educated, working-class men as casual (in the labor market 
sense), disengaged, and rootless. The men in this study certainly are casual (the men with 
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good job excepted), but these men do not seem particularly disengaged, and they are 
definitely not rootless. For many men, northwestern Pennsylvania is home, which has a 
uniquely powerful appeal that provides order to these men’s lives. Jacob, a law 
enforcement officer, has been fortunate to travel, but there’s no place like home:  
… I traveled the entire nation now for years… I’ve been into different countries 
for, you know, over throughout Europe and stuff for different reasons, um, and 
I’ve always enjoyed home.  Home’s home. I like to go to other places but home’s 
home to me. I’m just a home-bound guy, that’s it. Yeah. I’m just stuck here. 
 
Blake, who has just moved back after serving in the Coast Guard, likes where he 
is from: “I know I liked Pennsylvania. And I like this part of Pennsylvania.” A big part of 
the appeal is the rurality. As Randy describes, “I mean, I don’t see myself going 
anywhere, it’s where I’ve been all my life. And I like it, I like being in the country.” 
Casey prefers the term backroads: “It’s where home is. It’s where home will always be. 
Um, nowhere can I find more peace than driving down a backroad. Nowhere can I find 
more freedom then driving down a backroad, and nowhere can I find more happiness 
than driving down a backroad.” Cameron, a self-employed contractor who grew up on an 
area farm, is committed to the area: “Like that’s, you know, I’m, I’m very invested into 
this, this area in this community. Um, both, you know, financially, spiritually, I’m just, 
you know, everything relationally.” Even the few men are not originally from 
northwestern Pennsylvania also have some to see the appeal of small-town life. Victor, 
originally from the West Coast, sees the appeal of small-town living, particularly the 
intimacy: “There isn’t too many places in the country, in the city, where—where, you 
know your kids’ teachers and so on and on, and things like that. Parents have come to 
school and, ‘Hey, that was my teacher back then!’” As long as he and his wife can find 
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adequate work, they plan to stay: “…obviously, this is where we want to be, and it’s—
and it was just job-related. It’s just ideal for us.” 
While many men expressed great affection for “the country,” they do not idealize 
rural life. Many saw the challenges the area faced. As Ryan said simply, “Not a very 
good economy around here, in my opinion.” For some men, they felt torn between their 
love of northwestern Pennsylvania and the challenges they have had finding work. 
Charles has lived in the area his whole life, including during long stretches of 
unemployment. He articulated the ways in which it would make sense for him to move: 
Some people make the argument, you know, that wages aren’t high but cost of 
living is lower. That may be true, but, let’s say, ah... let’s say you were to buy a 
house, or... you know, and when it comes time to retire, or whatever, you sell that 
house, you’re not get as much for it. Or let’s take the example of a 401k, you 
know, you go somewhere... you go some... you stay around here. Let’s say you do 
have a retirement plan. You know, it’s going to be based upon your income here. 
Now if you go somewhere else, you know, let’s say everything else is equal, but 
you get more and the standard of living is higher. You can always retire from 
there, and come back here and have a much greater standard of living then what, 
ah... then what you would’ve by staying. 
 
Yet Charles has never moved: “You know, my family’s from here and that... this 
is my roots, but there’s nothing here. You know, it’s been real lack here.” Christian, who 
served in the military and had a good job outside Washington, DC before he and his wife 
decided to move back to northwestern Pennsylvania to raise their family, does not want 
to move but has struggled to find work: 
I don’t want to uproot the kids, but I knew if I moved to a bigger city, I’d find 
work pretty easily with my government background, the school, and technology 
background. I know in a bigger city like D.C. or wherever, you know, I wouldn’t 
be worried about work. I know that. But I don’t want to uproot the kids. We 
moved back here for a reason, that’s to be near all of our family. 
 
Given the perception among the men that the area has struggled economically, 
there is a sense that while many men stay because it is home, they understand why 
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outsiders would not be attracted to live there without gainful employment. Sam, who has 
a good job at a manufacturer, explains: “I mean, I love it here, but I don’t know if I would 
move here. I don’t think I would come here unless it was for a really good job. Like, if I 
didn’t have the job that I had making the money that I make, um, I would probably go 
somewhere else.” This sense of how outsiders view the area is not just perception. One of 
the men is dating a woman from Pittsburgh, and he says she finds life in northwestern 
Pennsylvania perplexing: “To her, this is absolutely a foreign way of living. Like, we 
hunt, we heat with wood. Like, to her, we are hillbillies.” Some men liked the area but 
had career aspirations that they knew would require moving away. Doug, who cooks for a 
local restaurant, sees the culinary scene as too confining for the types of cooking and 
experimentation he would like to do: “But, we still you know, we don’t want to stay here 
forever, and it’s not so much because I like, hate the area or anything, it’s just because I 
don’t think that I can pursue any kind of career path.” He adds, “Maybe if I was like 
worked on oil wells or… still did construction, it would be all right. But that’s just not 
where my life ended up.” 
Besides the sluggish economy, the most common complaint was the weather. As 
Dan said, “Winter times are pretty long and cold here.” Or in Dennis’ words, “The 
weather up here gets kind of depressing sometimes, you know, the winter—the 
wintertime.” For those who expressed a desire to move, it was often to leave the cold, not 
the rural. Most of time, it was idle talk rather than a concrete plan. As Keith said, “Uh, 
somewhere warmer would maybe be nice.” For most men, the ideal was to move south: 
Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, even Florida. While a few suggested they might 
move in the not-to-distant future, others thought they might wait until retirement, like 
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Sam: “So, I mean, if God is good enough to me to let me live that long and I get to retire, 
it will be south and I won’t be here very much, that’s for sure.” Even the reasons men 
want to move testify to their identity as rural men. For example, when asked where he 
would move, Dennis’ answer centered on hunting: “But I would move to Iowa, because 
as a resident of Iowa, you get two buck tags a year there, as a resident.” 
But despite the area’s economic limitations and cold, snowy winters, there was a 
sense of pride about being from what some believed was a forgotten part of the state. 
Todd, who helped expand microbrewing in the area, saw it as a part of his mission to 
reclaim pride in the area: 
So, the more good breweries and good beer we can make, and my goal is to make 
Northwestern Pennsylvania, which is always overlooked by every aspect 
politically, socially… genealogically in all of Pennsylvania, we are the bastards of 
the corner of the state. We don’t do anything superior, we don’t do anything 
worthwhile, and there’s all these breweries springing up Pittsburgh and they suck. 
So, my goal is when people come up to Northwestern Pennsylvania, they can go 
to any one of these breweries and get good beer. 
 
For other men, northwestern Pennsylvania gets a bad rap as being bereft of 
wealth. Brent, a contractor, gets to see a different side of the area thanks to his work: 
But um, there are people that have money, there are people that expect quality and 
expect professionalism. There are people that will pay for quality work. Um, 
there, there are people out there that will put, you know, $30 to $50,000 kitchens 
in. There are people, you know, I don’t have to go to a big city to find that and 
that. And that’s uh, that’s something that I feel people miss. You know, you just 
look at [his town], well, “I don’t want to work there and nobody has any money.” 
And I’ve heard that countless times. And you don’t have the options that you do 
have in a big city for sure, but it’s there. You just have to find it. You don’t have 
the competition that you have in a big city either. 
 
Not all men are unwilling to leave, but in some cases, it is their wives who are 
attached to the area. Justin, who traveled when he was in the service, tried to convince his 
life to live elsewhere to no avail: “So yeah, I was more committed to my wife to 
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wherever I lived ‘cause I’d already lived in enough places, I realized they’re basically all 
the same.” William, who has lived in both smaller and larger cities at times in his life, 
says his wife really appreciates aspects of small-town life: “She likes to have room to 
breathe and stuff. She can’t stand traffic.” As discussed in Chapter 3, some men would be 
interested in living elsewhere but want or need to stay near children. For example, Kyle 
says he’ll likely be in the area for the long-term because the mother of his first child plans 
to stay, and Kyle would never leave his son. 
Rural is more than a geographic designation; it also involves symbolic and 
cultural elements (Lichter and Brown 2011). There is an extensive literature on the 
concept of the rural idyll (Bell 2006; Mingay 2017; Shucksmith 2018), which The Oxford 
Dictionary of Human Geography defines as “an idealized, romanticized construct that 
presents rural areas as happier, healthier, and with fewer problems than urban areas” 
(Castree, Kitchin, and Rogers 2013). While there can be the tendency to idealize aspects 
of rural life, there is also the possibility that aspects of rural culture are different than 
urban. One value that emerged in these interviews was that of frugality and self-
sufficiency: there was a clear sense among many men in this study that they took pride in 
having simple tastes, making do with what they have, and living within their means.73 
Whether or not this rhetoric from the men in this study is actually true to their lives in all 
cases, the fact that this is part of the narrative of rural life is alone worth examination. To 
                                                 
73 While rugged individualism is part of the American myth (Beard 1931), a particular form of it stems 
from the American frontier past (Boatright 1941). For Boatright, the myth is the individualism, not the 
frontier. In his telling, frontier settlers were very much organized and mutually dependent, but their 
resourcefulness and self-reliance were often confused with individualism by historians. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, western Pennsylvania was once the colonial frontier, and the founding dates for many of these 
towns belie when colonists settled this area previously settled by various American Indian groups.  
245 
 
be fair, life in northwestern Pennsylvania has long been dependent upon a connection to 
the land in the form of gas, oil, and lumber extraction. As seen earlier in the chapter, 
hunting and fishing are almost ubiquitous leisure pursuits, evidenced in part by the fact 
that public schools train children in firearms safety and schools close for the first days of 
deer hunting season.  
For men up and down the wage scale, there is a measure of inconspicuous 
consumption where they seek to live simply and downplay the importance or necessity of 
luxury goods. Jeff, who makes a good living as a union carpenter, also knows that work 
is not always guaranteed and has seen colleagues run out of unemployment benefits while 
waiting for their next jobs, so he tries to live within his means: “I can have fun on the 
weekends, but not too-much-fun kind of things. There’s always that thing that’s just like 
could there be more, could there be something. You just kind of always get used to what 
you have.” Similarly, Wes, who also does relatively well in operations for a brewery, 
speaks of this simplicity: “We’re very simple. I get a birth—I get an ice cream cake for 
her [his wife] every year for her birthday and—but we don’t—we don’t buy dumb stuff.” 
Wes is also suspicious of those who violate these rules of inconspicuous consumption: “I 
see guys that make eight bucks an hour and they have $45,000 vehicles and… and then I 
find out wow, they just are really, really in debt and debt’s—debt’s I think our biggest 
fear.” For those with less resources, spending is even more modest, but there is a certain 
embrace of this forced simplicity. Jared, who once made good money long-haul truck 
driving but now lives on his disability check and his wife’s part-time income, describes 
their modest goals: 
But I mean like, I mean it, like I know it sounds stupid, but that’s actually a big 
goal for us, for the amount of money we make, you know. You know, I mean, it’s 
246 
 
just like we don’t set a goal like to go to the Bahamas, you know. We set a goal, I 
want a new Laz-E-Boy. Okay, let’s shoot for a year or two, you know, and stuff 
like that, you know. 
 
For some of the men, there is a connection between their contentment and their 
standard of living growing up. As Cherlin (2018) has suggested, people judge present 
circumstances less by their contemporaries and more by past generations. William grew 
up poor, so while he and his family live on less than $2,000 a month, he is grateful he can 
afford experiences his parents could not: 
Um, I think so because like I appreciate things a lot more and I cherish things a lot 
more.  Like the opportunities to take my kids to go and do stuff like, you know, 
I’ve taken my kids to professional football games, professional baseball games. 
Uh, we’ve gone and seen hockey, we’ve gone and seen professional basketball 
games. Um, we’ve gotten to meet players and we’ve gotten to get autographs and 
pictures taken and um with some pretty famous people. So, I mean it’s... and I 
appreciate that more and I cherish that more ‘cause I knew like I didn’t... like 
these are the things like my Dad wanted to do for me but couldn’t, you know? 
And so now I’m getting to do it now for my kids. 
 
In the words of some men, the praise of simplicity can also sound like a critique 
of consumerism and even capitalism. Greg, who runs a small business, sounds several of 
these notes in his monologue: 
I mean, you need your essentials and you need your food and water and, and um, 
a roof over your head. I mean and the air that God already provides for us. You 
don’t need that much, and people just... and they, they buy shit just to lock it up in 
their house. You know, like, it’s senseless. To be honest with you, money is just 
you need it, but you need it to live because obviously at the end of the year, you 
gotta pay your taxes for you to be in America or whatever, you know what I 
mean? So, you need it, but I just think too many people are going to, to be 
blindsided by the dollar signs and wanting to try and make more. And it starting 
to ruin our, our big picture of our world. 
 
For some, like Thomas, the simplicity—and his contentment in general—has 
roots in his religious faith: 
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It’s not money. It’s not income. It’s not the government. It’s not finances. It’s not 
where you’re at. It’s love, man. Jesus will show you true love, and true love is the 
most important thing. You can prevail in any situation. If you’re eating snails 
every day, as long as you got love and Jesus, you’ll be fine. Paul was incarcerated 
and wrote all the New Testament. He might not have been happy, but he had joy 
in his heart, you know? That was the whole debate like I had at Bible study. To 
have a joyful heart. Don’t sweat the petty. If I could give myself advice, that 
would be it. I’ve done so many things out of anger in my life, and out of raw 
emotion out of things that were stupid. When you live past that season, and you 
look back, it wasn’t even a big deal. You were stressing about that, dude? 
Honestly, just enjoy the time you have and keep Jesus number one. ‘Cause if I 
would of did that, I would be a lot further ahead in my life in a lot of areas than I 
am now. I wouldn’t have a lot of the blessings that I have now either. Through 
suffering you gain. Nobody gains anything without suffering. I mean it’s a catch 
twenty-two, you know what I mean? A testimony of blood and lamb. That’s 
where it’s at. So, without suffering... I don’t know. I would have to say love. Jesus 
Christ. Keep him number one. That’s would I have to say. Absolutely. 
 
 
Rooted in Whiteness  
Concern with social cohesion, especially in a rapidly changing world, goes back 
to the earliest days of sociology. In The Division of Labor in Society, first published in 
1893, Durkheim (2014) argued that it is the task of society to “put a stop to… anomie, 
and to find ways of harmonious co-operation between those organs that clash 
discordantly together” (340). He contrasted two types of social solidarity: mechanical 
solidarity, or solidarity by similarities, and organic solidarity, or the solidarity arising 
from the division of labor. Similarly, Tönnies (2017) wrote in 1887 of the differences 
between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society), in which social ties can 
be contrasted as personal (Gemeinschaft) or impersonal (Gesellschaft). Historically, 
social theorists have identified rural place as being more characteristic of mechanical 
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solidarity, Gemeinschaft, and other descriptions that emphasize close, in-person, personal 
ties grounded in similarities (for a brief review, see Albrecht and Albrecht 1996).74  
At least in northwestern Pennsylvania, which is predominantly white, one 
unspoken aspect of rural identity and solidarity is whiteness. The long-standing 
conflation of rurality and whiteness has been maintained by racially-exclusive 
constructions of rural living (Holloway 2007), whether in the form of the rural idyll 
discussed earlier or what is sometimes called rural white imaginaries, meaning “the 
romanticized pure white rural of colonial history” (Cairns 2013).75 When rural people 
describe rural place as friendly and tight-knit, this is often predicated on these racially-
exclusive understandings of rural place. In places where the sense of community has been 
challenged by the presence of black or brown bodies, scholars have documented hostility 
of the white majority and the intensive boundary work by the minority groups to fit into 
existing conceptions of the rural white imaginary. In rural Australia, Edgeworth (2015) 
finds that discourses of rural whiteness facilitate exclusion of resettled refugees where 
black bodies are cast as “out of place”. And recent work among Latino immigrants in 
rural Arkansas finds that the newcomers seek to fit in through hard work and 
neighborliness, explicitly setting themselves in contrast to “white trash” residents (Hallett 
2012), thus playing on class cleavages. Further, both Silva (2013) and Cherlin (2014) 
write in detail about the racial barriers that remain within the working class, including the 
deep-seated and long-running animosity of white workers toward African Americans.  
                                                 
74 Albrecht and Albrecht (1996) also discuss the convergence of many rural-urban indicators over time, 
perhaps diminishing the salience of this binary. In particular, they argue that many of these differences 
previously seen as rural/urban are better understood as farm/non-farm. 




Respondents in this study are ninety-five percent white, which is roughly in line 
with the demographics of the area. Men were not asked explicitly about race and few 
volunteered thoughts on the topic, so there is little that is explicit to glean from the 
interviews. Because northwestern Pennsylvania is a predominantly white space, it is safe 
to assume that at least some of the racially-exclusionary tactics present in other rural, 
white places are present there. I did not ask about racial attitudes of the men in this study, 
but as a baseline, research around the 2016 election shows while most white, working-
class people are conservative on a range of issues, there is small group of white, working-
class liberals and a much larger group of white, working-class moderates—about 35 
percent of the white, working-class total—who display more racial openness than white, 
working-class conservatives (Molyneux 2017). My experience in the field and deep 
connections to the area attest that individuals in this area are heterogeneous in their racial 
attitudes. However, regardless of the views of individuals, the persistence of pervasive 
yet subtle modern manifestations of racism still pervade American society (Bonilla-Silva 
2006; DiAngelo 2018), rural and urban alike. The United States is what Robert Chang 
(2017) calls a racial state, which he defines as a nation that “has allocated rights, duties, 
privileges, and material wealth based on race” (4). Even in the absence of much data 
from the interviews about race, it is safe to assume the existence of complex, racialized 
attitudes and social structures. 
Concern about the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in northwestern 
Pennsylvania was conspicuously absent in the interviews. As discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, in one of the rare cases in which “diversity” was raised in an interview, Nick 
equated it with “craziness” in the context of discussing city life: 
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I said, it’s not even Pittsburgh. I said it’s a whole new ballgame because those are 
the things that I never knew because I almost feel sheltered growing up in this 
town. There’s not enough diversity in this town that would show you remotely 
close to what’s out there in this world…. Craziness can be out there, and you have 
absolutely no idea. 
 
But Zach, who has mixed-race children, sees the lack of diversity through the 
eyes of his children. He says he would move to find a place with more diversity: “There’s 
not enough diversity, and with three of our kids being mixed race, it’s… it would be nice 
to have them in a community where they felt a little more welcomed, I guess.” He 
continues: 
… you could tell how awkward it was for them to be out in the community 
because everywhere they went it was just white people, and you would go to 
Walmart and people would be staring at you, and yeah, you really get a sense of 
what they go through so. If we had the opportunity to expose them to more 
diverse communities, we probably would. 
 
 
Rooted in Family 
Finally, many of these men are rooted in family life. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, about one-quarter of the men in this study are single, have never been married, 
and have no children; almost one-third have traditional family structure, meaning the men 
are either married and childless or married with children born within the marriage; and 
the remaining forty percent are in complex families. Cherlin (2014) has documented the 
fall of the working-class family from 1975-2010, a time in which the family formation 
patterns of the college-educated diverged from those with less than a college degree. The 
college-educated marry, have children after marriage, and are unlikely to divorce; those 
with less than a college degree also delay marriage, but they increasingly have children 
before marriage, often in cohabiting unions that are fragile. Claiming that men in this 
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study are rooted in family life is not a refutation of these broader trends, and the fact 
remains that the modal family structure in this study is nontraditional. Yet through the 
interviews and time spent with these men, it is clear that family matters, even when men 
sometimes fail in their responsibilities, which is in line with other treatments of low-
income fathers (Edin and Nelson 2013). Less surprising that family matters to these 
working-class men is the way in which they find identity in their roles and husbands and 
fathers, which is in contrast to the picture of earlier generations of more austere 
breadwinning men who often provided financially but not emotionally. In general, there 
is a salience of partnerships, children, and marriage among the men in this study that 
stands out from other samples of working-class men (see Edin et al. 2019). 
Among the men who are single, never married, and with no children, they are 
navigating employment precarity on their own. Only two of the sixteen men in this 
category have good jobs (see Chapter 4), and both men are outliers in the sense they are 
still single and childless in their 40s. Most of the men in this group are precariously 
employed in low-wage work, and many have had trouble maintaining labor force 
attachment. Some of the men are under 25 and still finding their ways in the world, but 
many are in their late twenties and even thirties and still having trouble finding their 
footing. It could be the case that the lack of employment security and the low wages 
among this group makes them less attractive to potential partners; none of these men are 
cohabiting, and only three of the sixteen were dating at the time of the interview. Some of 
these men have generative pursuits, like the ones discussed earlier, but a number of them 
do not. As a group, these men have tenuous attachments to work, family, and religion, 
making them most like those profiled in other recent work about working-class men 
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(Edin et al. 2019). There is reason to be concerned about the outcomes of these men, 
although as a note of caution, other men in the sample looked similarly adrift in their 
twenties and thirties only to find their employment and relational footing in their thirties 
or beyond. This tendency of men needing family to spur them vocationally is consistent 
with other treatments of family formation among low-income populations (Edin and 
Kefalas 2007). 
Because secure work is elusive for most men, forming families is not a “cure” for 
labor market precarity. For those in marriages and partnerships, there is most often a 
household-level livelihood strategy, marking a return to a previous mode of family life 
that predates the male breadwinner model (Cherlin 2014) and consistent with the 
movement of many women into the labor force during the last half of the twentieth 
century. Of the forty men in the study currently with a partner or spouse, thirty-one of 
those women are working full- or part-time. Two of the forty partners or spouses receive 
SSDI, which brings resources into the household in a different way. Only seven of the 
forty partners are not working, and of those, two are unemployed but looking for work. In 
almost all cases of men with working partners, the man makes more or equivalent to their 
partners, although it is not uncommon for men to be out of work and have their spouse or 
partner be the sole breadwinner for a time. As discussed in Chapter 2, most spells of 
nonparticipation are not permanent, so men usually resume earning at some point. 
In a few cases, remnants of the male breadwinner model remain in form, but the 
men are often careful to state that it is the choice of the wife not to work, not something 
imposed by him. Jacob makes a comfortable living in law enforcement, which has 
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allowed his wife to be home for the kids and pursue her hobbies. He describes this as the 
preferred arrangement between them: 
No, my wife is an at-home mom. This was an agreement we made years ago. She 
wanted to be an at-home mom, and I said, “Well, if I can get a good enough job 
where you live comfortable”, and I have no problem with that. Um, because then, 
every day when the girls come home, they’re always, there’s always one of us 
there. Now me, oh wait a minute, let me change that, her, not me, is into farming, 
I guess, is the word I want to say. Whenever I say farmer, I think of cows and 
doing, um, sewing oats and out in the fields, no no no, we have a farm, this is her, 
not me. I just look at her pay and I have to pay for it all, but we have a, we have 
over a hundred animals, or she does; I have one cat. Um, yeah, she grew, she was, 
she always grew up with horses and chickens and that, so we’ve got horses, 
chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, sheep, rabbits, cats, dog, fish. She just got 
peacocks. Um, she’s trying to get a license for a zebra now. Yeah, like I said, I 
just a person who live there. I have a cat. We have eight cats. 
 
But what counts as enough income to allow a partner or wife to stay home varies. 
William, who brings in a little under $2,000 a month from disability and a pension, and 
his wife determined that he brings in enough to allow his wife to stay home:  
She used to work. She was a cook down at the VFW, but she left that position. 
Um, and she just really just realized that, you know, she doesn’t need to. So, it 
was getting to be more stress and more politics and BS than she wanted to put up 
with, so she was like, “if I don’t have to put up with it, I’m not gonna.” And so, 
since she left that position that opened me up to go to school so. 
 
His wife staying home with the kids, which William had been doing, allowed him to use 
his GI Bill to pursue his college degree. 
While arrangements like William’s do not represent a total breakdown of 
traditional gender roles around tasks like caregiving, there is a sense that the rigidity of 
certain roles has eroded. Ryan and his partner capture this negotiation of caregiving roles 
around who in the relationship has work at the moment. Ryan moved among several low-
wage jobs after he dropped out of high school. After working in a factory and then in 
manual labor, he moved on to telemarketing but was fired for swearing on a call. By this 
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point, he was living with his girlfriend, who was expecting their first child. He got a job 
that required some local travel, but he decided he would rather be home: 
After having a daughter, I’m like, “You know, I really need a job, but this is kinda 
neat, you know. I’m not gonna go back to it. I wanna, you know, spend two 
weeks to a month with my daughter anyways, growing up, you know. [The travel 
job] wasn’t a job for somebody who just had a kid anyways, being on the road a 
week at a time. So, I didn’t work there for a while… 
 
During this stretch of nonparticipation, Ryan’s girlfriend worked nights at a local 
restaurant, and he helped with his daughter: “With her working and I wasn’t working, we 
had somebody to sit with the kids, you know, the house stayed clean.” Ryan would 
sometimes take day labor, depending on the weather. This combination of his girlfriend’s 
work and his piecework made things manageable: “So, I mean, things worked. We got 
by. We were never rich.” Christian had a stretch of several years where he used his GI 
Bill to go back to school and care for the kids while hi wife had a good job, and George 
left the labor force for about a year to care for his daughters while his wife was the 
primary earner. 
While it might be expected that men and their partners would have to negotiate 
roles in response to a precarious labor market, men in this study also express how much 
they embrace their roles as husbands and fathers in a way that exposes an emotional 
vulnerability foreign to earlier generations of working-class men. Some men talked about 
ways they take on household tasks for their partners or wives. Justin, whose wife works a 
demanding job, has learned one way he can support her is to make dinner and give her 
space after work. He makes dinner with the help of his six-year old daughter, which also 
offers bonding time with her: 
So, we’ll come home, we’ll make dinner so that my wife doesn’t have to think 
when she gets home cause she’s been dealing with angry people all day on both 
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sides, so when she gets home, it’s kind of like her safe place, you know. She isn’t 
always the most polite when she gets home, but she’s dealing with a lot, so you 
know, you kind of grow to accept that. So, I just try to make sure she doesn't have 
to do much when she gets home if I can help it. 
 
Similarly, Jared, who is on disability but whose wife works, has taken over all the 
cooking duties, which is not a bad deal for her since he has culinary training. Many men 
mentioned how they do some household tasks. Kyle, for example, who works part-time at 
a grocery store, has charge of his infant son in the afternoon after he gets off work. He 
speaks in mundane terms of the daily routine, which includes his caring for his son and 
making dinner, and doing the evening routine: “Um, usually come home, take the 
babysitter back to her house, uh, come back, usually he’s ready for a nap around then, so 
I lay my son down for a nap. I’ll play a couple rounds of video games or something, um, 
wake him up, feed him lunch, make dinner, then go for a walk, and then you know, it’s 
bath time, bed time.” I did not ask men their ideal arrangements for work and home life, 
but recent work suggests that men and woman across the education and income levels 
prefer egalitarian arrangements but often find themselves lapsing into traditional roles 
under the constraints of real life (Pedulla and Thébaud 2015; Yavorsky, Dush, and 
Schoppe‐Sullivan 2015). Still, men have increased their contributions to care work and 
housework (Bianchi 2011), although they do less than they think (Pew Research Center 
2015). In some respects, the men in this study conform to these trends: gender roles have 
not flipped, but men are doing more than past generations. 
Perhaps the biggest change from past generations of working-class husbands and 
fathers is the way these men measure their success and happiness according to how they 
perform in these roles. Nick, profiled at the start of this chapter, says that he has lived a 
good life, and his ultimate concern is for his daughter, although he speaks in the 
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collective about “our kids”: “Like I said, I worry about our kids. That’s the biggest thing 
to me. Um, I don’t worry about getting retirement or like that. I’m not old by any means, 
but I’ve lived pretty good, many years and having my fun. I want to make sure that my 
daughter...right there.”  
Thomas, who is divorced and remarried and has joint custody of his three kids 
from his first marriage, views his happiness, not according to his earnings, but his 
relationships. He sums up the ways in which many of these men have pivoted from 
viewing success in monetary or material terms to relational:  
Like I said, it’s all that happiness category. What is happiness to me? I don’t 
know, man. I just want my kids to be happy. I want to give them everything I 
possibly can. As long as they’re happy, I’m happy. You know what I mean? Make 
my wife happy. Be the husband I’m supposed to be and the father I’m supposed to 




Willis' (1981) classic work on lives of working-class boys in England depicts 
white working-class youth as political actors, consciously resisting authority, even though 
it meant socially reproducing their working-class station in life. The picture of men in 
this study is one of contentment, not resistance.76 However, there is a sense in which the 
men in this study might be unwitting resistors by virtue of the way they have re-centered 
the role of formal work as a source of meaning an identity. Not only does the presence of 
vocational selves make these men different from men in other studies of the working 
class, it also makes them different from their more-educated, more-affluent peers, for 
                                                 
76 More about these men’s political views will be explored in Chapter 6. 
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whom workism (Thompson 2019) and burnout (Petersen 2019) are characteristic. In an 
important sense, the men in this study have done what the economist John Maynard 
Keynes predicted for his grandchildren in 1930 (Keynes 2010) and what contemporary 
observers have suggested would be good medicine for our over-worked culture 
(Thompson 2019): they have made work less central to their lives. 
 
Conclusion 
In a recent article, Halpin and Smith (2017) introduce the concept of employment 
management work (EMW), which they define as “a generic, lifelong project in which 
most adults (and many youth) engage—to varying degree, intensity, autonomy, depth, 
and breadth, and with varying resources—to manage their employment experiences” 
(340). This theoretical concept is meant to capture the real-world calculations and trade-
offs made by workers—from white-collar managers to migrant workers—as they 
navigate the labor market. They suggest that while EMW is not new, it might be more 
frequent and fraught in an employment landscape characterized by precarity, turnover, 
layoffs, and churn (Kalleberg 2018).  
In a sense, this chapter explores EMW among working-class men in rural 
Pennsylvania, particularly the evolution of working-class identity among men in the face 
of growing labor market precarity. First, I find that the nature of these men’s jobs shapes 
their ability to think about and plan for the future. For the minority of men in secure 
positions, particularly those with jobs that offer a clear retirement timeline, they think of 
the future in those terms. Moreover, some men even forego opportunities for promotion 
at work in favor of maintaining job security, a demonstration that job security, which is 
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elusive, is more prized by some than prestige or even income. But for the majority of men 
who do not have secure work, they have difficulty thinking and planning for the future, 
which reflects the insecure nature of their work. In this sense, thinking about the future is 
a luxury these men are not afforded.  
One way that most men in this study have responded to growing job insecurity is 
that they ask both more and less of work than working-class men profiled in other 
sociological literature. They ask more in the sense that men care about the nature of their 
work and are less willing to countenance work that is not personally fulfilling or at least 
tolerable, especially when it does not pay well enough to justify the conditions. But men 
also ask less of work in the sense that at least some men have deemphasized the role of 
work in their identities. Men still value work, but they also find meaning in other spheres 
like family, church, friendship, and hobbies. Rather than identity being centered around 
“the disciplined self” (Lamont 2000), I find that men have vocational selves (Edin et al. 
2019), where their truest identities come from non-work pursuits. Two of the few times 
during my interviews where men used their phones to show me pictures were instances of 
men showing me their hobbies: Steve showed me pictures of the dirt-track race cars he 
builds (an activity he does with his oldest son), and Mark showed me pictures of him 
fighting fires as part of a volunteer fire department.  
Also in contrast to other treatments of the working class, in which men are angry 
(Silva 2013) and rootless (Cherlin 2014), the men in this study display a high degree of 
contentment with their situations, which I attribute to a set of subcultural beliefs and 
practices rooted in rural place and rural masculinity. Connection to rural place is 
especially salient for these men, and many evince a masculinity rooted in working with 
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one’s hands, being outdoors, and earning your beer at the end of the day. One unspoken 
aspect of this rural rootedness is its whiteness, which offers an unspoken degree of social 
solidarity under the guise of friendliness and community.  
In sum, as the traditional markers of adulthood have moved out of reach of many 
in the working class (Silva 2013), this study shows that not all men have responded 
similarly, which contributes to deeper understanding of the EMW as conducted by 
different workers in different social, familial, and geographic settings. As Halpin and 
Smith (2017) write, the growing precarity of work “… gives greater urgency to the 
importance of studying how human beings—hoping and needing to support themselves 
and others and aspiring to a modicum of dignity and self-worth in their laboring 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
In many ways, working-class men in rural America are doing better than popular 
depictions of rural America suggest. Among the men in this study, most are attached to 
the labor force most of the time. Further, almost all men make above the minimum wage, 
and about one-third have “good” jobs that pay at least $15 an hour, in some cases much 
more. The men in this study also do more than people think to improve their labor market 
prospects, including seeking additional education and training, moving for work, or 
taking jobs that require travel. Many men have cultivated vocational selves, and in 
general, men are content, a function at least in part of being rooted in rural place and, in 
many cases, to their families. Yet these men also face many challenges: most men move 
in and out of work, often spending extended periods unemployed or even out of the labor 
force. Some men are trapped in low-wage work, and many more have wages that are 
“stuck” at a level that is barely enough to raise them or their families out of poverty. Most 
men lack work that provides hope of future security, any clear ladders of upward 
mobility, or personal meaning and identity. Further, many men have jobs that are 
physically demanding, and some men have mental or physical health challenges severe 
enough that they have qualified for disability benefits. Complex family structures that 
include strained relationships with partners and children are common. And some men, 
especially younger, single men, have tenuous attachments to work and family. What does 
this mean for assessing the state of working-class men in rural America today? 
In this chapter, I conclude this dissertation by first exploring what might be 
learned from these men as it pertains to the current political moment. It is difficult to 
mention the “white working class” in 2019 without acknowledging that Donald Trump 
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was elected President of the United States thanks in part to a wave of white, working-
class support (Cohn 2017). Having started the fieldwork for this project the summer 
before the 2016 election, I had the opportunity to ask some of these men about their 2016 
votes, and the picture that emerged is more complex than many analyses of the 2016 
election allow. Rather than finding full-throated support for Trump, I find that many men 
were conflicted about their votes and only reluctantly chose Trump because of an even 
deeper suspicion of Hilary Clinton as the status quo option (Francis 2018). Yet one 
dominant picture of men like the ones in the study is that they are angry (Kimmel 2017; 
Sexton 2017), so I explore how the men in this study express and channel their political 
and economic grievances to the degree they have them. While there is hope among some 
on the left that these men can be mobilized on the grounds of economic populism, I find 
that these men cling to a political populism that distrusts government more than 
economic elites. This is in keeping with Arlie Hochschild's (2016) recent work among the 
Tea Party in Louisiana where she uncovers a “deep story” among her respondents that 
sees government as the problem and not the solution. Starting with Hochschild and 
adding Coleman (1982), I offer a theoretical way forward from our current political 
moment that takes seriously the deepest commitments of both the conservative right and 
the liberal left. I conclude with a summary of this dissertation, the contributions this 
dissertation makes to knowledge, and suggestions for next steps in research about the 




Him, Not Her77 
In the mid-1980s, Lois Weis (1990) studied white, working-class identity 
formation in a northwestern American city. She anticipated that white, working-class 
men—who had poor job prospects and a diminished labor movement with which to 
connect—would attach to the New Right’s platform of sexism and racism. Thirty years 
later, Donald Trump played on sentiments of the white working class as victims of 
globalization (Lamont, Park, and Ayala‐Hurtado 2017) and won the presidency on a 
wave of white, working-class support (Cohn 2017). Trump’s success in white, working-
class places is striking: of the 660 counties in America that are at least 85% white with 
below median incomes (places predominantly in the upper Rockies, Midwest, and 
Appalachia), Clinton won just two (Gest 2017). Her husband, by contrast, won nearly 
half of such counties just twenty years earlier. Yet while there is evidence of increased 
white working-class turnout in key states in the 2016 election (Morgan and Lee 2018), 
the reasons behind this “Trump bump” are debated. The white working class have 
variously been depicted as economically dislocated (Sides and Tesler 2016); dismayed at 
their diminished fortunes relative to previous generations (Cherlin 2016; Gest 2016); 
resentful of urban elites (Cramer 2016); concerned about the end of white Christian 
America (Jones 2016) and the crumbling of the racial hierarchy (Bouie 2016); and 
grieved at the prospect of minority advancement (Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Tesler 
2016).  
                                                 
77 Results in this section have previously appeared in “Him, Not Her: Why Working-class White Men 
Reluctant about Trump Still Made Him President of the United States” (Francis 2018). 
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How do the men in this study fit into this narrative, especially given their relative 
contentment? The beginning of my fieldwork in the summer of 2016 coincided with the 
national party conventions and the lead up to the 2016 election. Policy and politics were 
not the focus of this study, and men were screened into the study based on age and 
working-class status, not anything related to politics or voting behavior. Yet little did I 
know at the outset of this project that Mr. Trump would go from campaign curiosity to 
Commander-in-Chief. When I returned to the field in January and March of 2017, I added 
questions about the election for my new respondents and re-contacted subjects from the 
summer to also ask them who they voted for and why. The results, published in 2018 
(Francis 2018), tell a more complex story than media narratives of white rage. A theme 
among the interviews was the reluctance about Trump. While some men appreciated 
Trump’s boldness, most also saw him as unpredictable and were wide-eyed about the 
risks Trump posed. Dustin thought Trump “could be a disaster.” Greg, said Trump 
“might not be the best president,” adding that “he, he freaks me out a little bit… .” Zach 
described Trump as “a showman and celebrity and an antagonizer more than a bringer of 
peace.” William, a veteran, simply called Trump unqualified. And Jacob, a law 
enforcement officer, wished Trump weren’t the nominee. Yet despite the stated 
reluctance, most who voted still chose Trump, with Clinton and Johnson garnering 
minimal support. Why the votes for Trump? 
The answer I found was simple: in short, for them, Clinton was worse. Clinton, 
despite being the first female nominee of a major political party, was seen by these men 
as an entrenched politician and the status quo option. But more than that, these men did 
not like or trust her. For some, it had a basis in her policies or politics. Several men, 
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especially veterans, were troubled by the email server situation, and a few brought up 
other policy matters, such as one veteran who was concerned about military funding. Yet 
for many of the men, their critiques of her veered—whether subtly or sometimes more 
overtly—into sexism. Of course, it is not sexist to criticize a female candidate, and I want 
to be careful to be fair to these men’s stated reasons for not considering Clinton. Yet it 
was hard to escape the outsized sense of distrust of her that seemed to go beyond her 
policies and politics. Critiques went from the understated, like “I just didn’t believe her,” 
to the overt: “I don’t like how she looks, acts in public: her persona.” 
While some men in this group would have never considered any Democrat, 
Clinton or otherwise, many of these men had voted for Obama or other Democrats in the 
past and were genuinely conflicted about their vote. I identified four types of voters 
among my cases: first timers, those who had never previously voted but who did so to 
support Trump; Republican base voters, those who had varied thoughts about Trump but 
were unlikely to have supported any Democratic candidate, Clinton or otherwise; 
conflicted voters—about half of likely voters—who struggled with the voting decision 
but ultimately broke mostly for Trump because of their dislike of Clinton; and nonvoters, 
many of whom had opinions about the election and the candidates, but who either never 
considered voting or did not follow through for a variety of reasons.  
In the end, I think the overriding message from these men was clear: anyone but 
Clinton, even Trump. It was a choice, as one Trump voter told me, “between a douche 
and a turd sandwich.” While some men resolved this dilemma by not voting or voting for 
a third-party candidate, most ultimately held their nose and chose Trump as the lesser of 
two evils. This is not to say Trump had no appeal: the men who were motivated enough 
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to vote for the first time in support of Trump clearly liked Trump’s line on things like 
trade and immigration, although even those men acknowledged that Trump was a bit of a 
wild card who might not work out. Trump’s main appeal seemed to be his status as a 
political outsider, and men seemed to take the approach that trying something 
unconventional was worth it, especially if the alternative was a conventional politician. 
As law enforcement officer Sean said, “I felt like, if Hillary was gonna be in there, 
nothing was gonna change… somebody that was non-politician should be given an 
opportunity. I wish it wasn’t Donald Trump, but he was the only one there.” Had there 
been a Democratic nominee even remotely acceptable in the eyes of these men, some 
nonvoters would have voted, some third-party voters would have supported the 
Democrat, and several of the Trump voters would have defected. In fact, many of the 
Trump voters indicated they would have voted for Sanders or at least considered doing 
so. If nothing else, these findings cast some doubt on explanations for Trump’s large 
margins among working-class white men that rely primarily on Trump’s appeal, whether 
his personality or his policies, without much consideration for his opponent. While the 
move of the white working-class to the Republican Party has been on-going for decades, 
perhaps some of Trump’s margin among the white working-class was due to Clinton’s 
presence, not attraction to Trump. 
 
Which Populism? 
A prominent depiction of the working class, especially in the wake of the election 
of Trump, is one of angry white men (Kimmel 2017; Sexton 2017). Yet given the fact 
that many men in this study did not vote at all or were reluctant in their support for 
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Trump, an avenue opens for a different discussion about the political proclivities and 
fortunes of the white, working class. Several men in this study said explicitly they would 
have voted for Bernie Sanders had he been the nominee, which some might construe as 
support for Sanders’ message of economic populism. Indeed, given the levels of 
economic precarity and wage stagnation experienced by many of these men, one might 
expect to find more agitation for change. For Silva's (2013) working-class respondents, 
instead of funneling their grievance outward, they turn inward to take control of the one 
thing they can, namely their own psychological selves.  
How do the men in this study respond? As explored in Chapter 5, these men 
display a degree of contentment and acceptance of their circumstances not present in 
other recent treatments of the working class, but this is not mutually exclusive with 
grievance or political engagement. While men have learned to make do—in part out of a 
rugged individualism born of the “frontier” experience of rural place—they were not shy 
about offering criticism of their jobs, employers, or the economy. Many have faced 
unkind, unethical, and even illegal treatment at work. How do men interpret and channel 
these grievances? 
For the most part, men in this study did not connect their employment situations 
to a broader critique of prevailing economic or political systems. However, their political 
views often emerged in other portions of the interview, especially when I asked them 
what advice they would give to our political leaders. Some men took a humble approach 
to that question, suggesting they would not know what to say. Dan, a general laborer, said 
as much: “Oh geez, I don’t know what it would be, I mean, I’m not an economist or 
anything like that. I don’t know what solutions, or what you could do to improve the 
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situation at all.” He mused that we could “… start investing in, uh, battery powered cars. 
[Laughs] And making lithium batteries, I guess. I don’t know.” Other men were more 
opinionated. Justin, for example, lit up when asked what advice he would give to our 
elected leaders:  
Oh, my goodness. What I would actually just ask any of them to do is just to back 
off. Stop making laws. Just stop making laws. We actually seem to judge the 
effectiveness of a leader by how many new laws they created and never just the 
fact that all these frivolous laws are the stinking problem. They really are. You 
can try to make another law to improve someone’s life, when in reality—if you 
just stop criminalizing everything they do—then their quality of life is already 
improved. 
 
Justin’s comments capture the libertarian ethos that characterizes the views of 
many men in the study. While men would like higher wages, they also want the 
government to take less in taxes—from them and from businesses. The government is 
rarely seen in a positive light, and to the degree men mentioned the government, it 
concerned ways the government had intruded on valued aspects of their lives or the 
economy: through gun control; through regulations on extractive industries and small 
businesses; through taxes that are too high; and even by removing prayer from schools. 
Most men rhetorically supported programs to help the poor, especially women and 
children, but there was also a sense that “welfare” was being taken advantage of and 
more people needed to work. Some men’s families had used some safety net programs at 
times, but men generally resisted receiving government assistance out of a sense of pride 
and self-reliance, at least when it came in the form of “welfare” programs.78 Steve, who is 
                                                 
78 As Sherman's (2009) work shows, there is a hierarchy of the moral acceptability of low-income and 
government programs in rural places. “Welfare” is at the bottom, which seems true among these men, 
although so few people actually receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in the year after 
welfare reform (Edin and Shaefer 2015). The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is more 
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currently unemployed and whose wife receives disability benefits, framed his support for 
Trump around this issue: “‘Cause he’s [Trump’s] talking about a lot of these people that 
live off of welfare and stuff like that, he’s going to give them the boot and tell them 
they’ve got to go to work.” However, the libertarian bent among many of these men 
sometimes led them to positions that transgress Republican Party orthodoxy, such as 
questioning American military involvements. In fact, the most often cited policy 
suggestions among these men was the legalization of marijuana.79  
                                                 
common among these men and their families, although it is also stigmatized. The Special Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is more tolerated. The receipt of disability 
benefits is an interesting case: there is suspicion among some men about the deservingness of some who 
receive it, but because it requires a work history, it is more acceptable in general than other types of 
assistance. As discussed in Chapter 2, unemployment insurance—as an earned benefit—is not seen in the 
same category as these other programs and often plays an integral role in the social safety net for these 
men. 
79 Although a full accounting of these men’s views on policy is beyond the scope this chapter, the men had 
a collection of views that would not conform neatly to the policy positions of the political right or left. This 
“hodge-podge” of ideas is exemplified by this exchange with Mark, who works second shift at a factory: 
 
Mark:  Make all the rich people pay higher taxes, and poor people pay less taxes. 
 
Interviewer:   Yeah? 
 
Mark:   And people that don’t have a job, would be lookin’ for a job because they won’t be 
getting’ no  
government support. 
 
Interviewer:   Yeah. Sounds pretty straight forward. 
 
Mark:   I’d give ‘em medical, but that’s all they could get. 
 
Interviewer: Okay. Medical, no cash. 
 
Mark:   There’s no cash, there’s no food stamps, there’s none of that. 
 
Interviewer:   Yeah. What if someone wasn’t able to work? 
 
Mark:   There’s always work out there. 
269 
 
If there was anger expressed in the context of discussing policy or politics, it was 
directed at the political system. Jacob, who works in law enforcement and is a member of 
a public sector union, still directs his anger at “government”: 
I just don’t like Washington at all. I work for the government, but I don’t like the 
government at all. I’m not an... I’m not an anarchist, but you can look at it if you 
follow politics at all, it just isn’t what it was 50 years ago. It’s more of a very 
corrupt, self-centered... well, how can you take this amount of money here, put it 
into our pocket but when things aren’t getting done, blame the middle class and 
say it’s something that they have done is why this money is being wasted, but yet 
our pensions are going to be stuffed in our own pockets, we’ll be taken care of. 
It’s corrupt. 
 
Brad, a recovered opioid addict who receives disability from a back injury at work, 
seethes at the political establishment. Asked why he did not vote in 2016, he replied: 
‘Cause I hate politics. It’s just... if you have enough money you can become 
president and that is true. Doesn’t matter how many bad things you do, you are 
just going to become president. And that’s not how America used to be. I mean, 
Richard Nixon gets impeached for hiding things, and now look at the people who 
are running for president, become president. 
 
How does this libertarian ethos and distrust of government square with the near-
support among many of these men for Sanders in 2016? To understand this apparent 
incongruity, one helpful distinction is between what Guy Molyneux (2017) calls 
economic and political populism. According to Molyneux, Sanders and Elizabeth Warren 
represent an economic populism in which “the bad guys are the wealthy, corporations, 
and CEOs—with a special place in hell reserved for Wall Street.” While Trump taps into 
some of the same grievances among the working class as Sanders and Warren, Trump has 
a fundamentally different diagnosis of the root of the problem: it is a “failure of 
government” (emphasis his) in which people have been betrayed by political elites. 
Molyneux suggests that while most debate about the election of Trump has been 
concerned with weighing the relative contributions of economic despair and racial 
270 
 
resentment among the white, working class, the most underappreciated aspect of Trump’s 
victory is a distrust of government that has been decades in the making. This is in line 
with the evidence from the men in this study, who distrust government more than 
corporations. To the degree these men considered Sanders, it was as an outsider candidate 
and alternative to Trump, not as one who precisely articulated their preferred strain of 
populism. 
But what about the role of unions in tethering the working classes to the 
Democratic Party (Rosenfeld 2014)? While private sector union saturation is in the single 
digits, some men in this study still have the types of unionized, blue-collar work that 
could direct their political affections and keep them attached to the Democratic Party. Yet 
as we saw with Jacob above, the men in this study do not naturally connect their union 
membership with a loyalty to the Democratic Party. In general, men in this study have 
mixed feelings about unions, even for men who benefit from union wages, benefits, and 
protections. Jacob, himself a member of a public sector union, says that Wisconsin 
Governor Scott Walker’s assault on public-sector unions got him into politics: “...it was 
actually Scott Walker that got me watching politics. I never cared about it. Now I’m so 
obsessed to it.” But rather than his “obsession” translating into Democratic loyalty, he is 
disgusted with the whole political system and thinks the best thing an elected official can 
do is steer clear of both parties: 
My advice... no matter what the topic was, um, don’t listen to a Democrat or a 
Republican. Don’t, um, don’t because they’re looking at... their answers are 
always gonna be for what’s best for their, uh, their interest and stuff like that. Um, 
he needs to actually talk to people that are not politicians. Just start bouncing 





Jeff, a union carpenter, sounds very similar notes when he reflects on the state of 
the economy and his own union. He says it is the government and welfare spending that 
is “pulverizing” the middle class, not corporations: “I feel like the middle class is getting 
pulverized by the government, um, by the poverty level class.” He evinces a deep 
suspicion of those receiving government assistance: 
So, I mean, it’s just like there are people that can get free cell phones, they can get 
free food, they can get just about anything. I read something, I don’t know how 
true it is, but sometimes people that work the system can make out better than the 
people that actually work and support the system. When you add up all the 
benefits, all the housing and all this and all that. It’s enough to piss you off ‘cause 
it’s just like sometimes I feel like I can barely, if I get a hospital bill, it’s just like 
oh, or something that I know I need to pay or it will affect my credit or whatever. 
I just feel like it’s almost hard enough to keep your head above the water. 
 
While Jeff is concerned that Pennsylvania may soon become a Right-to-Work state, he 
also has little faith in the integrity of his union for reasons that he leaves unclear:  
They want to make, um, PA a Ready-to-Work state. If that goes into effect, then 
I’m going to be working with other people that—and be making half of what I 
make now maybe, I mean, maybe not. But, you know, the whole union idea, even 
politics inside the union, like they used to stand for good things, but I just don’t 
know how they can be so un-things you know. I guess where there’s power, 
there’s corruption. 
 
Seth, who is unionized and works for a manufacturer, speaks more warmly about 
his union than Jeff. Seth spoke at some length about the most recent contract 
negotiations, and he showed a fluency with the workings of his union and his many 
benefits derived from his membership: 
If my union dues went up, it would not bother me because of the security that I 
have. You know, I’m gonna have, for employee, next year will be my seventh full 
year, I’m gonna have three full weeks paid vacation, five sick days, all the 
benefits that I have. Like insurance for a single guy is six bucks a week. Guys 




But Seth also speaks to the fact that not all unions are created equal. He says he knows of 
some men who would like to vote out their unions: 
Well, I got some other buddies that work for some union shops, and they would 
like to vote it out because they don’t think that they’re getting the short end of the 
stick. But it all depends on your bargaining unit and what deal you cut, this and 
that, just like anything, you know. 
 
Sean, who works in law enforcement, is part of a workplace that made that very 
decision. In fact, he was the union representative for a time, and in his experience with 
negotiations, he found the union unconcerned about the needs of his men and ineffective: 
And, uh, it was a struggle. Yeah, they, the union was weak. Um, we’d go to 
negotiations and, um, we’d be six months in the negotiations and, uh, the union, 
um, lady would say, “What do you guys do again?” And I’m like, “Wait, what do 
you mean, ‘what do we do again?’” You know, just, she just wanted the contract 
signed. And I’m like, “Listen, no. I’m, you know, I’m here for half of our office,” 
you know. I’m tryin’ to fight wages, or fight that we have, and it wasn’t ridiculous 
wages, it was just, like, we have a dangerous job. 
 
Although Sean talked about progress won in negotiations over time, he said that 
eventually they decided the union was not worth it: “So, you know, it came a long way, 
but then, um, the union was just, like, you know, they were suckin’ the money out of each 
pay, and nothing was goin’ on. Nothing was getting’ any better. So, the, the deputies on 
their own decided we, we want out.” Sean admits that being part of the union had benefits 
(“… it does have its benefits to, to wages and, and equipment and, you know, other 
benefits and stuff”), but he also is skeptical of the role of unions in protecting jobs. 
Overall, he sees unions as a mixed bag: 
… I guess my, my opinion about a union is, um, it has its goods and bads, but my 
opinion is, if you’re worried, it shouldn’t be about, you shouldn’t be worried 
about, “Well, they’ll protect me if I get fired,” or, well, you shouldn’t worry about 
that. Just come to work and do your job and work your best. You shouldn’t need 
somebody to protect ya, nobody’s gonna let you go if you’re doin’ what you’re 




Sean isn’t the only man in the study to be part of a union that is judged as 
ineffectual. Phil, the male nurse who is part of a union, equivocates on the value of his 
union: “Pros and cons to it.” Although Phil has worked at the hospital for seven years, he 
knew very little about his union until the latest collective bargaining agreement, which 
some workers found lacking: 
Um, no one ever really educated me on why or what the union really does. Um, 
and they just came out with a new collective bargaining agreement like in the past 
month or two, and a lot of us were not really big fans of, like, they raised our 
health insurance deductibles a lot and we got, um, like every department—
because every position, not just nursing, is union, like dietary’s union, 
housekeeping’s union, maintenance is union—it’s all the same union. Um, so like, 
they got two percent pay increase across the board, which is basically cost of 
living increase. Um, and then nursing an additional two percent on top of that. 
Nobody else did, but nursing did, so that was kind of good for me. Um, but they 
really jacked up our deductible, so by the time you factor that in, like if me and 
my family, we meet our deductible this year, probably didn’t really get that much 
of a raise. 
 
One side effect of the dissatisfaction with the new contract was increased involvement by 
Phil and many others: 
Um, so they are just things in the most recent CBA—collective bargaining 
agreement—that a lot of us didn’t like, so um, they just had a union meeting 
yesterday and a bunch of us went. There were like thirty-six people there, and the 
union board were like, “Usually it’s just like three of us and no one really shows 
up.” 
 
The meeting gave Phil and others the chance to ask questions. One unintended 
consequence of the new CBA might be a reinvigoration of the union: 
So there hasn’t been a lot of communication between the union and us as union 
members. I was kind of asking them, like I said, “I’ve been here seven years, and 
no one’s ever invited me to a meeting.” I know that’s kind of my responsibility to 
figure out if I want to be involved, but at the same time, like you would think, you 
know, if you’re a union to represent us, you would think. So like, right now, the 
only way they like advertise their meeting times, they’ll post a blank white piece 
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of paper with black text on it on a bulletin board, which there’s so papers on a 
bulletin board, that by the time you notice it, it’s probably over anyway.  
 
So, I was like, “Don’t you guys send out emails? Don’t you have like a Facebook 
group or something like that?” And they were just kind of like, “This is the way 
we’ve always done it.” The president of the union there, she’s probably like in her 
mid-to-late sixties. She’s probably been working there for years, so it’s just been 
kind of something that turned into just, like uh, it’s always been there and nobody 
asks questions, so it’s kind of funny then because we’re—the dynamics of our 
time changing and a bunch of people are suddenly interested cause we kind of got 
a bad agreement, so like everyone’s really interested in them now. 
 
While it is difficult to know if these men are characteristic of union members writ large, 
their mixed experiences and opinions about the value of unions is a troubling sign for the 
unions that hope to direct these men’s political energy toward the party that is more likely 
to protect collective bargaining and support organized labor. 
  
Deep Stories 
A series of studies have attempted to unpack the fact that many poor and working-
class whites support the Republican Party (for one such attempt that includes a review of 
previous literature, see Prasad et al. 2009), something that has long vexed many in the 
academy, who view this support as against the self-interest of the working class. One of 
the most notable such efforts is by Arlie Hochschild, who seized upon her confoundment 
at the Tea Party to venture into Louisiana in an effort to breech the “empathy wall” and 
understand a tribe different from her own, a journey she recounts in Strangers in Their 
Own Land (Hochschild 2016). Among her central findings is the discovery of what she 
calls a “deep story,” a narrative that transcends facts to reveal the “subjective prism” 
(2016: 137, emphasis hers) through which her subjects make sense of the world. The 
deep story for her Tea Party respondents involves waiting in a long line that is being 
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cut—by “[w]omen, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers” (2016: 137)—all with 
the help of government, as they then fall further behind. The deep story, according to 
Hochschild, helps explain how—from the perspective of the liberal left—the animus that 
these men and women should direct toward Big Oil is instead channeled toward the line 
cutters, and ultimately, the government enabling them. However, in a less-discussed 
portion of the book, Hochschild suggests that the liberal left has its own deep story that 
revolves around the benefits of government in building a public square: 
In it, people stand around a large public square inside of which are creative 
science museums for kids, public art and theater programs, libraries, schools—a 
state-of-the-art public infrastructure available for use by all. They are fiercely 
proud of it. Some of them built it. Outsiders can join those standing around the 
square, since a lot of people who are insiders now were outsiders in the past; 
incorporation and acceptance of difference feel like American values represented 
in the Statue of Liberty. But in the liberal deep story, an alarming event occurs; 
marauders invade the public square, recklessly dismantle it, and selfishly steal 
away bricks and concrete chunks from the public buildings at its center. Seeing 
insult added to injury, those guarding the public square watch helplessly as those 
who’ve dismantled it construct private McMansions with the same bricks and 
pieces of concrete, privatizing the public realm (Hochschild 2016:235-36). 
 
The two deep stories Hochschild identifies turn on whether one sees the state as 
an actor for good or ill, which reflects the long-running, deep-seated trench warfare 
between the political right and left in the United States about the size of government 
(Teles 2013). The antipathy for government among the political right is long-running, and 
the response of the liberal left has often been to defend the role of government, a tactic 
typified by the statement of President Obama during the 2012 campaign, “If you’ve got a 
business—you didn’t build that”, which was an attempt to speak to the often taken-for-
granted infrastructure and even rule-of-law necessary for any small business to thrive. 
However, such lines of argument are rarely persuasive, for as we see among the men in 
this study, government is—at best—a necessary evil. There have been recent attempts to 
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bridge this divide between the political right and left, including one notable effort by the 
Niskanen Center (Lindsey et al. 2018), in which both markets and governments are 
rehabilitated. As the authors of a new Niskanen Center report write, an effort is needed 
“… that sees government and market not as either-or antagonists, but as necessary 
complements” (Lindsey et al. 2018: 3).  
While any contribution is welcome that seeks common ground in a polarized 
time, I suggest that most attempts to bridge our political divide fall short because of a 
failure to take seriously the deep stories of both the conservative right and liberal left. In 
the remainder of this section, I draw upon James Coleman’s work, The Asymmetric 
Society (1982), to offer a way forward in what the Niskanen Center rightly calls “an age 
of extremes” (Lindsey et al. 2018). 
 
Coleman’s Framework 
In 1982, sociologist James Coleman wrote a slim and prescient book called The 
Asymmetrical Society. He suggested that society is composed of two kinds of persons: 
natural persons, individuals like you and me, and corporate actors, which broadly 
understood are agglomerations of people into entities that are greater than the sum of the 
natural persons of which they are composed. Corporate actors for Coleman were 
primarily corporations, entities that had evolved over time to have their own legal rights 
independent from any single person, like a CEO, or even any group of people, like the 
Board of Directors or the employees.80 As seen in Figure 1, these two types of entities—
                                                 
80 This point is expanded upon in We, The Corporations (Winkler 2018). 
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natural persons and corporate actors—can have three types of interactions: natural person 
with natural person, corporate actor with corporate actor, and natural person with 
corporate actor. The first and second types of interaction are worthy of investigation, but 
Coleman was especially concerned with the last type. He diagnosed something that is all 
the much clearer now than it was when he wrote, namely that the interaction of a natural 
person and corporate actor is not a meeting of equals. It is, indeed, the crucial 
“asymmetry” that defines our asymmetric society. 
 
Figure 6.1: Coleman’s Matrix of Object-Subject Interactions 
 
 
This asymmetry between natural persons and corporate actors is of no small 
consequence, as corporate actors—by virtue of their size and power—pose great risk to 
natural persons. In particular, Coleman identifies four types of risk that corporate actors 
pose to natural persons. First, there is a risk to customers, which Coleman calls an FDA-
type risk, where natural persons can be harmed by consuming the product of a corporate 
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actor since any individual cannot inspect products for their safety. Customers are put at 
risk if a corporate actor sells contaminated meat, exploding cell phones, or cars with 
faulty air bags. The second type of risk a corporate actor poses to a natural person is what 
Coleman calls the OSHA-type risk, namely the risk to employees. A single employee, 
especially one who wants to keep their job, is at a disadvantage if a corporate actor has 
that employee working in unsafe conditions or performing unsafe tasks. Third, corporate 
actors pose a risk to natural persons as neighbors, or what Coleman dubs an EPA-type 
risk. A corporate actor that pollutes a stream or causes an oil spill creates risk to that 
corporate actor’s neighbors, whether or not those natural persons are customers or 
employees, yet any of those individual neighbors has little ability to hold the corporate 
actor accountable not to pollute his or her neighborhood. One need not be a direct 
customer or even an employee of a corporate actor and still be affected by this type of 
risk. Finally, corporate actors pose an Agent Orange-type risk, which is a risk more 
broadly distributed to all citizens.   
Not only do corporate actors pose multiple risks to natural persons, Coleman 
describes why it is exceedingly difficult for natural persons to hold corporate actors 
accountable for these risks. Corporate actors are larger and more powerful than natural 
persons, and thus can easily resist them. Further, the differentiation in structure of 
corporate actors also makes redress by natural persons more difficult, if not impossible. 
Likewise, the diffusion and deflection of responsibility in a highly differentiated 
corporate structure makes accountability hard to apply, as was the case after the financial 
crisis. And finally, the only constraints on the behavior of a corporate actors are external 
because there is no internalization of norms by corporate actors. The only norm of a 
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corporate actor is to maximize profits, not to protect natural persons. It might be “good 
business” not to make one’s customers sick or pollute the stream in a town whose 
compliance a corporate actor needs, but in this sense, any minimization of risk to natural 
persons is inadvertent. If circumstances changed such that profits could be increased only 
if risk is also increased, there are no corporate norms to interfere there is when a natural 
person thinks better. In short, there is no corporate conscience.  
 
Fallacies of the Modern Right and Left 
Coleman’s analysis of corporate actors is even more poignant today than when it 
was written, yet his typology—to be fully applicable—is incomplete because he fails to 
adequately distinguish among different types of corporate actors. Corporate actors for 
Coleman were primarily corporations, entities that had evolved over time to have their 
own legal rights independent from any single person or even any group of people (also 
see Winkler 2018). Coleman acknowledges that corporate actors are not merely 
corporations, but he does not incorporate this into his schema. On one hand, he writes of 
the risk governments can pose to natural persons, yet he also speaks of the government’s 
regulatory role in mediating the risks of some corporate actors toward some classes of 
natural persons. At one point he calls the state “that one large and most powerful 
corporate actor” (1982:90), yet he fails to disentangle it from for-profit corporations in 
his risk assessment. Thus, Coleman under-develops the implications for natural persons 
of the actions of other corporate actors in society, most importantly the state. 
If Coleman’s primary framework of natural persons and corporate actors is 
amended to include the state as a corporate actor, it creates a framework within which to 
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make sense of American politics over the last half century. As mentioned, American 
politics in recent decades has been a tug-of-war between over the role of government: 
Statism on the Left and Marketism on the Right. Applying this revision of Coleman’s 
framework to the modern political landscape, I argue that the deep stories of the 
conservative right and the liberal left each commit a fallacy by only considering the risks 
of one type of corporate actor. The conservative right is guilty of what I term the 
Libertarian Fallacy, ignoring or minimizing the risks to natural persons posed by 
corporations while emphasizing risks posed to natural persons by the state. The liberal 
left is prey to what I call the Socialist Fallacy, namely emphasizing the risks posed to 
natural persons by corporations while not taking seriously the risks to natural persons 
posed by the state. Both positions fail to take seriously the ways in which concentrated 
power, whether in the form of corporations or the state, can oppress natural persons, 
especially non-dominant groups. Coleman’s frame of seeing relations in terms of 
corporate actors and natural persons allows us to take the deep story of the right and left 
seriously, especially each story’s critique of power . In doing so, it offers a way forward 
that does not require convincing the right or the left that their deep story is false. 
For those shaped by the deep story of the conservative right, the main concern is 
state power. As illustrated above, this comes in many forms for the men in this study, 
including gun control, regulations perceived to hurt industries vital to the local economy, 
and state encroachment on religious expression, or conversely, state failure to protect the 
unborn. Further, these men evince a rugged individualism and frontier spirit in which 
government assistance in the form of social programs is seen as violating norms of self-
sufficiency and responsibility for one’s family. Support for the party that is at least 
281 
 
rhetorically supportive of small government is consistent with many of these men’s 
deepest values. The liberal left’s tact with those on the right is often to either draw out 
inconsistencies (“Keep your government hands off my Medicare!”) or rehabilitate the 
role of government (“You didn’t build that!”), yet this fails to take seriously the ways in 
which government represents a form of corporate power that even the left should have 
cause to question. Some risks posed by the state to natural persons are relatively benign, 
such as the bureaucratic inconvenience of the DMV or the US Postal Service. But other 
ways in which the state, whether at the local, state, or federal level, abuses its power often 
draws more concern from the left, such as the Flint water crisis. Indeed, the liberal left 
has its own inconsistencies in its approach to government. As Hochschild’s deep story on 
the left suggests, the left is comfortable extolling the virtues of public goods in the form 
of museums and parks, but omitted from this story are the ways the liberal left often 
critiques the state, such as in its imperialism, militarism, and police brutality, which are 
all carried out by appendages of the state. There are also the many ways in which social 
policy, while often well-intended, has worked out to harm the very populations it was 
meant to assist, the history of housing policy being a prime example.81 This is not to 
mention that public goods the left extols might be less visible, viable, or even available in 
places that are already disadvantaged. In this reading, the deep stories of the right and left 
are correct but incomplete: the Libertarian and Socialist Fallacies concern the ways in 
which the right and the left should expand their deep stories to encompass others types of 
                                                 
81 As has been well-documented (Hirsch 2009; Massey and Denton 1993; Rothstein 2017), the state has 
played an integral role in sustaining, reinforcing, and even deepening social inequality through its housing 
policy. More broadly, many social policies—even ones that were colorblind on their face—were often 
implemented in ways that further disadvantaged non-dominant groups, especially African Americans 
(Coates 2014; Katznelson 2005). 
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corporate risk. Rather than asking the right and left to nullify each other’s deepest 
concerns, this approach keeps each deep story in tact yet asks each to expand its 
fundamental concerns to other realm of corporate power.  
 
Mitigating Corporate Risk 
While the Coleman framework of seeing the world in terms of corporate actors 
and natural persons exposes fallacies in the deep stories of the right and left, it also 
presents the opportunity for a first principle that unites both stories, namely a concern for 
the liberty of natural persons from coercion of corporate actors. Both the right and the left 
can agree—in keeping with their deep stories—that the power of corporate actors should 
be moderated. For the right, the main concern is the state, while for the left, it is 
corporations. The proper binary, however, is not between the state on one hand and 
corporations on the other, but between what Jeffrey Stout (2010) terms domination and 
non-domination. As the deep stories of the right and the left attest, natural persons can be 
harmed—dominated in Stout’s terminology—by any corporate power, whether the state 
or corporations. Societal relations should be analyzed according to power, and as 
Coleman notes, natural persons are in an asymmetric relationship with corporate actors. 
For Stout, the important question is one of accountability; as he writes, “power minus 
accountability equals domination” (2010: 63). The deep stories of the right and left can 
be united by setting the liberty of natural persons as a first principle, not the primacy of 
one type of corporate power over another. In this reformulation, the opposite of tyranny is 
not liberty but accountability. The left and right can unite around the judgment of any 
given societal arrangement according to whether natural persons are free from 
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unreasonable coercion and have recourse to hold corporate actors—whether corporations 
or the state—accountable in cases of abuse. Perhaps the men in this study would be 
receptive to voices from the left that recast corporate dominance in terms of the 
infringement on personal liberty and are mindful of the ways that state power can be seen 
by some subjects as equally intrusive as that of any corporate actor. 
 
Summary82 
A constellation of events over the past few years has brought working-class men 
in rural America out of the shadows and into the national spotlight. The 
methamphetamine and opioid crises, which have devasted some rural places, have made 
national headlines. In 2015, work by the economists Ann Case and Angus Deaton broke 
through to mainstream audiences when they found evidence of an increase in midlife 
mortality among non-Hispanic, white Americans, which the researchers attributed in part 
to so-called “deaths of despair”: alcohol, drugs, and suicide (Case and Deaton 2015). And 
of course, the election of Donald Trump has raised the profile of predominantly white, 
working-class, rural places even higher. Given the increased attention to the white, 
working class in the wake of the 2016 presidential election and the likelihood this group 
will be of even greater interest in the lead up to the 2020 election, there is perhaps no 
better time for scholarly attention to white, working-class men in rural America. This 
dissertation, based upon life history interviews with 61 working-class men from 
                                                 
82 The first paragraph of the Summary is adapted from ”White Poor, Black Poor: Untangling Structure and 
Culture” (Francis 2017). 
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northwestern Pennsylvania, seeks to better understand the current state of working-class 
men in rural America today. 
The narrow empirical phenomenon that animated the early stages of this 
dissertation is the declining labor force participation rate among prime-age, working-
class men, which is near its lowest point on record and has generated concern among 
scholars and policymakers. While virtually all the men in this study were in the labor 
force at the time of the interview, a closer examination of their lifetime labor force 
histories finds that most men have experienced at least one period of nonwork. In fact, 
almost half of the men have had at least one spell outside the labor force of a year or 
more. The picture that emerges is one of what I term chronic churning, a phenomenon in 
which men leave the labor force for extended periods but almost always return and often 
persist in formal employment. As to why men make these extended labor force exits to 
begin with, the qualitative data allow me to set these men’s decisions to leave the labor 
force in context. I find that the four reasons men leave the labor force are 1) to pursue 
education or training; 2) struggles with substance abuse; 3) the receipt of disability 
benefits; and 4) what I term elective nonparticipation, which are periods of labor force 
dropout where men elect to leave the labor force for a time. Most elective 
nonparticipators show a relatively high degree of labor force attachment, and most often 
return to the formal labor force sooner or later. A final group of men, about ten percent of 
the total, are who I call marginal men, who have tenuous attachments to the labor force 
over time. These men tend to be younger, unmarried, and childless, thus resembling the 
popular depiction of nonworking men, although the exact reasons why these men have 
forsaken formal work vary. 
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While interest in labor force dropout launched this dissertation, the fact that most 
men in the study have worked most of time allowed for other avenues of inquiry into the 
labor force experience of working-class men. While much has been written about the 
divergence in labor force outcomes between those with and without a college degree, a 
common refrain from observers and even some scholars questions why men with such 
poor prospects are not doing more to improve their labor market outcomes. With the 
benefit of life history interviews, this dissertation can not only examine the steps men 
have—or have not—taken to improve their prospects, but it can present how men 
understand the choices they make. The evidence presented in this dissertation shows that 
men are often doing more to improve their labor market position than outcome-based 
accounts allow. First, a majority of men in this study have pursued some sort of 
postsecondary education or training. Second, despite evidence that Americans in general 
are moving less for work (Austin et al. 2018; Ganong and Shoag 2017), the men in this 
study often took one of a set of what I call mobility measures to improve their labor 
market opportunities, such as enlisting in the military, taking jobs that require travel, or 
moving away for brief periods on what I call prospecting trips in which men move 
without a job in search of better opportunities. I also find that men who attempt a mobility 
measure are usually drawn back to the area by several factors, including the “stickiness” 
of rural place and obligations to custodial and noncustodial children. Finally, I find that 
while few men have worked nontraditional jobs, many more have considered such jobs 
and even taken preliminary steps toward such work.  
Having a range of cases in this study also allows for internal comparison, such as 
between those who have “good jobs” that pay at least $15 an hour, and those who don’t. 
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Almost one-third of the men in the study have good jobs, including a dozen men who 
earn an effective hourly rate of at least $25. For the men in good jobs, I identify three 
themes among their jobs: they are mostly in traditional, blue-collar occupations and 
industries; they tend to be unionized; and many of the jobs are professional or 
managerial. In many cases, it is a combination of these factors that makes a real 
difference in earnings. But while many men in the study had good jobs, a majority of the 
men did not. Some of the men once had good jobs but no longer do, while others have 
never managed to navigate their way into higher-paying work. While some of the men’s 
wages have been perennially low, more common among the men are those whose wages 
seem to stall between $10 and $15 an hour in what I call bad(ish) jobs. These jobs are not 
the most poorly paid, but they generally lack opportunities for predictable advancement 
or assurance of measurable wage gains over time. I identify four dynamics of this lower-
wage labor market: 1) the job carousel, in which men move laterally among jobs that pay 
comparably but struggle to find opportunities to advance; 2) chutes and ladders, which 
describes the fact that there is often not a clear-line path of wage improvement, as almost 
half of men at one point made more than they currently do; 3) the steel ceiling, the 
working-class version of the glass ceiling, in which men find their wages stagnating, even 
after years of service to the same employer; and 4) not management material, the fact that 
some men desire advancement but are deemed not to be suitable managers by their 
employers, often compelling men to make lateral moves to other occupations or 
industries. A final group of men make up what I call the downwardly mobile, which are 
those with greater earning power who have chosen not to use it or those whose hourly 
wages are not reflective of their true labor market position. 
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Given the many changes in working-class work for men who have come of age in 
the twenty-first century, what has happened to working-class male identity? For the 
minority of men in secure positions, particularly those with jobs that offer a clear 
retirement timeline, they think of the future in those terms. Moreover, some men even 
forego opportunities for promotion at work in favor of maintaining job security, a 
demonstration that job security, which is elusive, is more prized than prestige or even 
income. But for those who do not have secure work, which is a majority of the men, they 
have difficulty thinking and planning for the future, which reflects the insecure nature of 
their work. In this sense, thinking about the future is a luxury these men are not afforded.  
Job insecurity, in turn, affects the relationship of work and identity, causing men 
to ask both more and less of work. They ask more in the sense that men care about the 
nature of their work and are less willing to countenance work that is not personally 
fulfilling or at least tolerable, especially when it does not pay well enough to justify the 
conditions. But men also ask less of work in the sense that many men have deemphasized 
the role of work in their identities. Rather than identity being centered around “the 
disciplined self” (Lamont 2000), I find that men have what I call vocational selves, in 
which they find meaning and fulfillment in non-work pursuits. In the face of often 
meaningless and poorly paid work, men have elevated other aspects of their lives as 
sources of meaning and satisfaction. Asking both more and less of work are two sides of 
the same coin: they both imply less commitment and attachment to one’s job.  
A unique feature of the men in this study, especially in contrast to other recent 
profiles of the working class, is their contentment, which I attribute to a set of subcultural 
beliefs and practices grounded in rural masculinity. This identity is deeply connected to 
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rural place and rooted in working with one’s hands, being outdoors for work and leisure, 
and having autonomy. Rather than “stuck” in rural America (Florida 2019), the men in 
this study strongly identify with what they see as the virtues of rural life, challenges and 
all, which provides refuge from the vicissitudes of labor market precarity. Yet while these 
beliefs provide a sense of contentment, but they also constrain how men approach work. 
For example, the aversion to working for a boss in supervised, indoor settings limits 
opportunities; seeing urban spaces as unsafe makes them non-starters for relocation; and 
masculinity as expressed in practical, hands-on skill can evoke a distrust of higher 
education or even an anti-intellectual ethos. Construed positively, this sense of rural 
masculinity provides a meaningful connection to place. Further, one unspoken aspect of 
this rural rootedness is its whiteness, which offers an unspoken and often unexamined 
sense of social solidarity.  
Finally, any treatment of the white, working-class in 2019 must touch upon the 
implications for politics. In talking with these men about the 2016 election, which 
occurred early in the dissertation fieldwork, there was almost universal reluctance about 
Trump, which stands in contrast to depictions of white, working-class men as “true 
believers”. (It is also noteworthy than half of the men did not vote at all.) In fact, about 
half of likely voters were conflicted about their vote, although most still ultimately voted 
for Trump, largely because Hillary Clinton was an even more unacceptable choice. 
Several men said they would have voted for Bernie Sanders had he been the nominee, 
and the degree of hesitation about Trump suggests a softness in their support for him that 
is contingent on how Trump performs. While these findings might give hope to those on 
the political left who want to build a coalition on a message of economic populism, the 
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nature of these men’s grievances is more in line with what Molyneux (2017) calls 
political populism, which is a distrust of political—but not economic—elites.  
 
Contributions to Knowledge 
This dissertation touches upon of several sociological subfields: the sociology of 
work; the sociology of gender; poverty, inequality and mobility; and rural sociology. It 
also addresses two phenomena—the declining labor force participation rate and the 
election of Donald Trump—that have largely been in the purview of economists and 
political scientists, respectively. Concerning the sociology of work, this dissertation 
stands in a long line of work about the working class, offering an updated picture of the 
labor force experiences of working-class men. This dissertation documents the 
considerable structural constraints that confront men without a college degree, including 
a lower-wage labor market that offers few clear-line paths of wage improvement or 
advancement and a wage ceiling that leaves most men short of a living wage. These 
constraints result in labor force patterns where men often make lateral moves to other 
occupations or industries and even churn in and out of the labor force completely. Paired 
with these structural constraints, there is also a set of subcultural beliefs and practices in 
this part of the country that shape and constrain how men approach work. This identity is 
deeply connected to rural place and rooted in working with one’s hands, being outdoors 
for work and leisure, and having autonomy. While these beliefs are adaptive, which is 
touched upon more below, there are also ways in which they constrain how men 
approach work. The aversion to working for a boss in supervised, indoor settings; seeing 
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urban spaces as unsafe; and a distrust of higher education can all limit certain labor 
market opportunities.  
This dissertation also contributes to sociology of gender in its examination of the 
evolution of working-class masculinity. Perhaps the central finding of the dissertation 
concerns how these men have responded to the changed world of work by de-centering 
the role of formal work in their identities through the formation of vocational selves. 
With work that is neither well-paid nor fulfilling, these men have looked elsewhere for 
meaning, often to hobbies and sometimes to relationships and community or religious 
involvements. And in contrast to other recent studies of the working class (Cherlin 2014; 
Silva 2013), the men in this study display a high degree of contentment with their 
situations, which is rooted in kind of rural masculinity. Rather than “stuck” in rural 
America (Florida 2019), the men in this study strongly identify with what they see as the 
virtues of rural life, challenges and all, which provides refuge from the vicissitudes of 
labor market precarity. And rather than something to be transcended, they also embrace 
their working-class identities, even at a time when there are fewer opportunities to 
actualize this identity in the formal labor market. 
Additionally, this dissertation explores how these men approach traditionally 
female-dominated occupations and industries. While few men have worked in 
traditionally female-dominated occupations, evidence from this study indicates that men 
have considered such jobs and have even taken preliminary steps toward them, even if 
they end up not following through. These findings suggest that we may be closer to a 
tipping point with some occupations than occupational data suggest. This said, the few 
men in this study who are in female-dominated occupations testify to some resistance 
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from family and peers, indicating that certain cultural barriers remain entrenched, perhaps 
particularly in rural America, where a type of “country boy” masculinity is more 
pronounced (Campbell et al. 2006). Additionally, given the remaining cultural cost for 
some men to switch careers and the availability of at least some traditional work that pays 
well, it may take even more time and decimation of less-skilled, male-dominated 
occupations to push more men into female-dominated jobs. 
This dissertation also contributes to the sociology of poverty, inequality and 
mobility by examining the social mobility strategies of these men, uncovering 
misunderstandings about why working-class men adopt—or fail to adopt—the labor force 
improvement strategies they do. Rather than seeing pursuing additional education or 
training in purely market-based terms as means to improve their labor market positions, 
many men use education and training as a way to explore vocational interests at a time of 
life when many of their college-going peers are doing the same and in a world without a 
dominant local employer that obviates vocational exploration. Some men do not have the 
opportunity for such exploration, as life circumstances expedite entry into the labor 
market or their own choices limit opportunities for vocational exploration. Additionally, 
these men see education as a means to an end, not an end in itself: pursuit of education is 
most often to gain a practical skill or trade that can be transferred in an immediate and 
obvious way to the labor market, something especially true in rural places where formal 
educational credentials are sometimes less valuable than personal trust and practical 
knowledge. Further, looking only at out-of-state moves is too limiting when trying to 
understand the ways in which men use geographic mobility to improve their labor market 
prospects, such as enlisting in the military and taking jobs that require travel, such as 
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long-haul truck driving or itinerant work crews. And by examining the men who have 
managed to do well, this dissertation also contributes to understanding of some of the 
pathways of mobility that remain. And by centering this work in rural place, this 
dissertation also contributes to rural sociology, adding to a long history of qualitative 
studies of the poor and working-class in rural places (Carr and Kefalas 2009; Duncan 
1992, 2014; Fitchen 1991, 1995; Sherman 2009). Rural America is not homogenous, but 
it does face unique challenges when compared with urban and suburban places. As 
described above, attachment to rural place and a form of rural masculinity each play 
important roles in the lives of rural, working-class men.    
Finally, this dissertation addresses two issues that have largely been studying 
within other disciplines. The declining labor force participation rate among prime-age 
men has been the territory of economists, but this dissertation seeks to add to this 
literature through an exploration of this phenomenon using qualitative methods. While 
there is evidence of men moving in and out of the labor force in the shorter term 
(Coglianese 2017), the discovery among these men of chronic churning contributes a 
unique explanation of what may be contributing to increased rates of nonparticipation in 
the labor force. The existence of chronic churning also suggests that even long bouts of 
nonparticipation are not permanent, and men who have such spells outside the labor force 
have not lost their desire to work. It also challenges the implicit notion that workers and 
nonworkers are relatively fixed categories that are stable over time and pushes back 
against analyses that have reified these survey categorizations of “worker” and 
“nonworker” into de facto social classes with qualitative commonalties. And although 
policy and politics was not part of the original research design, the serendipity of being in 
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the field before and after the 2016 election thrust the election of Donald Trump onto the 
study. Many studies from political scientists and some sociologists have sought to 
understand votes for Trump. Many analyses start with the election choice—a vote for 
Trump—and then correlate it with surveys of racial and economic attitudes. This 
dissertation, by asking men who they voted for and why, allows men to craft their own 
narratives about their vote. The finding of reluctant support for Trump is meaningful for 
at least two reasons. First, it opens the possibility that some white, working-class 
people—including some Trump voters—are within reach for those who hold out any 
hope of building interracial coalitions of poor and working-class people. Second, it 
creates a counter-narrative to the popular sentiments that all white, working-class people 
voted for Trump, and they did so out of racial animus. In a recent opinion piece in The 
New York Times, Kentucky-based writer Robert Gipe writes, “Sexism and racism have 
played a significant role in the voting habits of some of my neighbors. So has anger. So 
have conservative religious beliefs. But that isn’t just in Appalachia. That’s what’s 
happened in America” (Gipe 2019). 
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
This study has several limitations. First, conducting the project in an area that is 
virtually all white precludes the data from speaking to the situation of working-class 
African Americans and other racial and ethnic groups who have faced well-documented 
barriers to employment that even disadvantaged whites have not faced. This may limit the 
applicability of the conclusions to all working-class men, but it opens the door for other 
studies that examine the labor force experience of men of other racial and ethnic 
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backgrounds in rural place and beyond. Further, the lack of a comparison site for this 
study—whether urban, suburban, or another rural location—makes certain types of 
inference difficult. The decision to focus on rural America was born of the interests of the 
researcher and the time and resource expenditures involved in a multi-site project. It is 
my hope that other scholars will pursue these questions in other locations or across 
multiple sites to provide studies against which this study can be evaluated. Next, by only 
talking with men, there is a risk of getting one side of the conversation when it comes to 
family and household matters.83 Men might be inclined to favor their version of events, 
while partners and spouses might have differing opinions. (Partners and spouses were 
present for a few interviews, but nothing close to a majority.) Future stages of this project 
might include the involvement of partners and spouses. Finally, only including workers 
and not employers might limit the perspectives of the local labor market. To understand 
the employment situation of the region, the pilot study proposed the inclusion of a small 
number of interviews with local employers in businesses or industries likely to hire men 
with less than a college degree. Interviews with five employers were conducted, and 
employers were asked about the types of positions in their business, hiring practices, the 
availability of qualified candidates, retention of employees, and other challenges of 
maintaining a workforce. Data from those interviews largely confirmed common wisdom 
among employers, namely that good workers are hard to find and that issues with 
                                                 
83 One version of this project proposed following-up with all men at least six months after the initial 
interviews and then conducting full interviews with any men who had a change in employment status since 
the initial interview. These follow-ups were to include any partner or spouse to remedy the limitation of 
only having one side of the household story. Due to the accelerated timeline of the project, this phase was 




nonwork are due to characteristics of men themselves, not employers or the labor market. 
Understanding the relational nature of any potentially exploitative arrangement is 
important (Desmond 2016), and future work about the working-class should consider the 
often hidden role of employers. 
This dissertation sheds light on one corner of the twenty-first century labor force, 
that of rural, white, working-class men. Given the changing nature of working-class work 
and the likelihood of even greater disruption of the working classes due to automation 
and other forces, understanding the labor force choices of working-class men is 
imperative for the future of workers and the nation. By presenting these men’s 
understandings and experiences of work, this dissertation hopefully moves us closer to 
finding ways to support all poor and working-class people.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Interview Guide 
 
Background and Neighborhood 
 
1. Tell me the story of your life. 
 
2. Tell me about your family. (Get ages of all family members.) 
 
3. Who all lives here?   
a. Let’s start with the adults. (If extra adults not mentioned above, get ages 
and relationship to respondent.) 
b. How about the kids? (If extra kids not mentioned above, get ages and 
relationship to respondent.)   
c. What about people who live here part of the time, not all of the time?  (If 
part time residents not mentioned above, get ages. Probe as to how often 
and for what duration.) 
 
4. What was it like for you growing up? 
 
5. Tell me about your parents’ educational background. (Probe for highest level of 
schooling completed.) Tell me about how they made a living?  (Probe for 
mother’s job and father’s job while respondent was living at home.) 
 
6. How would you describe your standard of living while growing up? 
 
7. Tell me the whole story of how you came to live in this area. 
 





9. Tell me all about your situation right now. (Probe for work status, type, hours, 
and/or whether in school and what kind of program.) 
 
10. Walk me through a typical day for you. (Probe for times waking, eating, sleeping, 
traveling, working, etc. Ask about routines and how they vary.) 
 
11. What about the situation of the other adults in the house? (Probe for work status, 
type, hours, and/or whether in school and what kind of program.) 
 
12. What about the situation of the kids? (Probe for whether in school, what grade, 
whether working, how they arrange childcare, where the kids are in care, other 




Work History and Labor Force Participation 
 
13. Now I’d like to talk in more detail about your work history. What was your first 
job? (Probe for how they got the job, wage rate, hours, benefits, duties, bosses, 
job tenure, reason for leaving, satisfaction with the job. Continue to next job until 
every job has been covered.) 
 
14. Are you currently working? (If yes, use probes for #13 about the current job. If 
not, ask the probes below.) 
a. Do you currently want a job, either full or part time? 
b. Have you been doing anything to find work during the last 4 weeks? (If 
so, what are all of the things you have done to find work during the last 4 
weeks? If not, what is the main reason you have not been looking for 
work?) 
c. Last week, could you have started a job if one had been offered? 
 
15. Have you ever had periods in the past when you were not working? What were 
the reasons why you were not working? How did you support yourself during that 
time? 
 
16. Have you made money in any ways we haven’t discussed? (Probe for off-the-
books work, odds jobs, etc.) 
 
17. How does your job compare with your friends’ jobs? 
 
18. Have your jobs matched your skills and experience? What other kinds of jobs do 
you think you could get with your skills and experience? 
 
19. What would be your ideal job? (Probe for schedule, wages, working conditions, 
type of work.) 
 
20. Are there any jobs around here you would not do, even if one was offered to you? 




21. What are your main expenses in a typical month? (Probe for housing, utilities, 
transportation, food, schooling and child care, phone/cable/internet, medical, 
alcohol/cigarettes, special occasions.) 
 
22. How did you spend your last paycheck? (Probe for expenditures in detail, trying 
to nail down what the money was spent for, when it was spent, and why it was 




23. Tell me about your other sources of income. (Probe for income from informal 
jobs, and transfer programs.) 
 
24. Do you pay child support? How much? Is this by court order? 
 
25. What about your partner? Tell me a little bit about the jobs she has right now. 
(Probe more in depth for wage rates, hours, benefits, duties and job tenure.) Tell 
me about any other jobs they’ve had in the past few years. (Probe in depth for 
wage rate, hours, benefits, duties, and job tenure). 
 
26. What about other adults in the household? How much do they earn? How much to 
they contribute to the household expenses each month? 
 
27. What about anyone outside the household that helps you out financially on a 
regular basis? Do you have to pay them back? (Who, how much, how often?)   
 
28. Do you receive any government programs or benefits? What about the others in 
the household? Are there any government programs that you could apply to for 
assistance, but don't? 
 




30. What do you think your situation will be like 5 years from now? What about 10 
years? (Probe for expectations for asset accumulation, adult work and school 
status, and for child work and school status. If kids are projected to go to college, 
probe for how respondent plans to pay for it). 
 
31. If you had to give advice to yourself when you were 16, what would you say? 
 
32. If the president were to ask your advice on how to improve job opportunities, 
what would you tell him? 
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